The dialectic of conscience within Hegel's philosophy of right by Jennings, Sarah
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/34558
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
  
The Dialectic of Conscience within Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right 
 
 
by 
 
 
Sarah Jennings 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement 
for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
July 2010 
 2 
 
Contents  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
4 
List of Abbreviations  
 
 
5 
Introduction 
 
 
6 
Chapter I  
 
The Truly Free Will and Abstract Right 
 
 
10 
Chapter II 
 
Morality, the Good and Duty 
 
 
31 
Chapter III  
 
Moral Conscience and Evil 
 
 
49 
Chapter IV 
 
The Aufhebung from Moral Conscience to the True Conscience of Ethical Life 
 
 
78 
Chapter V 
 
True Conscience within Ethical Life 
 
 
110 
Chapter VI 
 
True Conscience within the Legislative Power 
 
 
134 
Conclusion  
 
 
170 
Bibliography 
 
174 
 3 
 
 
 
With thanks to Professor Stephen Houlgate, 
Professor Ludwig Siep, The Arts and Humanities 
Research Council and The German Academic 
Exchange Service 
 4 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the dialectic of conscience within Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right. It aims to show that Hegel provides a fundamental role for 
conscience within the state and, thus, that Hegel preserves the right to subjective 
freedom within ethical life. In doing so, it aims to unite divided opinion on the role of 
conscience within Hegel’s political philosophy and to further disarm the charge that 
Hegel’s state advocates repressive or authoritarian political structures.  
 
In order to pursue this argument, this thesis first examines the emergence of conscience 
within the morality section of the text. It presents the moral conscience as the fruition of 
subjective freedom; as possessing the right to produce its own convictions and 
determine for itself what is good. However, it then continues to highlight the necessarily 
formal nature of the moral conscience and claims that, because of this formality, the 
content of conscience is always contingent. As such, the moral conscience is always in 
danger of willing evil; and it is precisely this danger that necessitates the move into 
ethics. The moral conscience is sublated by the true, ethical conscience.  
 
This thesis presents its own reading of the Aufhebung from the moral conscience to the 
true conscience of ethical life, which it believes properly reflects the dialectical 
progression of freedom within the text. It argues that, during the process of Aufhebung, 
the essential moments of moral conscience are retained and only the negative aspects 
are lost. In particular, it claims that conscience’s right to produce its own convictions 
(and, thus, the right to subjective freedom) is preserved within ethical life, but that the 
contingency of conscience is not. As such, true conscience (unlike the moral 
conscience) wills the good both in and for itself. This does not mean that true 
conscience cannot make mistakes. But it does entail that true conscience cannot put its 
own convictions beyond criticism. For this reason, this thesis also maintains that the 
formal conscience of morality, in its non-aufgehoben form, has no place within the 
ethical realm. 
 
This thesis locates true conscience’s function in the disparity between the actual and the 
existing state. It argues that, in recognising the rational principles inherent in society 
and by transforming the existing world to conform more faithfully to these principles, 
true conscience plays an essential role in keeping the state in line with its own, rational 
essence. However, it also maintains that this type of immanent critique extends only to 
reform, and not to not radical, social criticism. The thesis concludes by describing true 
conscience’s role in the legislative power. 
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Introduction 
 
Thanks to the recent work of philosophers such as Allen Wood, Paul Franco, Frederick 
Neuhouser, Stephen Houlgate and Allen Patten, who identify Hegel’s political 
philosophy as a philosophy of freedom, the notorious charge against Hegel – that he 
advocates an authoritarian political state – is now, by and large, refuted.1 At present, it 
is widely acknowledged that Hegel’s state is based on freedom, and does not comprise 
repressive or totalitarian structures. As such, the infamous charge of authoritarianism, 
made by Rudolf Haym, Karl Popper and Ernst Tugendhat (among others), is, more or 
less, overturned in current Hegel scholarship.2 However, even though this defence of 
Hegel has been generally successful, it remains incomplete, since there is still 
considerable disagreement about the role of conscience within Hegel’s state. Even 
though Hegel’s philosophy is widely accepted as a philosophy of freedom, it is often 
claimed that Hegel allows insufficient room for moral reflection within the political 
sphere.3 Therefore, it could still be argued that Hegel’s state does not fully respect the 
right of subjective freedom. For this reason, there is still more to say in response to the 
initial charge of authoritarianism. Conscience was, after all, an integral part of the 
original objection. In his book, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Tugendhat 
writes that, within the state, “the particular conscience of the individual must disappear” 
and, in his book, The Open Society and its Critics, Popper maintains that Hegel finds it 
necessary to “argue against the morality of conscience” (1986:315-6/1945:67). These 
                                                 
1
 Allen Wood [1990], Paul Franco [1999], Frederick Neuhouser [2000], Stephen Houlgate [1991], Allen 
Patten [1999]  
2
 Karl Popper [1945:67], Rudolf Haym [1962:375-6], Ernst Tugendhat [1986:315] 
3
 J. N. Findlay [1958:317], Sidney Hook [1970b:97], Dudley Knowles [2002:282] 
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specific accusations remain valid. In order to refute these claims, we have to 
demonstrate that conscience fulfils an irreducible and meaningful function within 
Hegel’s state. It is only by doing so that we can complete Hegel’s defence against the 
charge of authoritarianism.  
I believe the key to understanding the dialectic of conscience in the Philosophy 
of Right is to examine what happens to conscience during the Aufhebung of morality 
into ethical life. Conscience first emerges in morality, where it represents an essential 
moment of subjective freedom: the ability to produce its own convictions and to 
determine for itself what is good. However, with the transition into ethical life, the good 
ceases to be something purely subjective. Instead, it adopts a customary and objective 
nature; being ethical, for Hegel, involves affirming the rational, objective institutions of 
one’s society. It could be assumed, therefore, that the type of ethical state Hegel 
describes is simply incompatible with the notion of conscience.4 This leads some 
commentators to conclude that, with the move into ethical life, conscience disappears, 
along with the right to subjective freedom. In order to refute this claim, we need to 
demonstrate that conscience is retained with the move into ethics.  
I argue that conscience is retained in the ethical realm, but not in its pure, moral 
form. Conscience itself undergoes a process of Aufhebung. With the transition into 
ethics, the moral conscience is sublated by the true conscience of ethical life. However, 
when understood correctly, this process of Aufhebung does not represent a loss of 
subjective freedom. I argue that, with the move into ethics, all the essential features of 
conscience remain and only the negative aspects are lost. True conscience retains the 
right to produce its own convictions and to decide for itself how to best actualise the 
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good. However, unlike the moral conscience, the true conscience recognises that the 
good is both subjective and objective; therefore, it also wills what is good in itself. In 
other words, true conscience retains the right to subjective freedom whilst recognising 
the objectivity of ethics. I shall devote a large part of this thesis to examining the logical 
and concrete significance of this claim.  
Even if we establish that conscience is preserved within the ethical realm, we 
have to examine where precisely it is located. Does it guide the decisions we make in 
our own, private lives, or does it help form public policy? Hegel says little about the 
specific role of true conscience within ethical life (this is, no doubt, partly responsible 
for the criticism that Hegel neglects the role of conscience within his political society). 
However, I believe that, by appealing to the logical development of conscience and the 
concrete institutions of ethical life, it is possible to identify a precise function for 
conscience within the state. I argue that this function is to be found in the legislative 
power.   
Although the role of conscience within the Philosophy of Right is still debated, it 
is widely acknowledged that the dialectic of conscience is a central feature within the 
text. Many scholars claim that, through a proper understanding of the dialectic of 
conscience, we can illuminate Hegel’s position on subjective freedom as a whole.5 If we 
can show that conscience is retained with the move into ethics, and if we can show that 
the conscience – the fruition of subjective freedom – has a meaningful role to play 
within the state, then we can show that Hegel does not dismiss the right to subjective 
                                                                                                                                               
4
 In a society in which the ethical is to “do what is prescribed, expressly stated and known”, it could be 
argued that conscience has no legitimate function (1991:193). 
5
 Frederick Neuhouser [2000:229], Dean Moyar [2008:3], Donald Dahlstrom [1993:186] 
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freedom. Therefore, we can finally disarm the charge that Hegel’s state is founded on 
authoritarian structures. This is what I aim to do in my thesis.  
 10 
Chapter One 
 
The Truly Free Will and Abstract Right 
 
The Philosophy of Right is primarily a philosophy of freedom. Although the text is 
often described as a political philosophy, this is only true in so far as the political 
structures presented within it are a direct result of the concept of freedom and its 
actualisation. Hegel does not attempt to construct political institutions ‘from scratch’ or 
from first principles; instead, he demonstrates how political structures emerge 
necessarily from the notion of freedom itself. Freedom is both the starting point and 
sole focus of the Philosophy of Right: Hegel begins the text with a discussion of the free 
will, and continues to describe how this freedom manifests itself into legal, moral, 
social, economic and political spheres. The culmination of this immanent, dialectical 
progression is the rational state. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to claim that freedom 
permeates the whole of Hegel’s political philosophy; it is precisely because Hegel 
examines the notion of freedom that the Philosophy of Right becomes a political 
philosophy. For this reason, I shall begin this chapter with a discussion of the free will. I 
shall examine the dialectical process whereby the implicitly free will becomes truly 
free, since this is a necessary condition for the actualisation of freedom. I shall then 
continue to discuss the first instance of right, abstract right, in order to identify the 
main, logical progression which necessitates the move into morality. However, since 
my thesis centres on the spheres of morality and ethical life, I shall limit my exposition 
to the moments of logical significance. I shall pay particular attention to the dialectic of 
crime and punishment and the transition into morality.  
 11 
The will is necessarily free. In section four of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
writes that “freedom is just as much a basic determination of the will as weight is a 
basic determination of bodies” (1991:35). In the same way that objects are essentially 
heavy, so the will is essentially free. The will without freedom is an “empty word” 
(Hegel 1991:35). Having already derived the concept of the free will in the Philosophy 
of Spirit, Hegel doesn’t provide a proof of the free will in the Philosophy of Right; he 
simply asserts it as a point of departure: “the concept of right”, he remarks, “so far as its 
coming into being is concerned, falls outside the science of right; its deduction is 
presupposed here and is to be taken as a given” (1991:26). However, even though 
freedom is a necessary property inherent in all willing, if the will itself fails to recognise 
its own freedom, it remains only implicitly free. The will which is only implicitly free 
lacks an awareness of itself as a free being. The slave, for example, is only implicitly 
free, for he “does not know his essence, his infinity and freedom” (1991:53). In the 
Philosophy of History, Hegel also ascribes this implicitly free status to the Ancient 
Orientals.6 In order to become explicitly free (what Hegel calls “truly free”), the will 
must recognise its own freedom. It must acquire an awareness of itself as necessarily 
free and, what is more, it must commit itself to willing this freedom. Only at this point 
is the will truly free. In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel provides a 
comprehensive account of the will’s development from an implicitly free will to a truly 
free will. This development comprises three stages, which correspond to Hegel’s 
fundamental, dialectical logic and which reflect the structure of the Philosophy of Right 
as a whole: abstract universality, particularity and individuality. At each of these three 
                                                 
6
 Hegel [2004:18] “The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit – Man as such – is free; 
and because they do not know this, they are not free” (or, to invoke Hegel’s vocabulary from the 
Philosophy of Right, they are not truly free). 
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stages, freedom is given a different expression. It is only after the stage of individuality 
that the will can commit itself to its freedom and become truly free. Let us first examine 
this dialectical process. 
The first stage in the dialectical progression is abstract universality. At this 
stage, freedom is simply the ability to abstract from every particular determination and 
to think of oneself as a universal “I”. During this stage of abstract freedom, the will 
flees all determinacy, for it views every particular content as a limitation. Hegel 
describes this type of freedom as the “absolute possibility of abstracting from every 
determination in which I find myself or which I have posited in myself, the flight from 
every content as limitation” (1991:38R). Although it is ultimately incomplete to 
conceive of freedom as the ability to abstract from particularity, this stage of freedom 
contains within it an “essential determination” and should “therefore not be dismissed”, 
since it demonstrates the will’s capacity to withdraw from determinacy and to be with 
itself (Hegel 1991:39). In other words, it demonstrates the will’s capacity for thought, 
which, for Hegel, is precisely this ability to abstract from particularity and represent 
something as a universal.7 When the will thinks of itself as “I”, it negates all its 
particular properties (its age, physical condition, temperament, etc.) and conceives of 
itself as simple universality. It is this capacity for thought that distinguishes the human 
from the animal, since “the human being alone is able to abandon all things” (Hegel 
1991:38). Unlike the animal, the human can think of itself as an abstract entity, in 
separation from its particular surroundings. This moment, although ultimately one-
sided, is an essential part of freedom.  
                                                 
7
 Hegel [1991:35] Paragraph 4: “Every representation [Vorstellung] is a generalisation, and this is 
inherent in thought. To generalise something means to think it. “I” is thought and likewise the 
universal”. 
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Since this stage of freedom involves a negation of the will’s particular 
determinations, Hegel also refers to it as “negative freedom” (1991:38). It is important 
to note that Hegel’s use of the term ‘negative freedom’ differs from Isaiah Berlin’s 
subsequent use of the term in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, first published in 
1958. For Berlin, negative freedom refers to the ability to pursue one’s particular, 
chosen desires in the absence of external constraints.8 To be negatively free, for Berlin, 
is to minimise restriction and to maximise choice. However, in the Philosophy of Right, 
negative freedom has nothing to do with the unrestricted pursuit of particular desires or 
maximising our ability to choose. In fact, it is precisely the notion of particularity from 
which the will flees. For Hegel, negative freedom represents the earliest stage of 
freedom there is: the ability to renounce all particular determinations and to think of 
oneself as an abstract being. So, unlike negative freedom in Berlin’s sense, this first 
stage of freedom, for Hegel, demonstrates an intolerance of particularity. The negatively 
free will exists as pure thought. Whilst this is an essential stage of freedom (the will 
must recognise itself as a thinking being), Hegel warns that this type of abstract 
freedom, if actualised in the political realm, can have dangerous consequences. He 
refers to the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution as an example of negative 
freedom at its most damaging. The Terror, we learn, “was a time of trembling and 
quaking and intolerance towards everything particular” (1991:39A). Freedom, during 
this time, was present in only an abstract form (the “abstract self-consciousness of 
equality”), to which no particular institutions were compatible. Therefore, instead of 
creating new, stable political structures, the Reign of Terror led to the “fury of 
destruction”, and “the people destroyed once more the institutions they themselves had 
                                                 
8
 Berlin [1969:118-172] 
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created” (1991:38/39A). The negatively free will is never at home in the world, for it is 
forever fleeing particularity.  
Having described the moment of abstract universality, Hegel moves onto the 
second stage in the dialectic: particularity. During this moment of freedom, the will no 
longer flees determinacy; instead, it gives itself a particular content. It wills something. 
Hegel describes this moment of particularisation as a “limitation”, since, by willing 
something determinate, the will has ceased to exist as an abstract universal (1991:40A). 
It has ‘limited’ itself to a particular content. However, this moment of limitation (or 
“finitude”), does not represent a loss of freedom: just as freedom involves the capacity 
to abstract from determinacy, so it requires that something be willed. Therefore, Hegel 
does not prioritise the first moment of indeterminacy. Instead, we learn that “the 
indeterminate will is … just as one-sided as that which exists in mere determinacy” 
(1991:40A). The first and second moments of freedom, though essential parts of the 
dialectical structure, are equally one-sided. In order to overcome this, we require a 
synthesis of abstract universality and particularity.  
This synthesis is the moment of individuality. The individually free will is able 
to give itself a particular content whilst maintaining an awareness of itself as a 
universal, thinking being. As such, it unites the first and second moments of freedom 
and supersedes the one-sidedness of both. The individual will limits itself (by giving 
itself a particular content), but it does so willingly, for it recognises that its universal 
status as a thinking being remains throughout its various determinations. Hegel 
describes this as “concrete freedom”, which, we are told, “is to will something 
determinate, yet to be with oneself [bei sich] in this determinacy and to return once 
more to the universal” (1991:42A). Hegel remarks that this type of concrete freedom, in 
 15 
which we willingly limit ourselves, is already present in the form of feeling, such as 
friendship or love. In friendship and love we voluntarily limit ourselves in the other, 
but, throughout this limitation, we do not cease to know ourselves.  
Having established that the individually free will is able to remain with itself in 
its determinacy, we now need to ask in which ways the will determines itself. There are 
two ways in which the will determines itself: in its form and in its content. The form of 
the will refers to the will’s ability to transform a subjective end into objectivity. If the 
will’s objective determination corresponds to its subjective intention, it can be called 
“its own” (1991:43). Content, on the other hand, refers to the specific determination the 
will gives itself. It is the notion of content (and not form) that occupies the majority of 
Hegel’s subsequent discussion of the free will. If the will’s content corresponds to the 
concept of the will (freedom), then its content is true. As such, the will that determines 
itself in accordance with its status as an essentially free being, has a true content. 
However, at this stage of the progression, this cannot be said for the individual will. The 
individual will is concretely free in so far as it remains with itself in its determinacy, 
but, at this stage, the content of the will does not correspond to its concept. This is 
because its content is still given to it by nature. It remains an “immediate will” or a 
“natural will”, since its content consists of “drives, desires and inclinations by which 
the will finds itself naturally determined” (1991:45). The will does not yet have its own 
freedom as its content and, therefore, exists in a state of self-contradiction: its content 
does not match its concept. The natural will is free only in itself, i.e. in its concept, but it 
is not yet free for itself, for it has not yet elevated its own essence (freedom) to its 
content.  
 16 
Of course, the natural will still contains essential moments of freedom. Firstly, 
the natural will is able to “stand above [its] drives”, even though these drives are 
provided by nature (1991:45). Unlike the animal, which must obey its natural 
inclinations, the natural will can evaluate its desires and select a desire with which to 
identify itself. Also, unlike the abstract will, the natural will is able to resolve on 
something particular.9 It is able to limit itself. This act of limitation, as we discussed 
earlier, is required for individuality. “By resolving”, Hegel writes, “the will posits itself 
as the will of a specific individual and as a will which distinguishes itself from 
everything else” (1991:46). However, even though the natural will is able to stand 
above its desires and resolve on a particular content, these desires themselves are still 
dictated by nature, and this is what prevents it from being truly free. The will can 
choose between various determinations, but the choice available to it is not a product of 
its own freedom. Because of this, the will remains “tied to [its] content” (1991:47).  
The will which identifies freedom explicitly with the ability to choose between 
various natural determinations is called the “reflective will” (or “choosing” will) 
(1991:48). The reflective will is able to stand above its desires and select between them. 
However, since none of the determinations from which it chooses is a product of its 
own freedom, the reflective will doesn’t identify completely with any of its choices. As 
such, its choice is entirely arbitrary [willkürlich] and the will is liable to renounce its 
decision at any time. Hegel acknowledges that freedom is often understood in this way. 
He writes that arbitrary choice is “the commonest idea [Vorstellung] we have of 
freedom” (1991:48R). Understood as such, freedom consists simply in the ability to 
                                                 
9
 See also Hegel’s account of the Beautiful Soul in the Phenomenology of Spirit [1977:407]. The 
Beautiful Soul is “discorded to the point of madness” and “wastes away in yearning” because of its 
inability to limit itself. 
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resolve on things “as one pleases” and to change one’s mind if desired (much like 
Berlin’s notion of negative freedom). However, for Hegel, this idea represents a “lack 
of intellectual culture”, for the notion of arbitrary choice is, ultimately, a deficient way 
to conceive of freedom (1991:48R). Hegel writes that, “instead of being the will in 
truth, arbitrariness is rather the will as contradiction” (1991:48R). The will that selects 
its determinations arbitrarily still has a content which is given by nature. In Hegel’s 
terms, it has a contingent [zufällig] content, for its content is provided by something 
other than its own freedom (its concept). The choosing will, therefore, remains free only 
in itself. In order to become free in and for itself – to become truly free – the will must 
adopt freedom as its content.  
But how does the will do this? In section twenty-one, Hegel writes that it is 
through the process of thought that the will adopts freedom as its content. The will must 
think of itself as essentially free and develop a self-consciousness of freedom as its 
“substance and destiny”; something which, up until this point, was only an implicit part 
of its concept (1991:35). By becoming aware of freedom as its own essence, the will 
“purifies and raises its object, content and end to this universality” (1991:53). The will, 
by thinking of itself as essentially free, replaces its naturally-determined content with its 
own freedom. At this point in Hegel’s account, we are reminded of just how integral the 
notion of thought is to the concept of the will. Hegel writes that it is “only as thinking 
intelligence that the will is truly in itself and free” (1991:53). In other words, it is only 
because the will has the capacity to think of itself as necessarily free, that it can adopt 
freedom as its content. As we mentioned earlier, the slave is unable to do this and, thus, 
lacks the self-consciousness required for true freedom. The same is true for every 
civilisation that tolerates slavery. Hegel praises Christianity, especially the Christian 
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Reformation, for its insight and subsequent proclamation that every human being, 
simply by being human, is free.10 The Reformation, for Hegel, brought this fundamental 
awareness to the modern world.  
In section twenty-one, Hegel provides his definition of the truly free will as the 
“free will which wills the free will” (1991:57). The truly free will no longer wills what 
is provided by nature; instead, it wills its own freedom. The truly free will is many 
things. Firstly, as its name suggests, the truly free will is “true”. This is because its 
content is now in accordance with its concept (freedom). Secondly, the truly free will is 
“infinite”, since it has itself as its object, and not something which it views as a 
limitation. Thirdly, the truly free will is “universal”, since it has superseded all 
particular limitations within itself, and can be at home with itself in the other 
(1991:53/4). In becoming truly free, the will has developed an awareness of itself as an 
essentially free being and it has committed itself to willing this freedom. As such, it has 
renounced its ability for arbitrary choice. It no longer associates its freedom with the 
unrestricted capacity to select between various natural determinations. Instead, it 
determines itself in a way that remains faithful to its free essence. It has become 
rational. In section twenty-four, Hegel writes that the rational is “the universal which 
has being in and for itself ” (1991:55). The rational will is the will that makes freedom 
its content. 
We have now arrived at the concept of the truly free (or rational) will. However, 
it is not enough that the rational will remains as concept. The Philosophy of Right, as we 
learn from the very opening line, is about the Idea of right, which involves both “the 
                                                 
10
 See Hegel’s Philosophy of History [2004:344-5] “Thought received its true material first with the 
Reformation, through the reviviscent concrete consciousness of Free Spirit” [2002”417] “This is the 
essence of the Reformation: Man is in his very nature destined to be free” 
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concept of right and its actualisation” (1991:25 my italics). In order to become Idea, the 
rational will has to develop itself into objectivity. It has to become actual. But this 
process of actualisation is not driven by factors external to the rational will. Essential to 
Hegel’s methodology is the claim that the free will “gives itself actuality and engenders 
itself in an existing world” (1991:60 my italics). As the rational will exercises its 
freedom and develops an understanding of what freedom entails, so the concept of 
freedom unfolds and assumes different determinations in the existing world (abstract 
right, morality and ethical life). The course of actualisation is not arbitrary; it follows a 
necessary, immanent, dialectical progression, whereby the implicit determinations 
contained within the concept of freedom are rendered explicit. It is the concept of 
freedom itself that propels this dialectical process. To invoke Hegel’s analogy, the “very 
soul” of freedom “puts forth its branches and fruit organically” (1991:60). The fruition 
of freedom’s actualisation is the rational state, for it is at this point that the will fully 
comprehends what it is to be free. The rational state is nothing “new” to the concept of 
the will, for all the eventual determinations of freedom are implicitly present within its 
concept. However, it does represent the point at which all these implicit determinations 
have been comprehended and realised in the existing world. As such, Hegel claims that 
“the last determination coincides in unity with the first” (1991:61). Every stage along 
the process of actualisation is a product of the concept of the truly free will.  
As the logic of the concept unfolds, so freedom transforms itself into various 
existing forms. It is these existing forms of freedom that Hegel refers to as right [Recht]. 
In section twenty-nine, Hegel defines right as “any existence [Dasein] in general which 
is the existence of the free will” and, in section thirty, he describes right as “the 
existence of the absolute concept, of self-conscious freedom” (1991:58/9). So, in a 
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broad sense, right is any existing form of the rational will, i.e. any existing form of the 
will which has recognised and committed itself to its own freedom (or “self-conscious 
freedom”). This includes all legal, moral, social, economic and political instances of 
freedom that follow the will becoming truly free. As such, Hegel uses the term right in a 
wider sense than we commonly understand it. Right doesn’t refer simply to the notion 
of entitlement (such as legal rights or human rights), but also to “morality, ethics and 
world history” (1991:63). Right, for Hegel, is any existence of freedom in the world. 
However, Hegel also plays on the ambiguity of the word Recht in German (which can 
mean many things: ‘right’, ‘just’, ‘lawful’, etc.), in order to allude to right in the 
narrower sense of entitlement (and corresponding responsibility). He does so in order to 
bring out the fundamental relationship between the will and its own freedom. The truly 
free will, as we have discussed, has attained an awareness of itself as an essentially free 
being. As such, it understands its freedom as a right (as an entitlement). It has a right to 
its own freedom and to any subsequent form of freedom’s existence. For example, the 
will has a right to own property, to consult its conscience, to choose its own profession, 
to participate in the state, etc. However, an essential part of freedom within the 
Philosophy of Right is that, alongside the right to freedom, comes the duty to will what 
freedom demands; for it is only as a free will that the will enjoys a right to all of 
freedom’s determinations. Therefore, as well as the right to own property, the will also 
has a duty to own property, and as well as the right to consult its conscience, the will 
also has a duty to consult its conscience, and so on. Hegel presents this idea most 
comprehensively in section 486 of the Philosophy of Spirit. He claims, “That which is a 
right is also a duty, and what is a duty is also a right. For an embodiment is a right only 
on the basis of the free substantial will; the very same content, in relation to the will 
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differentiating itself as subjective and individual, is duty” (2007:218). The will, as an 
essentially free will, has a duty to will what freedom entails.  
Of course, at this point in the dialectic, the will cannot say what this duty will 
involve, for it is unaware of the full content of freedom. It has committed itself to 
willing its freedom, but cannot foresee the ways in which freedom will actualise itself. 
All future determinations of freedom are, at this point, unknown to it. It may seem 
paradoxical that, at the point of becoming truly free, the will cannot determine the 
course of its own freedom. But this is precisely the idea that characterises freedom 
within the Philosophy of Right: that freedom is both within and without the will’s 
control. The will can claim its own freedom as a right, but it cannot dictate its content. 
So, at the point of becoming truly free, the will commits itself to future, unknown 
instances of freedom (to the stages of abstract right, morality and ethical life). However, 
even though the will cannot foresee the full content of freedom, it recognises that all 
future determinations of freedom further its status as an essentially free being. It is in 
this respect, i.e. in committing itself to willing what freedom demands, that the will 
remains in control of its own, free essence. The Philosophy of Right, therefore, becomes 
an account of what the rational will must uphold in order to remain truly free. The will 
progresses through three main stages of right: abstract right, morality and ethical life. In 
each of these stages, freedom is given a different expression, because the will 
understands differently what it is to be free. As the will progresses through the stages of 
abstract right, morality and ethical life, freedom is actualised in the world and the will 
develops an understanding of what true freedom entails. Each of these stages is right in 
the broad sense of the word – since it represents an existence of the rational will – and 
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also a right in the narrow sense of the word – since the rational will has an entitlement, 
and corresponding duty, to will it.  
Having examined the dialectical progression whereby the implicitly free will 
becomes truly free, let us now examine the first stage of right: abstract right.  
The abstractly free will has attained an awareness of its own freedom and has, 
thus, become truly free. However, at this stage, the abstract will has no conception of 
itself other than an essentially free will. It thinks of itself as a “completely abstract ‘I’” 
(1991:68R). As such, it conceives of its freedom purely formally and abstractly; it 
doesn’t associate its freedom with its particular characteristics, interests or desires. It 
thinks of itself simply as a universally and infinitely free being. This, for Hegel, is what 
constitutes personality. He defines personality as the “the will’s self-conscious (but 
otherwise contentless) and simple reference to itself in its individuality [Einzelheit]” 
(1991:67). He also claims that, in the person, “all concrete limitation and validity are 
negated and invalidated” (1991:68R). In this respect, personality resembles the 
negatively free will, which we discussed earlier in this chapter. The negatively free will 
also associates freedom with the ability to abstract from particularity and exist as a 
universal ‘I’. However, the fundamental difference between the negatively free will and 
freedom of personality is that the negatively free will is only implicitly free. The person, 
on the other hand, is truly free. The person understands its freedom as both a right and a 
duty and is, therefore, free both in and for itself. Although the person demonstrates a 
very abstract and limited understanding of what freedom entails, it recognises its 
essential freedom; and it is precisely this recognition that distinguishes it from the 
negatively free will. 
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However, even though personality thinks of itself as indeterminate and abstract 
universality, in reality, it is not. The person is determined in all sorts of ways; it has 
particular characteristics, particular interests, particular desires, etc. In short, it is 
“something wholly determinate” (1991:68A). Personality involves being something 
finite, yet thinking of oneself as infinite, universal and free. Therefore, personality is “at 
the same time the sublime and the wholly ordinary” (1991:68A). It exists as 
contradiction. The ability to support this contradiction, we are told, is the “supreme 
achievement” of the person (1991:68A). Hegel doesn’t dismiss the stage of personality; 
on the contrary, he values it at the point at which the will demonstrates an 
overwhelming, if ultimately abstract, awareness of its own freedom. However, because 
the person doesn’t associate its freedom with any of its particular determinations, its 
own particular content remains something external to it. Hegel writes that the person 
“encounters this content as an external world immediately confronting it” (1991:67). 
The person doesn’t determine its own particular content; instead, it simply exists 
alongside it and relates immediately to it (we shall return to this idea during our 
discussion on property). 
Because of the formal and universal nature of freedom within abstract right, 
abstract right is the sphere of legality. It is concerned with protecting the universal 
rights of the person. Since the abstract will associates its freedom with its universal 
status as a free being, and not with its particular determinations, it must recognise that 
every other person lays claim to freedom in exactly the same way. Therefore, the 
commandment of abstract right is “be a person and respect others as persons” 
(1991:69). Abstract right is not concerned with promoting particular interests or welfare 
(this is the sphere of morality); it is simply concerned with upholding the rights of 
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personality. Of course, protecting the rights of personality is an essential part of 
freedom, and something that we value highly today. We like to believe that, irrespective 
of somebody’s particular characteristics – age, gender, nationality, etc. – a person has 
entitlements simply because he/she is a person. This is the basis for our current system 
of human rights. However, Hegel also points out that rights, by themselves, are limited 
as a guide for action. In abstract right, no action is positively encouraged or 
recommended. Actions are simply permitted or forbidden; the only acts that can be 
‘commanded’ are those whose omission is forbidden. As such, Hegel remarks that the 
whole of abstract right is “limited to the negative – not to violate personality and what 
ensues from personality” (1991:70). With such a limited, negative principle to guide 
behaviour, Hegel claims that moral and ethical relations are simply a “possibility” 
within abstract right (1991:69). The person does not consider what it should do, or why 
it should do it. It thinks only of what it must not do if it is not to violate its own rights or 
the rights of its fellow persons. 
The first right of personality is the right to own property. Through the 
appropriation of external objects [Sachen], the person gives itself an external sphere of 
freedom. This is the first time in the Philosophy of Right that freedom actualises itself 
and, thus, the first time that freedom exists as Idea. The right to property is based on 
entitlement, and not utilitarian grounds. The will, as a free will, has an “absolute right of 
appropriation” over things which have no end in themselves (1991:75). As well as a 
right to own property, the will also has a duty to own property, for it is only through 
appropriating objects that the will can actualise its freedom in the external world. By 
owning property, the will overcomes the subjectivity of personality; it objectifies its 
will in an object, which, before its appropriation, had no will of its own. It gives the 
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object its will. However, at this stage in the dialectic, the will still thinks of itself as an 
abstractly free being and does not associate its freedom with its particular 
determinations. Its particular content, at this stage, is “a matter of indifference to it” 
(1991:69R). Therefore, even though the will knows it has a right to own property, it 
relates only immediately to the particular property it owns. Its freedom (as it 
understands it) dictates only that it appropriate objects; it says nothing about the 
particular objets to appropriate. Hegel writes, “this particular aspect, in the sphere of 
abstract personality, is not yet posited as identical with freedom” (1991:80). The will 
does not associate its freedom with how much or what type of property to own; its 
particular choice of property is, at this stage, unreflective and immediate. As such, its 
choice is also arbitrary. Just like the ‘choosing will’ in section fifteen, the abstract will 
of personality does not identify its freedom with the ability to determine its own, 
particular content.11 Therefore, it’s choice of object is arbitrary and its content is 
contingent.  
Because every person has the right to own property and must also respect the 
property rights of others, the person enters into contractual relationships with other 
wills. In contract, the person posits its freedom as part of a ‘common will’ between two 
or more contracting parties. In doing so, the person continues to exist as an owner of 
property, but it also exists for another will. Contract represents an important 
development in the will’s comprehension of its freedom, for it is the moment at which 
the will recognises the need for mutual recognition between property owners. As such, 
it is the first moment at which the person exists for another. However, contract is an 
ultimately deficient structure, because it is based on the will’s arbitrary appropriation of 
                                                 
11
 Of course, the fundamental difference between the ‘choosing will’ and the abstract will of personality 
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objects. Whilst the form of contract is a direct result of freedom, its content is simply an 
aggregation of arbitrary preferences. Therefore, the content of contract (just like the 
content of the will) is contingent. It is for this reason that Hegel is notoriously critical of 
the contractual relationship. He describes contract as an “appearance” of right, since its 
content is not determined by freedom (1991:115). He is also keen to point out that the 
contractual relationship does not form the basis of the rational state.12 The common will, 
because of its arbitrary character, is instable. Just as the person can renounce its 
arbitrary choice of property, so it can renounce its contract. In other words, contracts are 
liable to be broken.  
If the will renounces its contractual agreement, it commits wrong. During 
wrong, the will elevates its particular interests above the universal, common will. 
Whereas contract is only an “appearance” [Erscheinung] of right (since its content is 
only contingently related to freedom), the act of wrong is a complete “semblance” 
[Schein] of right, because, in negating the common will, the person wills something 
completely at odds with its own freedom (1991:115). It prioritises its particular interests 
over its universal interests. There are three types of wrong: unintentional wrong, 
deception and crime. Unintentional wrong is the least serious of the three, because, 
when the will commits an unintentional wrong, it negates the universal by mistake. As 
such, the will still recognises right (at this stage, the common will) as the “universal and 
deciding factor” (1991:117). Its respect for right remains intact, even if right is 
objectively negated. In deception, these subjective and objective considerations are 
inverted; the deceiving will no longer respects right, but its deception relies on right 
remaining objectively intact (at least in the eyes of the person being deceived). 
                                                                                                                                               
is that the person understands its freedom as a matter of right.  
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However, it is the third moment of wrong, crime, that represents “wrong in the proper 
sense”, because, during crime, right is objectively negated along with the will’s respect 
for it (1991:119). To commit a crime, Hegel writes, is to “infringe right as right” 
(1991:121). The criminal elevates its particular interests above the universal in such a 
way that right is no longer subjectively nor objectively present. As such, crime is a 
complete denial of right.  
At this point, let us recap briefly on the will’s logical structure leading up to and 
during crime. In property, the universal and particular moments of the will are united 
immediately in the object it owns. The will seeks an external form of freedom, but this 
freedom does not determine its particular choice of object. Its universal freedom is, 
therefore, bound immediately with its particular choice of property. During contract, the 
will continues to own property, but it elevates its universal freedom to a common will 
with other contracting parties. As such, its particular and universal moments are 
separated for the first time; it has both a particular will of its own and a universal, 
common will with other persons. However, it is during the moment of crime that the 
will first posits its particular content above that of the universal. In crime, will 
prioritises its particular interests – its desire for another’s property, etc. – over the 
universal, common will. This is the first moment in the Philosophy of Right at which the 
will’s particular and universal moments exist in opposition. By negating the common 
will, the will negates its freedom in favour of particular desires; it sacrifices its universal 
moment in search of its own, particular gain.  
The criminal’s negation of right has two consequences. Firstly, in committing 
crime, the criminal negates right in the objective sense, i.e. the criminal negates freedom 
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 See the Remark from Paragraph 75 [1991:105] and the Remark from Paragraph 258 [1991:277] 
 28 
as externally present in contract. However, in committing crime, the criminal also 
negates its respect for right and, therefore, does not honour its status as a free being.13 
Both of these factors, Hegel claims, require that crime be punished. Punishment in the 
Philosophy of Right is fundamentally retributive. Hegel does not justify punishment on 
utilitarian principles or reasons of deterrent; it exists simply to negate the negation of 
crime. Punishment is required in the first case – the objective negation of right – in 
order to restore right and cancel a criminal act which would “otherwise be regarded as 
valid” (1991:124). This is what Hegel refers to as justice. However, as well as 
implementing justice, punishment is also required in order to restore the criminal’s 
respect for right. The criminal will, having negated its own freedom, needs to reaffirm 
right and reaffirm its status an essentially free being. Interestingly, Hegel argues that the 
criminal, simply through its criminal act, consents to its own punishment. Let us explore 
this idea further. 
In section 100, Hegel presents the idea that, as a rational will, the criminal wills 
its own punishment through its own criminal act. Because the criminal is formally free, 
when it acts criminally, it sets up a law that permits its action universally. As such, it 
implicitly consents to this law being carried out on it, too. Hegel writes, “it is implicit in 
his action, as that of a rational being, that it is universal in character, and that, by 
performing it, he has set up a law which he has recognised for himself in his action, and 
under which he may therefore be subsumed under his right” (1991:126). In other words, 
if the criminal will steals, it universalises the law that it is acceptable to steal and, thus, 
it implicitly permits theft against itself. In this way, the criminal can be said to consent 
                                                 
13
 Of course, even during crime, the concept of the free will itself is not negated. The will remains an 
essentially free will. Hegel claims that, “right, as an absolute, cannot be cancelled” [1991:123]. However, 
during crime, the will negates the objective expression of its freedom (contract) and also its respect for its 
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to its own punishment; for it consents to its own law being turned on itself.14 If the 
criminal were to remain unpunished, his status as a free being would be denied. By 
punishing the criminal, on the other hand, the criminal is “honoured” as a free being 
(1991:126). As such, through punishment, the criminal is led to reaffirm its status as an 
essentially free being and as a bearer of rights. 
The dialectic of crime and punishment is essential for the transition into 
morality, for it is through this progression that the will ceases to relate immediately to 
right. During crime, the will’s universal and particular moments – which were, 
previously, united immediately in an external object – exist separately and in 
opposition. It is through punishment that the will supersedes this opposition, because, 
during punishment, the will recognises that both its universal status as a free being and 
its particular content are essential parts of its freedom. Previous to punishment, the will 
related only immediately to its particular content. However, during punishment, the will 
recognises that its particularity also belongs to freedom. It can no longer allow itself to 
be determined by natural factors (desires, inclinations, etc.); instead, it has to determine 
itself in a way that remains faithful to its free essence. During punishment, the will 
reclaims its universal and particular moments. It is “confronted with itself” 
(1991:132A). As such, instead of seeking its freedom in something external, the will 
makes itself into its own object: “the next stage is for the will to have existence in itself, 
in something internal” (1991:132A). The will internalises its universality and 
particularity. As such, the will exists as subjectivity. However, even though its universal 
and particular moments are internalised, they are not identical. They remain separate (as 
                                                                                                                                               
freedom. It is in this sense that “right as right” is negated [1991:121].  
14
 Punishment need not adopt the crime’s qualitative form (an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth, etc.), but 
should be of the same value. See Paragraph 101 [1991:127-130] 
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they were during crime). It is the obligation of the moral subject to unite these two 
aspects of freedom. The moral subject must determine its particular content so that it 
corresponds to its universal moment of freedom. For this reason, the sphere of morality 
is the sphere of self-determination.  
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Chapter Two  
 
Morality, the Good and Duty 
 
Following the dialectic of crime and punishment, the will no longer relates immediately 
to right. Instead, it has to determine itself to recognise right. Having internalised its 
universal and particular moments, the will now has itself, and not an external thing, as 
its object. As such, it exists as subjectivity: “this reflection of the will into itself and its 
identity for itself … determine the person as subject” (1991:135). The moral subject no 
longer seeks existence in something external, but in its own self. It has to determine its 
own, particular content so that it corresponds non-contingently with its universal 
freedom. In other words, it has to unite its moments of universality and particularity, 
which, although internalised, are not identical. In order to do this, the subject must 
reflect on its particular choices; unlike the abstract will of personality, it must consider 
matters such as intention, responsibility, satisfaction and conscience. By doing so, the 
moral subject attempts to determine itself in a way that freedom demands. It attempts to 
will the good. In this chapter, I shall examine the right that permeates the whole of 
morality: the right of subjectivity. Contained within this right are the moments of 
purpose and responsibility, intention and welfare, and the good and conscience. I shall 
provide an outline of all these moments, except conscience, which I discuss separately 
in the next chapter. I shall pay particular attention to the dialectical significance of the 
good and its first appearance as duty. I shall argue that, because of the logical structure 
of morality, the notion of duty is necessarily indeterminate. I shall then demonstrate 
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how the indeterminate nature of duty leads to the emergence of conscience.   
In section 107, Hegel defines the right of subjectivity as the will’s right to 
“recognise something or to be something only in so far as that thing is its own, and in so 
far as the will is present to itself in its subjectivity” (1991:136). The moral subject is 
“present to itself” in its decisions and claims its decisions as “its own”. It no longer acts 
unreflectively (as it did in abstract right). Therefore, the right to subjectivity is best 
described as the will’s right to reflection, and the right to understand its decisions as a 
product of its own freedom. To put it another way, the right of subjectivity is the right to 
reflective, self-determination. As we will see, this right involves many things: the right 
to have intentions, the right to be judged only on these intentions, the right to find 
satisfaction in fulfilling these intentions, etc. And, most relevant to my thesis, it also 
involves the right to consult our conscience in order to determine, for ourselves, what is 
good. However, the right to subjectivity also entails that, as free agents, we assume 
responsibility for our actions. The fact that we are responsible for our actions follows 
directly from the fact that we determine ourselves and that our actions are to be 
regarded as our own. Responsibility does not make us less free. In fact, it reinforces the 
fact that our subjectivity is respected. In exercising our subjective freedom and 
accepting responsibility for our actions, we determine for ourselves the best way to act. 
We cease to assent to external, given factors, and we build up a personal knowledge of 
the difference between good and evil. This is absolutely fundamental to Hegel’s account 
of subjective freedom. The right to subjectivity allows us to identify right with our own 
ability (and responsibility) for self-determination.  
In section 132, Hegel provides another definition of the right to subjectivity: 
“The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognise as valid should be 
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perceived by it as good” (1991:158).  This is a crucial statement in the Philosophy of 
Right, for it confirms the idea that the moral subject should not assent to anything that it 
does not recognise as good (its own character, moral systems, political institutions, 
etc.). The moral subject is reflective and, as such, should not adhere blindly to external 
commands. It has to affirm the good for itself. Of course, the extent to which the moral 
subject (or the ethical subject) can assert its own, moral convictions against objective, 
political institutions is a notoriously difficult problem in the Philosophy of Right, and a 
problem which I aim to solve in my thesis. However, at this point in the text, it is 
important to recognise that the right of subjectivity rules out the possibility for 
unreflective moral behaviour. The moral subject can only endorse those determinations 
that it recognises as good. For Hegel, the right to subjectivity is an essential moment in 
the dialectic of freedom, and marks the onset of the modern age: “The uncivilised 
human being lets everything be dictated to him by brute force and by natural conditions 
… but the cultivated and inwardly developing human being wills that he should himself 
be present in everything that he does” (1991:136-7A). 
As has become evident, Hegel uses the term morality in a wider sense than we 
use it today. Morality, in the Philosophy of Right, encompasses everything that belongs 
to human subjectivity – interests, intentions, responsibility, happiness, etc. – and not 
just the morally good. Hegel does not refer to the moral in order to exclude the 
immoral. He writes, “The moral is not primarily defined simply as the opposite of the 
immoral, just as right is not in an immediate sense the opposite of wrong. On the 
contrary, the universal point of view of the moral and the immoral alike is based on the 
subjectivity of the will” (1991:137R). This passage is revealing, for it introduces the 
idea that subjectivity brings with it the potential for good, but also the potential for bad. 
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Both morality (in the narrow sense in which we use it today) and immorality can 
emerge from the right to subjectivity. The subjective will has the potential to get things 
wrong. As we shall see as my thesis continues, subjective freedom is a fundamental 
right of the moral subject, but one which is ultimately fallible.  
The expression of the moral subject is action. Action, in the moral sense, is 
more than simply ‘what we do’. It is the positive representation of our subjectivity – our 
choices, intentions, motivations, etc. – in the objective world. Hegel highlights this idea 
by contrasting moral action with the legal ‘action’ of abstract right. Legal action is 
characterised by prohibition, so the content of legal action is not a positive 
representation of subjectivity; it is simply a process of obeying negative 
commandments. In the sphere of abstract right, the “moments of moral action proper” 
were only “externally present” in the will (1991:141R). The will was not determining 
for itself how to behave, it was merely following external demands. It is only with the 
onset of morality that we enter the sphere of action as a positive representation of our 
subjectivity. The moral subject is reflective, and this reflection is objectified in the 
external world through its action. Through engaging in the self-conscious 
implementation of ends in the public world, the will demonstrates its subjective 
freedom. 
I will now continue to discuss the different stages of action, and how, as the 
moral subject learns more about its subjective freedom, its actions become increasingly 
permeated with its  own subjectivity.  
Given that the moral subject determines itself through its actions, it must first 
recognise the right to responsibility. The term responsibility has acquired negative 
connotations in our current, moral vocabulary – we force others to take responsibility 
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for their actions, or we condemn people for avoiding it – but, as we discussed above, in 
the Philosophy of Right, responsibility is something the moral subject claims for itself 
as a right. It is not something to be avoided, and it is not imposed upon the moral will 
by others. Responsibility is recognised by the moral subject as a right which is essential 
to action. This is because the moral will has a right to initiate actions and to recognise 
them as its own. It has the right to express its subjectivity through its actions. Therefore, 
it has the right to claim responsibility for them. By embracing the right to responsibility, 
the will declares that its actions are expressions of its own particularity. We could say 
that, in claiming responsibility for its actions, the moral subject is claiming ‘credit’ for 
them; it is declaring, to itself and to others, that its actions are the self-conscious 
implementations of its unique subjectivity in the public world. Whether or not its 
actions are good, or have good consequences, they are expressions of its own 
particularity, and this connection between actions and self-determination is what is so 
crucial about the right to responsibility. Of course, sometimes the right to responsibility 
will earn the moral subject prestige, and sometimes it may force the moral subject to 
repent for its actions; but, either way, the right to responsibility ensures that the moral 
subject recognises its actions as its own. 
We have established that the moral subject is, and takes itself to be, responsible 
for its actions, but there is a fundamental difference between an action [Handlung] and 
a deed [Tat]. The moral subject lives against a backdrop of of the external world, which 
Hegel calls the “finitude of the subjective will” (1991:143). When it engages in action, 
the moral subject causes an objective alteration to this backdrop. This objective 
alteration, taken in its entirety, is the deed. But the moral subject cannot always be held 
responsible for the entire alteration, because it is possible that some of the alteration was 
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beyond the subject’s control (even the best of intentions can yield unwanted and 
unpredicted results). The moral subject is responsible for only the aspects of the deed 
which it knew to be contained within its purpose [Vorsatz], for this captures the aspect 
of the deed that expresses the subject’s particularity. Hegel writes, “The deed posits an 
alteration to this given existence [Dasein], and the will is entirely responsible for it in so 
far as the predicate ‘mine’ attaches to the existence so altered” (1991:143). So an action 
is the part of the deed for which the moral subject is responsible; the part of the deed 
that is contained within its purpose and that it can claim as its own. For this reason, the 
moral subject cannot be held accountable for events that are committed in ignorance, or 
for consequences that spiral out of control. To be held responsible for something, the 
moral subject must have acted knowingly. Hegel calls this the “right to knowledge” 
(1991:144). Hegel claims that, for this reason, Oedipus cannot be charged with 
parricide; for, at the time of ‘acting’, Oedipus did not knowingly kill his father. Oedipus 
committed the deed but not the action of parricide. In Hegel’s opinion, one of the flaws 
in ancient legal codes was that they neglected this subjective dimension of the action, 
and instead held people accountable for the deed in its entirety: “the legal codes of 
antiquity attached less importance to the subjective element, to responsibility, than is 
the case today. This is why sanctuaries were established in antiquity, to receive and 
protect fugitives from vengeance” (1991:144A). He continues this observation with a 
critique of the “heroic self-consciousness” of ancient tragedies, which he remarks has 
“not yet progressed from its unalloyed simplicity to reflect on the distinction between 
deed and action, between the external event and the purpose and knowledge of the 
circumstances.” (1991:146R). 
Having said this, the moral subject should be expected to understand the likely 
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consequences of its actions. As a responsible person, the moral will should be aware of 
the probable consequences of its conduct. It should understand not just the particular 
deed in which it is engaged, but the general character of the deed, and what is likely to 
happen as a result. In other words, the will has the right to intention. The right to 
intention allows the moral subject to be judged for only what it intended to do, but it 
also requires that the moral will understand the “universal content” of the deed, i.e. all 
the “various connections” contained within it (1991:147). In other words, it demands 
that the moral subject recognise that certain consequences are integral to certain actions. 
Intention is the universal aspect of the action, not the action taken in an isolated 
existence. Hegel uses arson and murder to illustrate this: the arsonists doesn’t intend to 
set fire to a single piece of wood, but the whole house; and the murderer doesn’t plan to 
destroy an isolated piece of flesh, but “the life within it”, i.e. the universal (1991:148R). 
It is not sufficient to isolate one’s intention to a specific unit in a chain of events, for, 
within each unit, there is a universal element, of which the moral subject should be 
aware. For this reason, the moral subject cannot reasonably claim that it intended to set 
fire to just one section of the wooden house, without being aware that this would almost 
definitely result in a blaze.  
Of course, in the world of externality, in which the moral subject necessarily 
acts, things can go wrong. The moral subject cannot expect to anticipate every possible 
consequence of its action. In some cases, the disparity between intention and 
consequences may be vast; for example, it is possible that, in lighting the candles on my 
child’s birthday cake, I accidentally set fire to my house. In considering responsibility in 
cases like this, it is vital to take seriously the notion that it was not my intention to start 
a fire. But, in other cases, Hegel is less forgiving. Perhaps the arsonist doesn’t expect 
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the fire to spread so far, or unwittingly kills those inside the property. In these 
situations, the moral agent is responsible for the unforeseen consequences, since it 
inheres in such an action that it may extend to unpredictable and immeasurable 
consequences. To illustrate this, Hegel cites the old proverb, “The stone belongs to the 
devil when it leaves the hand that threw it” (1991:148A). The moral subject must 
anticipate that certain acts can have dangerous consequences. In other words, the action 
itself has a right to be understood properly. Hegel calls this the “right of objectivity of 
the action” (1991:148). The action has the right to be “known and willed by a thinking 
agent” (1991:148). Only those without the capacity for rational thought – “children, 
imbeciles, lunatics, etc.” – can escape this right.   
Therefore, an irresolvable tension emerges in the Philosophy of Right: how far 
can I claim that my intention did not coincide with the consequences of my action? 
What do I hold myself responsible for and what do other people hold me responsible 
for? As a rational, moral subject, I am expected to have intelligent intentions; yet I 
cannot claim to predict every result of my conduct. So, how much of the deed can I 
subsume under my intention? In morality, there are no shared standards, so this tension 
remains unresolved. There exists a continual balancing act between intention and 
responsibility. This unresolved tension is another example of the fact that, in the 
Philosophy of Right, freedom is both within and without the will’s control. The will 
wants to determine itself to behave in accordance with right, but it acts in a world of 
contingency, where things can go wrong. The idea will become important in the later 
chapters of my thesis.  
The moral subject has the right to understand its actions as the successful 
fulfilment of its intentions and, therefore, it has the right to find satisfaction in its 
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actions. The right to satisfaction relates to the particular aspect of intention; I perform a 
given act because of its “subjective value and interest for me” (1991:150 my emphasis). 
We usually refer to this as the ‘motive’ for an action. Let us return to the example of 
murder for a moment. Hegel writes, “The murder was not committed for the sake of 
murder; on the contrary, some particular positive end was also present” (1991:149). 
Perhaps the murder was carried out as a particular act of revenge. If so, this would be 
the “particular positive end”. To invoke another (legal) example: I may give to a 
particular charity because I like the specific work they do. In this case, I am satisfying 
my particular opinions through my action (we shall return to the notion of charity in 
Chapter Five). The right to satisfaction represents subjective freedom in its concrete 
form. The subject, when it acts, wills “the fulfilment of its desire and gratification of its 
passions” (1991:150A). For Hegel, fulfilling our desires is a fundamental aspect of 
morality; it is not something from which we should separate moral judgements. He 
describes the right to satisfaction as the “higher moral viewpoint”, in which we do not 
“[stop] short at the gulf between the self-consciousness of the human being and the 
objectivity of the deed” (1991:150A). Hegel considers the right to satisfaction as an 
essential mark of the modern age. 
However, the content of satisfaction, at this point in the dialectic, still derives 
from the natural will, which consists of “needs, inclination, passions, opinions, fancies, 
etc.” (1991:150). Because this content is natural and given, when the will acts to satisfy 
it, the will does not determine itself in accordance with its own freedom. So, even 
though the will has a right to find satisfaction in its actions, the desires on which it acts 
are still provided by nature, and not its rationality. The aim to satisfy these natural 
desires is welfare or happiness. Of course, it is important to note that, contained within 
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the concept of welfare or happiness, is the moral subject’s ability to stand above and 
evaluate its desires (just like the ‘natural will’ and the ‘choosing will’, which we 
discussed in the previous chapter). We learn in section twenty of the Introduction that, 
“in happiness, thought already has some power over the drives” (1991:52A). In order to 
maximise its happiness, the moral will has to order its preferences and decide which 
actions will result in the greatest satisfaction. However, at this stage, the content of 
satisfaction remains given (it is not until the moral subject adopts the good as its end, 
that it has freedom as its object). Hegel doesn’t condemn the natural content of 
satisfaction. He is keen to point out that the natural passions of the moral subject belong 
to the moral subject as a living being, and are not simply opposed to freedom. Having 
questioned whether the moral subject has a right to set these natural drives as its end, 
Hegel claims, “The fact he is living is not contingent … but in accordance with reason, 
and to that extent he has a right to make his need his end. There is nothing degrading 
about being alive” (1991:151A). For Hegel, right to find satisfaction is an essential part 
of morality (though it will eventually be preserved in the non-contingent and sublated 
form of the good). He claims that only “abstract reflection fixes this moment 
[satisfaction] in its difference from and opposition to the universal, and so produces a 
view of morality as a perennial and hostile struggle against one’s own satisfaction, as in 
the injunction: ‘Do with repugnance what duty commands” (1991:152R). This obvious 
attack on Kant (or, more accurately, his misinterpretation of Kant) serves to highlight 
that Hegel includes the subject’s right to satisfaction as an essential part of morality. 
As we have seen, welfare concerns the particularity of the moral subject. In 
pursuing its own welfare, the moral subject evaluates its intentions and pursues those 
activities which bring it satisfaction. However, Hegel goes on to claim that, as well as 
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its own welfare, the moral subject should also take into account the welfare of others. 
He writes, “The welfare of many other particular beings in general is thus also an 
essential end and right of subjectivity” (1991:153). This move from the welfare of the 
self to the welfare of others is made rather swiftly in Hegel’s account, but it is possible 
identify the fundamental, logical move behind it: the moral will actively determines 
itself to be free. But, the ‘self’ that it determines is both particular and universal. So, in 
as far as it is universal, it is, indeed, the self of others, too. It is a necessary part of 
freedom that every moral subject pursues its own happiness. Therefore, Hegel writes 
that, “The implementation of my end ... has [the] identity of my will and the will of 
others in it – it has a positive reference to the will of others” (1991:139). As a moral 
subject, I should act not only for the sake of my happiness, but also for the happiness of 
others. 
In welfare, the moral subject pursues its own particular desires (and, as we have 
just established, the particular desires of other moral subjects). However, it is possible 
that, without anything to constrain it, the pursuit of particular interests can lead to an 
infringement of the legal rights of personality that form the basis of abstract right. If the 
moral subject has nothing but its own/others’ welfare to guide its decisions, then the 
fundamental rights of personality could be under threat. For example, if I pursue my 
desire to accumulate possessions to the extent that I am stealing from or murdering 
people for them, then I am violating the fundamental rights of personality which are 
essential to freedom. Hegel is adamant that this should not be so. He writes, “My 
particularity, ... like that of others, is only a right at all in so far as I am free. It cannot 
therefore assert itself in contradiction to this substantial basis on which it rests” 
(1991:153). The intention to promote welfare cannot justify an action which runs 
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contrary to the rights of the free person. So the moral will, at this stage, remains reliant 
upon the abstract rights of personality for its universal element. Welfare must be 
restrained by right, so as to prevent it negating the universal aspect freedom; to prevent 
it becoming a “one-sided” and standard-less subjectivism. Right (and by this I mean the 
upholding of the rights of personality, as discussed in abstract right) must be considered 
alongside welfare when considering how to act. The moral will can only pursue 
happiness to the extent that it does not infringe right. 
Welfare without right is inadequate and one-sided. But right without welfare is 
equally insufficient. In certain situations, we have to sacrifice the rights of personality in 
order to live. Hegel describes this as the “right of necessity” (1991:154). Hegel uses the 
example of stealing a loaf of bread in order to survive and claims that “it would be 
wrong to regard such an action as common theft” (1991:155A). Life itself has a right in 
opposition to the abstract right of personality. And if we were not allowed to take 
certain measures in order to preserve our life, then our life itself, and thus our entire 
freedom, would be negated. Hegel describes this as the “ultimate wrong” (1991:155A). 
So, at times, we have to exercise the right of necessity and prioritise welfare over right. 
By doing so, we avoid the guiding principle attributed to the Holy Roman Emperor 
Ferdinand I, Let justice be done, even if the world should perish, to which Hegel alludes 
in section 130.  
By themselves, welfare and right are insufficient as a guide for action. Welfare 
has particularity without universality, and right has universality without particularity. In 
order to prevent a one-sided moral decision, welfare and right must coincide. However, 
since the content of welfare is still natural and given, it remains a matter of contingency 
as to whether welfare and right will coincide. The will’s particular desires may happen 
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to coincide with its universal freedom, but they may not (as we discussed in the 
‘stealing’ and ‘murdering’ examples above). To put it into logical terms, the particular 
and universal moments of the will are, at present, only contingently related. What is 
required is a concept that unites welfare and right in a non-contingent fashion. The will 
requires a concept that, if adopted, will ensure that the will’s particular desires always 
conform to the universal principles of freedom. This concept is the good. The good, we 
are told, “has a complete content whose import encompasses both right and welfare” 
(1991:157A). But the good does more than simply ‘contain’ right and welfare; it is an 
idea which unites the concept of the will – freedom – with the particular will. The good 
is a fundamental dialectical point in the Philosophy of Right because, when the will 
pursues the good as its end, it no longer has merely natural or given inclinations as its 
content (as it did in welfare). Instead, it wills its own freedom and unites its universal 
and particular moments. It was precisely this requirement – that the will, in its 
particularity, will the universal – that led us into morality in the first place. So, when we 
arrive at the good, we arrive at a resolution of the dialectic of freedom in the Philosophy 
of Right. The good is the moment at which the ideal of morality is realised and the 
obligation of the particular will to will the universal is fulfilled (although, it will 
become apparent that this obligation cannot be realised in morality). As such, Hegel 
describes the good as “realised freedom, the absolute and ultimate end of the world” 
(1991:157). 
However, it seems as though we encounter a difficulty when we arrive at duty, 
which is the first determination of the good. So far we have been told that the good 
unites welfare and right in a non-contingent manner; yet, as soon as the good is 
characterised as duty, Hegel claims that it is impossible to arrive at any determinate 
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instances of the good. His notorious critique of Kantian duty is used to illustrate that 
duty is insufficient as a guide for action.15 Irrespective of whether Hegel's critique of 
Kant is successful, it is essential to recognise that, even within Hegel’s own system, the 
concept of duty is the object of criticism. Hegel describes duty as “indeterminate” and 
“identity without content” (1991:162). But, surely, within Hegel’s account, duty does 
have content: welfare and right. So why does Hegel describe duty as indeterminate? Is 
there an inconsistency in Hegel’s account?  
I don’t believe there is. In my opinion, this apparent inconsistency can be 
explained by appealing to the relationship at the heart of morality: the relationship of 
unqualified obligation that exists between the particular moral subject and the universal. 
Let us explore this further.  
Ever since the dialectical moment of crime and punishment in abstract right, the 
will has had to determine itself to recognise the universal. Before crime, the will related 
immediately to the universal. But, having negated right (in crime), the will is forced to 
re-examine and reaffirm what it takes right to be. It turns towards its own subjectivity to 
explore, for itself, the nature of its own freedom and the best way to remain faithful to 
it. In other words, it aims to unite its particular and universal moments. This is the goal 
of morality. From the moment we enter morality, the moral subject exercises its 
subjectivity in an attempt to reaffirm right and determine for itself what is good. But, 
throughout this process, the moral subject remains confronted by the presence of a right 
in itself, from which it departed during crime.16 It recognises that, whilst it must learn to 
will the universal, it is different from the universal. It no longer enjoys an immediate 
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 Hegel [1991:162-3] 
16
 Hegel claims that, even during crime, “right, as an absolute, cannot be cancelled”. In other words, even 
though the appearance of right (contract) is negated in crime, right in itself – the will’s essential freedom 
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relationship with the universal; instead, the universal becomes something with which it 
must align its particularity. And, in morality, we witness the moral subject’s endeavour 
to close the gap between its particularity and the universal, i.e. its attempt to will the 
good. Hegel writes, “In the moral sphere, the will still relates to that which has being in 
itself; it is thus the point of view of difference, and the process associated with it is that 
whereby the subjective will achieves identity with its concept” (1991:137A). So, whilst 
the moral will has the freedom to exercise its subjectivity, its ultimate obligation is 
towards the universal and to its essence as a free will. In one of the opening sections of 
morality, Hegel writes, “the moral point of view is one of relationship, obligation, or 
requirement” (1991:137). The moral subject stands in relationship to the good as 
something it ought to determine. Morality is the sphere of “perennial obligation” 
(1991:163R). 
It is worth noting at this point that, if we take Hegel’s “perennial obligation” 
claim seriously, it doesn’t appear that the moral will can ever fulfil its requirement to 
determine the good. All it can do is strive towards it. This idea is supported by Hegel’s 
characterisation of the moral will as “sheer restless activity which cannot yet arrive at 
something that is” (1991:137A). It is only in the ethical sphere that the will achieves 
identity with the good. And when we stop to consider the logical character of the good, 
this is not surprising. The good is such an important dialectical moment in the 
Philosophy of Right precisely because, in willing it, the will unites its particularity with 
its universal status as an essentially free being. In willing the good, the will is 
guaranteeing that, whatever its particular interests, it will not violate what is right in 
itself, i.e. its own freedom. In morality, we are introduced to the logical structure of the 
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good, but as something to which the moral will stands in a relationship of obligation: 
the will is not able to actualise the good until we reach ethical life. It is only in 
Sittlichkeit that the good as “fundamental realised freedom, the absolute and ultimate 
end of the world” emerges (1991:157).  
However, for the moment, let us return our attention to Hegel’s claim that duty 
is indeterminate.  
I believe that the key to understanding Hegel’s claim lies in section 133. At the 
outset of this section, Hegel asserts, “The relation of the good to the particular subject is 
that the good is the essential character of the subject’s will” (1991:161). He then goes 
onto claim that, because of this relation, the particular subject has an “unqualified 
obligation in this connection” (1991:161). This is unproblematic. We have already seen 
that, with the move into morality, the moral subject is defined by its quest to will the 
universal, thus remaining true to its status as an essentially free being. In order to 
remain faithful to its own freedom, the moral subject must seek to will the good. But 
Hegel then goes onto claim that, “Because particularity is distinct from the good and 
falls within the subjective will, the good is initially determined only as universal 
abstract essentiality – i.e. as duty” (1991:161). Why is this so?  Why is the particular 
will distinct from the good and not part of the good? Is Hegel correct to claim this and 
therefore correct to claim that duty is abstract? I believe he is correct to claim this, 
because, at this stage in the dialectic, the moral will is different from the universal. It 
stands in a relation to the universal (i.e. it is striving to will it), but it knows also that it 
is not the universal. It departed from the universal during the crime, and it now 
associates its freedom with its ability for self-determination. So we arrive at the 
fundamental contradiction at the heart of morality, and one which explains Hegel’s 
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seemingly inconsistent remarks about the indeterminate nature of duty: the moral will 
thinks of itself as both different from and identical to the universal. It is universally free, 
but it has to determine for itself how to remain faithful to this freedom. It is for this 
reason that the good is both the “essential character” of the particular will but why 
Hegel describes the particular will as “distinct from the good” (1991:161).  
Given that the particular will is, at this stage, distinct from the good, duty is 
rendered abstract, i.e. it is regarded, by the will, as something separate from it. We 
could say that duty is simply a reminder of the moral will’s unconditional obligation to 
pursue the good. This, in itself, is an important notion; the moral subject must 
appreciate its duty to will the good (and this is something for which Hegel praises 
Kant’s moral philosophy). But, when we enquire into what the moral will’s determinate 
duties are, duty cannot provide any answers. In section 134, Hegel writes, “what is 
duty? For this determination, all that is available so far is this: to do right, and to 
promote welfare, one’s own welfare and … the welfare of others” (1991:161). But this 
is not sufficient. Although welfare and right “give rise” to duty, they are not contained 
in duty itself, for, once we arrive at duty, we enter the “higher sphere of the 
unconditional" (1991:162). We become aware of our “unqualified obligation” to will 
the good and remain faithful to our own freedom (1991:161). Right and welfare are 
“conditional and limited” and, once we reach the unconditional realm of duty, it is 
impossible to return to them as a guide for action. To put this another way: the moral 
will approaches duty through its considerations of welfare and right but, having 
encountered duty, is overtaken by its requirement to will the good. Duty is a necessary 
moment in morality, since it reinforces the relationship of obligation between the moral 
will and the universal (for this reason, Hegel describes it as “the essential or universal 
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element in the moral self-consciousness” (1991:162)) but, by itself, it is empty. It has no 
determinate content. Duty encapsulates the essence of morality – that the moral will 
must strive to determine the good – but cannot provide us with anything determinate. In 
the hope of discovering specific instances of the good, the moral will must turn inwards 
and appeal to its conscience.  
In the next chapter, I shall examine Hegel’s account of conscience within 
morality.  
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Chapter Three  
 
Moral Conscience and Evil 
 
The moral subject strives to will the unconditional good. However, as we established in 
chapter two, the moral subject recognises the unconditional good as something distinct 
from it and, therefore, the notion of duty – the unqualified obligation to will the good – 
is rendered abstract: the moral subject knows it must do its duty, but it cannot derive 
any particular duties from the notion of duty itself. Duty is thus indeterminate. We have 
reached a stage in the dialectic at which the moral subject is aware of its formal 
obligation to ‘act for the sake of duty’, but it has no specific duties on which to act. This 
is problematic because, as a particular subject, the moral subject requires particular 
moral principles to guide its behaviour. So, whilst it is essential to recognise the 
importance of duty, the moral subject requires more than this abstract obligation; it 
needs to relate its duty to the particular choices it makes in its own life. The moral 
subject inhabits a world of determinacy – it is this subject, living in this community, 
with this vocation and these interests, making these choices – and it is precisely these 
determinate factors that the moral subject needs to reconcile with the unconditional 
good. This is the goal of morality. However, this cannot be achieved if we conceive of 
the good in terms of abstract duty. In paragraph 136, we learn that, “One may speak of 
duty in the most sublime manner … But if it leads to nothing determinate, it ultimately 
grows tedious, for the spirit requires that particularity to which it is entitled” 
(1991:163A my italics). The moral subject “requires” determinate obligations on which 
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to act. It is, therefore, essential that the moral subject develop a system of determinate 
moral principles. It is only through doing so that the moral subject can realise the good.  
But from where is the moral subject going to derive particular moral 
obligations? We have established that it cannot derive any from the abstract notion of 
duty. Nor can it look towards its society or community for objective, shared standards, 
because, at this stage in the dialectical progression, there is none (the whole purpose of 
morality is to establish what these should be). In an attempt to obtain particular 
instances of the good, the moral will must turn towards its own subjectivity. Hegel 
writes, “Because of the abstract character of the good … particularity in general, falls 
within subjectivity” (1991:163). The moral will must examine its subjectivity in order 
to construct a system of determinate moral principles.  
Of course, from the outset, the morality section of the Philosophy of Right 
centres around the moral will’s right to self-determination and the ability to express its 
own subjectivity through its actions. In this respect, the exercising of subjectivity is 
nothing new; the moral will has always understood its actions as expressions of its 
subjectivity. After all, the moral will is the self-determining will. However, the extent to 
which action is permeated by subjectivity increases as we progress through morality 
(from purpose, to knowledge, intention, welfare, etc.), and we now encounter the 
moment at which the right to exercise subjectivity reaches fruition. The moral will, 
having realised the abstract and indeterminate nature of duty, has nothing other than its 
own subjectivity on which to rely as a guide for action (there are, as yet, no shared, 
objective, social standards on which to base its moral decisions). The moral subject has 
to provide a content for duty from within itself. It has to decide for itself what is right 
and what is wrong; and it is only through doing so that the moral subject can produce 
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particular duties on which to base its actions. Hegel writes, “Subjectivity, in its 
universality reflected into itself, is the absolute certainty of itself; it is that which posits 
particularity, and it is the determining and decisive factor” (1991:163). This type of 
subjectivity is the moral conscience.  
The moral conscience marks the fruition of subjective freedom in the Philosophy 
of Right, for it is the moment in which the moral subject is bound by nothing other than 
its own subjectivity. The right which permeates the entire moral sphere, the right of the 
subjective will17, finds its ultimate expression in the moral conscience: in appealing to 
its conscience, the moral subject recognises itself as the only legitimate moral authority. 
It withdraws from externality in an attempt to determine, for itself, what is good. It is 
the “decisive factor” and the “absolute inward certainty of itself” (1991:163). 
Conscience posits its own convictions as determinate instances of the good and, in 
doing so, refuses to submit to external moral demands. As such, conscience captures the 
essence of morality, which is to play an active role in determining moral structures and 
to reject unreflective moral behaviour. For this reason, I consider conscience to be an 
extremely important phenomenon in the Philosophy of Right, and one which, when 
understood correctly, illuminates Hegel’s position on subjective freedom as a whole. 
This is a view which is supported by current Hegel scholarship. In his book, 
Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, Neuhouser refers to conscience as the “central 
feature” of moral subjectivity and suggests that, when investigating the notoriously 
problematic relationship between morality and ethical life in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, it is essential to ask whether or not ethical life can accommodate conscience 
(2000:229). Similarly, Dean Moyar characterises conscience as the “central figure” in 
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 See chapter two for a discussion of the right of the subjective will [Paragraph 132: The right of the 
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the transition from morality to Ethical life, and argues that, “once [the status of 
conscience within ethical life] is understood, [Hegel’s] transition from morality to 
ethical life is both more comprehensible and less threatening to liberal freedom” 
(2008:3). And, echoing this sentiment, Dahlstrom claims, “Demonstrating the dialectic 
of conscience is a way of establishing the necessity of morality for-and-within ethical 
life” (1993:186). All three of these commentators recommend that we approach the 
question of subjective freedom within the Philosophy of Right (and the essential 
question of whether or not Hegel respects it) via a detailed examination of the dialectic 
of conscience. If we can establish that conscience – the fruition of subjective freedom – 
has a meaningful function within ethical life, we can further undermine the infamous 
criticism that Hegel allows little or no room for subjective freedom within his political 
sphere. My thesis will argue that conscience does play a meaningful role within ethical 
life and, thus, that Hegel is not dismissive of subjective freedom.18 In order to do this, it 
is first necessary to look at how Hegel introduces conscience in the moral sphere. This 
will occupy the remainder of this chapter. 
The obligation that permeates the entire morality section of the Philosophy of 
Right is that the moral subject align its particularity with the unconditional good. 
However, as we have seen, conceiving of this obligation in terms of ‘duty’ only leads to 
a moral impasse. The notion of duty, by itself, takes the form of an abstract obligation 
(the moral subject knows it must act for the sake of duty, but it cannot derive any 
particular duties from the notion of duty itself). It is the moment of conscience that 
promises a way out of this impasse, for it is during the moment of conscience that the 
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 I shall, in later chapters, argue that the right to subjective freedom is retained in the Aufhebung from 
the moral conscience to true conscience of ethical life.  
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abstract idea of duty can become actual. Through examining its conscience, the moral 
subject attempts to give content to the abstract notion of duty. Hegel writes that 
conscience is “the power to which the good, which is at first only Idea and obligation, 
owes its actuality” (1991:166). Without the moment of conscience, the moral subject 
would recognise its unconditional obligation to act for the sake of duty, but it would not 
be able to produce any particular duties. It would remain in a sphere of perennial 
obligation, without content. It is conscience that holds the promise of fulfilling the goal 
of morality; for it is conscience that allows the moral subject to give itself a particular 
content. 
But what exactly is the moment of conscience? What goes into this process of 
providing content to the abstract nature of duty?  
Conscience is the process through which the moral will makes a judgement 
about whether or not a specific action accords with the good. By consulting its 
conscience, the moral will aims to acquire a motivating belief or conviction, which will 
give it a reason for acting in a particular way. Hegel describes this process as “the 
power of judgement which determines solely from itself what is good”(1991:166). The 
first thing to notice from this quotation is that consulting one’s conscience is a solitary 
process: conscience produces its convictions “from itself”. This will, of course, become 
important later. But, the second thing to notice is that Hegel refers to this deliberative 
process as the power of judgement. To which type of judgement is Hegel referring here? 
Is Hegel using the term loosely, to mean something like ‘conviction’ or ‘sensation’? Or 
is he using the term in a stricter sense? Dudley explores this question in his book, 
Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy. He argues that Hegel uses the term ‘judgement’ 
purposefully, and that the type of judgement in which the conscience engages 
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corresponds to the Judgement of the Concept in Hegel’s Logic. This is because, as 
conscience, the moral will tries to decide whether or not an given object (in this case, an 
action), measures up to a given concept (in this case, the unconditional good). The 
moral will must “compare its individual actions with the concept of a good action, so as 
to judge in each case whether an action is good and required by (or at least in 
accordance with) its freedom” (2002:51). This seems plausible. The moral will, by 
exercising its conscience, judges whether or not a specific action is in accordance with 
the concept of the unconditional good; whether or not a specific action fulfils its duty. 
However, Dudley continues to explain why it is problematic to conceive of conscience 
in this way. In order to articulate his concerns, we need to indulge temporarily in some 
of Hegel’s logical terminology. But, by doing so, we can highlight rather succinctly the 
dangers of claiming that conscience is the power of judgement.  
Contained within the Judgement of the Concept are three types of judgement: 
assertoric, problematic and apodeictic. An assertoric judgement simply identifies an 
individual subject with a universal predicate; for example, as Dudley suggests, ‘this 
action is good’ (2002:51). This is exactly the kind of claim that the moral conscience 
makes (and, if it is successful, will unite the universal and particular). But, the difficulty 
with this kind of judgement – as the name suggests – is that it is merely asserted and its 
justification is, therefore, only subjective. The objective truth of the judgement is not 
guaranteed. So, in the case of conscience, whether or not a given action does indeed 
conform to the unconditional good is a simply matter of contingency. Because the 
assertoric judgement is subjective, it is also problematic. A problematic judgement is 
one that can be “confronted with equal right by its contradictory.” (Hegel 1969:660). In 
other words, because a judgement is merely asserted, it is possible to assert the opposite 
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and for both of these judgements to have an equal claim to the truth. For example, my 
conscience may tell me that ‘this action is good’, and another conscience may claim that 
‘this action is bad’. With only subjective justifications available, both judgements are 
equally defensible. The moral conscience experiences this problem. If conscience 
recognises its own entitlement to assert what is good, then, in turn, it must recognise 
another conscience’s right to do exactly the same. The claims of the two consciences 
may disagree, yet it is impossible to choose between them. In an attempt to do so, we 
could employ an apodeictic judgement. This type of judgement tries to solve the 
problem of subjective justification by constituting the particular in such a way that it 
can be legitimately subsumed under the concept. As Dudley writes, “here there is a 
specified criterion (having a particular constitution) that justifies the application of the 
universal predicate” (2002:52). So, for example, we could say, ‘if we constitute a 
particular action in this way, we can subsume it under the universal good’. But the 
problem is obvious. We cannot know how to constitute a particular action unless we 
already know the content of the universal predicate (i.e. the good). And if we already 
knew the content of the good, we wouldn’t need to consult our conscience in the first 
place! We are confronted with a paradoxical situation. And, as a result of this, Dudley 
argues, it is a mistake to say that conscience can always use the power of judgement to 
successfully determine which actions correspond to the good. He concludes, “All that 
the moral will can use to determine its duties is its subjective certainty” (2002:52). 
Of course, this somewhat swift discussion highlights many difficulties to which 
we shall return, both in this chapter and later chapters (since an integral theme in my 
thesis is the debilitating subjectivity of the moral conscience). However, I think it is 
helpful to examine what Hegel means when he refers to conscience as the power of 
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judgement. What Dudley accurately shows in the previous analysis is that, if we identify 
conscience with Hegel’s judgement of the concept, saying that conscience has the 
‘power of judgement’ doesn’t amount to anything more than saying that conscience has 
the power of ‘subjective conviction’. There is nothing to separate an assertoric 
judgement from mere opinion (albeit an opinion strongly believed). We therefore have 
to be careful, when reading Hegel’s account of conscience, not to attribute this term 
‘judgement’ with any kind of objective validity. Of course, it is possible that conscience 
might make a correct judgement; Dudley does not deny the possibility of objectively 
true judgements. But what he does emphasise is that this objective truth is not 
guaranteed. Therefore, when we read that conscience ‘judges’ an action to be good, we 
should read it along the same lines as ‘conscience has a conviction that this is good’, or 
‘conscience strongly believes that this is good’. Within the section on moral conscience, 
judgements, opinions and convictions are all subjective in character.  
With this in mind, let us return to Hegel’s description of conscience in section 
136 and 137. Another thing we learn about conscience is that it involves a complete 
withdrawal into the self. We learn that conscience is the “deepest inner solitude within 
oneself in which all externals and all limitation have disappeared” (1991:164A). 
Conscience is not bound by the external and determinate world. During the moment of 
conscience, the moral subject abstracts from the world and is guided by nothing other 
than its own subjectivity. It performs a “descent into the self” (1991:164A). This type of 
radical subjectivity is the moral conscience. Having abstracted from the world, 
conscience can reflect on itself and arrive at particular duties that it thinks fulfil its 
obligation to will the good. But what criteria does conscience have for arriving at a 
particular duty? Well, at this stage, the only criterion conscience has is that it believes 
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the action to be good. Conscience gives itself content through an immediate conviction 
that something fulfils its duty. If conscience judges a particular act to be good, then it is 
good. The conscience is “pure certainty of itself alone” (1991:166). We will return to 
this idea shortly.  
Conscience has long been a powerful term in moral philosophy, valued for its 
ability to speak to everybody in a recognisable voice: the authentic voice of the 
innermost self. It represents the uniquely modern ethical view that, irrespective of social 
conditions, it is possible to access an uncorrupted, moral authority; namely, our own 
conviction. I think that, to this day, we value conscience for the same reason. We 
cherish the idea that our moral behaviour is not limited to obedience; that we can 
possess convictions, even if these run contrary to what society demands. And we 
believe, perhaps naively, that if we remain faithful to our convictions, we cannot go 
wrong (we shall return to this idea later in my thesis). Conscience takes us beyond 
ethical immediacy. It requires us to reflect on moral principles and determine, for 
ourselves, how to act. For Hegel, the moral conscience is also a valuable mark of 
modernity. In the lecture notes19 which accompany paragraph 136 of the Philosophy of 
Right, it states: 
 
conscience represents an exalted point of view, a point of view of the 
modern world, which has for the first time attained this consciousness, 
this descent into the self. Earlier and more sensuous ages have before 
them something external and given ... but my conscience knows itself 
                                                 
19
 The lecture notes (marked as Additions) in the Cambridge text (1991) are taken from an edition of the 
Philosophy of Right compiled by Eduard Gans and first published in 1833. The lecture notes themselves 
were compiled by H. G. Hotho, who attended Hegel’s lectures of 1822-1823, and K. G. von Griesheim, 
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as thought, and that this thought of mine is my sole source of 
obligation. 
 
In this passage, Hegel praises conscience for taking us beyond the stage at which 
we submit to that which is “external and given” (by this, Hegel may have in mind the 
demands of the church or a non-rational state). For Hegel, unreflective submission to 
external authority demonstrates a primitive understanding of freedom, for it neglects the 
right of the subjective will. Despite his reverence for the Ancient Greek world, Hegel 
did not believe that the pre-Socratic, Greek Polis had progressed beyond this early stage 
of freedom.20 The Greeks had a customary ethics, which was unreflective and 
immediate. In the Philosophy of History, Hegel writes that “morality properly so called 
– subjective conviction and intention – ha[d] not yet manifested itself” in the Greek 
world (2004:251). It was Socrates who first challenged this system. Hegel describes 
Socrates as the “inventor of morality”, since he was the first to proclaim that citizens 
could discover for themselves what is good. By questioning the customs of Ancient 
Greece, Socrates encouraged the Greek citizens to develop moral insight and 
conviction. He appealed to his infamous ‘daimon’ to guide his behaviour; thus shifting 
the locus of moral truth, from external laws, to his own subjectivity. For Hegel, this 
move was the beginning of a long, historical process whereby subjectivity, and not the 
customary objectivity, laid claim to the good. However, in an ethically-immediate 
society, in which only external authority prevails, such examples of conscientious 
objection threaten the state. Therefore, Socrates’ challenge was met with hostility: 
“That very subjective Freedom which constitutes the principle and determines the 
                                                                                                                                               
who attended Hegel’s lectures of 1824-1825.  
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peculiar form of Freedom in our world – which forms the absolute basis of our political 
and religious life, could not manifest itself in Greece otherwise than as a destructive 
element” (2002:252). Even so, Socrates remains the earliest example of moral 
conscience, and, for this, Hegel reveres him.   
Hegel’s celebration of conscience is not limited to his discussion of Socrates. In 
fact, in other passages, Hegel becomes rather emphatic in his praise of conscience. As 
well as describing conscience as an “exalted point of view”, he also refers to it as the 
“absolute entitlement of the subjective self-consciousness” and a “sanctuary which it 
would be sacrilege to violate” (1991:164R). Since Hegel is so often accused of hostility 
towards the moral conscience, it is essential to take seriously the claims he makes here. 
However, Hegel’s account of conscience within morality seems to take on a 
contradictory character once he begins to criticise its ability to determine the good. 
Having just hailed conscience as a necessary expression of subjective freedom and the 
mark of modernity, Hegel goes on to claim that conscience has “no distinctive content 
of its own”, that “the state cannot recognise the conscience … any more than science 
can grant any validity to subjective opinion” and also that conscience “consists simply 
in the possibility of turning at any moment into evil” (1991:164/165R/167R). Can we 
reconcile these claims? Is there an ambiguity within Hegel’s account of conscience? 
I believe we can reconcile these claims and that the ambiguity lies not in Hegel’s 
account of conscience, but in the very concept of moral conscience itself. This 
ambiguity is only resolved with the Aufhebung from moral conscience to the true 
conscience of ethical life. Let us explore this further.  
                                                                                                                                               
20
 See Hegel’s Philosophy of History [2004:250-256] 
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As with most stages in the Philosophy of Right, contained within the moral 
conscience is an implicit contradiction. The moral subject turns towards its conscience 
because it requires determinate principles on which to act; duty cannot provide these 
principles, so the moral subject must examine its own subjectivity in an attempt to 
actualise the unconditional good. It is, therefore, the subjective quality of conscience 
that qualifies it as a guide for moral action. Based on this, the moral subject should 
follow its convictions. However, it is precisely this subjective quality of conscience that 
also disqualifies it as a guide for action. This is because, by appealing to itself alone, the 
moral conscience cannot provide objectively-valid principles; it can provide only 
subjective, one-sided convictions. To put it in more Hegelian terms, the conscience, at 
this stage in the Philosophy of Right, wills only the form of the good. 
The moral subject has an “unqualified” obligation to will the good. Its appeal to 
conscience follows logically from the indeterminate nature of duty and is part of the 
moral subject’s obligation to align particular and universal moments. As such, an appeal 
to conscience has the form of the good, because freedom demands that the moral 
subject consult its conscience. By doing so, the moral subject recognises its obligation 
towards the good and the process by which it should will it. However, at this stage in 
the Philosophy of Right, there is no guarantee that the content of conscience, i.e. the 
specific moral principle on which the conscience decides to act, will coincide with what 
is objectively good. The moral subject may intend to will the good through a genuine 
appeal to conscience, but, its success is not guaranteed: “The conscience is … subject to 
judgement as to its truth or falsity” (1991:165R). In short, conscience is fallible. And 
this is because conscience provides the content of duty from itself alone. The moment 
of conscience is a “total withdrawal into the self”, during which the moral subject 
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becomes its own moral authority (1991:164A). Conscience gives itself content. It 
produces its own moral convictions. Hence, these convictions are subjective, and may 
or may not form part of the unconditional good (as we discussed earlier with reference 
to assertoric judgements). Therefore, all we can achieve through an appeal to 
conscience, is the “certainty of this subject” (1991:164). Even though the individual 
moral conscience may be convinced that it is willing the good, we cannot guarantee that 
the content of conscience will coincide with what is objectively good.  
And simply ‘trying harder’ does not help, for  built into the very concept of 
conscience is the notion that it is its own authority. We saw earlier that conscience 
understands itself as its “sole source of obligation” (1991:164A). So, even if we aimed 
to consult conscience at a deeper level, we would simply be entering an infinite regress, 
or begging the question. Conscience has nothing other than itself for moral calibration. 
This is what Wood refers to when he claims that, “Conscience cannot … avoid an 
attitude of self-worship” (1990:174). And it is precisely this fact that makes conscience 
a one-sided and potentially unreliable guide for moral action. Subjectivity is, therefore, 
both the conscience’s defining feature and its downfall. Hegel writes that conscience’s 
“appeal solely to itself is directly opposed to what it seeks to be – that is, the rule for a 
rational and universal mode of action which is valid in and for itself” (1991:165). Hegel 
refers to this as the “ambiguity” of conscience (1991:165R).  
As such, Hegel claims: 
 
Here, within the formal point of view of morality, conscience 
lacks this objective content, and is thus for itself the infinite 
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formal certainty of itself, which for this very reason is at the 
same time the certainty of this subject. (1991:164)  
 
So, as we have seen, the moral conscience cannot lay claim to objectively-valid 
moral principles. All it can say is that, as a particular subject, it has a particular 
conviction. Conscience, at this stage in the Philosophy of Right, is purely formal. It 
knows that, in order to will the good, it must provide a content to duty. But, because 
conscience provides this content from within itself alone, only the form of the good is 
present. The objective truth of the content of conscience is not guaranteed. The moral 
conscience is simply “infinite, formal certainty of itself” (1991:164). And this is 
precisely why Hegel claims in section 137 that, “The point of view of morality … 
contains only the formal conscience” (1991:165R).  
There is a second sense in which the moral conscience is necessarily formal, and 
this relates to the contingent nature of its content. Although the moral will has 
internalised its moments of particularity and universality, it has not yet learned to align 
these with each other. This alignment, in itself, is the task of morality. However, for as 
long as these two moments remain separate, the moral will cannot guarantee that 
whatever it claims (as a particular subject) will correspond to the universal. This is why 
it is such a problem that the conscience gives itself content; because, as a moral will, its 
own particular content is not necessarily in line with what is universally good (if we 
were in the sphere of ethics, it would be a different story). This is the true meaning of 
being ‘formal’: that the content of the moral will is only contingently related to its true 
concept, i.e. its universal nature as a free being (in this case, what is unconditionally 
good). And this is precisely what gives conscience the potential to get things wrong. Of 
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course, it may happen that the conscience correctly judges something to be inline with 
its universal nature, but, as we saw earlier, this success is not guaranteed. The content of 
the moral conscience is not intrinsic to its concept as a free being, and, therefore, it 
remains formal. The moral will has to rely on something other than its universal nature 
as a free being to give itself content. In this instance, the moral will relies on its own 
convictions, which, although internal to it, are still a product of contingent particularity; 
which, in itself, is a type of authority. Conscience is still guided by that which doesn’t 
stem from its universal nature, even if these are its own subjective opinions. These 
subjective opinions are still ‘given’ to it. And this is the problem when we say that 
moral conscience is formal.  
What if we were to establish a community of moral consciences? If we could 
establish a ‘consensus’ of moral conviction, would this solve the problem of formality? 
Not surprisingly, the problem of formality would still remain. Firstly, there is no 
guarantee that the community of consciences could establish a consensus. And, even if 
they could, this consensus in itself would be contingent, since the content of each 
particular conscience is contingent (think back to ‘contract’ in abstract right). As soon 
as one member of the moral community changed its mind, the common agreement 
would collapse, along with the conviction. The limitations of the formal conscience 
cannot be solved by reaching out to the community. As we shall see later, Hegel does 
regard the ethical will as necessarily social, but, it is not the ‘sheer number of people’ 
that makes the difference: the ethical will has a subjective and objective content. Within 
morality, conscience lacks this objective content. So the problem of formality remains.  
We have already established that, because the moral conscience is formal, it has 
the potential to get things wrong. Moral conscience is fallible. Because of this, Hegel 
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claims that, “Conscience, as formal subjectivity, consists simply in the possibility of 
turning at any moment into evil” (1991:167R). For Hegel, evil [Böse], is simply the 
moment at which the moral subject consciously gives itself a content that does not 
accord with its universal nature as a free being, i.e. a content which does not conform to 
the unconditional good (“something opposed to the universality of the will” (1991: 
169R)). It is, therefore, clear to see that the formal conscience – whose content is only 
contingently linked to its universal nature – has the potential to be evil; for it is possible 
that the moral conscience gives itself a particular content that does not conform to the 
unconditional good. Not surprisingly, this is a worry for Hegel, and the dialectical 
progression from conscience to evil will eventually necessitate the move into ethical 
life. However, before we continue to discuss the dangers of moral conscience’s ability 
to will evil (and the six different types of evil), I first want to emphasise Hegel’s claim 
that, even though evil is undesirable, it is a necessary danger that emerges from the 
moral subject’s right to consult its own conscience.  
As we discussed earlier, Hegel considers the right of the subjective will as an 
indispensable mark of modernity. The right to consult one’s conscience, to reflect for 
oneself on what is good and to reject external, moral authorities, is something to be 
cherished, for it marks a necessary departure from unreflective, ethical immediacy. It 
was a feature that, for all his reverence of ancient Greek society, Hegel considered 
lacking from the Greek Polis. And, according to Hegel, it is a feature that it would be 
“sacrilege to violate” (1991:164R). However, with this indispensable right of 
subjectivity, the possibility for evil necessarily emerges; for, built into the very concept 
of conscience is the idea that conscience may get things wrong. The right to subjectivity 
does not entail that our subjective convictions will always be in line with the good (as 
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we discussed in previous paragraphs). The very fact that the moral subject consults its 
conscience, opens up the possibility for evil. This is why Hegel claims that the formal 
conscience is the “common root” of both good and evil (1991:167R). Consulting one’s 
conscience can lead to good (if the moral subject gives itself a content which accords 
with its universal nature), or it can lead to evil (if the moral subject gives itself a content 
which does not accord with its universal nature; which is, instead, based on arbitrary 
choice, needs, preferences, desires, etc.). It all depends on the particular content that 
conscience gives itself. So, the possibility to will the good and to will evil go hand-in-
hand. The possibility of evil emerges from exactly the same right as the possibility for 
good: the right of the subjective will. As such, Hegel goes on to claim that, “Thus, evil 
as well as good has its origin in the will, and the will in its concept is both good and 
evil” (1991:169R).  
In an interesting passage in the additional lecture notes by Hotho in Section 139, 
Hegel discusses how his conception of the origin of evil differs considerably from the 
Christian account of the origin of evil. In Hegel’s dialectical account, evil is something 
internal to the concept of the moral subject, and, as this concept unfolds, evil emerges 
alongside the possibility to will the good. Hegel acknowledges that, initially, this idea 
may seem counterintuitive, since we don’t immediately consider (or want to consider) 
evil as something inherent in our nature, “The difficulty about the question of how the 
will can also be evil usually arises because we think of the will as having only a positive 
relationship to itself, and envisage it as something which exists for itself, i.e. as the 
good” (1991:169R). But, in order to avoid this difficulty, he suggests that, when 
considering the origin of evil, we reformulate the question as follows: “How does the 
negative come into the positive?” (1991:169A). For Hegel, the answer is clear: the 
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negative follows necessarily from the right of the subjective will and is, therefore, 
inseparable from the good. However, for Christianity, the idea that God, “the absolutely 
positive”, could allow the negative to come into the positive, i.e. could create space for 
evil within the world, is “unsatisfactory and meaningless” (1991:169R). Instead, 
Christians view evil as not originating from the concept of the will, but, instead, as 
something which “comes to the positive from outside” (1991:169R). In the biblical 
account of the Fall of Man, it is the devil who ‘tempts’ Eve to eat the apple. The 
departure from a prelapsarian paradise into a world in which man has the potential to 
sin, is based on this external confrontation. As such, Hegel goes on to claim that, “in 
religious myth, the origin of evil is not comprehended”. (1991:169R). He argues that, if 
we refuse to see the negative as itself rooted in the positive, then we “have an empty 
determination of the understanding which clings to one-sided abstractions” 
(1991:169R). Reason demands that we go further than this type of understanding. In 
Hegel’s opinion, it is absolutely fundamental that we recognise both good and evil as a 
necessary part of the concept of the will. 
The inseparability of good and evil is an essential feature of morality, and I 
consider it significant for two reasons. Firstly, and rather positively, the fact that Hegel 
roots evil in the possibility for good, means that he takes seriously the claim the 
conscience has the right to decide for itself what its duties are. The very fact that good 
and evil follow from the same right – the right of the subjective will – means that Hegel 
respects the idea that the subjective will has to think for itself. However, as has become 
apparent, a negative consequence of this inseparability is that Hegel posits conscience 
as always in danger of willing what is evil. This is the feature that explains some of 
Hegel’s disparaging remarks about conscience in section 137 (“the state cannot 
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recognise conscience … any more than science can grant validity to subjective 
opinion”, etc.). Even though Hegel views conscience as an essential right of the 
subjective will, he argues that its potential to give itself a content which does not 
correspond to the good, means that, by itself, it is an unreliable guide for moral action. 
Conscience is always in danger of being evil.  
Hegel describes six types of evil in the Philosophy of Right: bad conscience, 
hypocrisy, probabilism, good intention, conviction and irony. I will now discuss these 
six moments of evil in turn, paying particular attention to the final three, which, I argue, 
are at the centre of Hegel’s critique of the formal conscience.  
Bad conscience is the first type of evil. It occurs when the moral subject claims 
to have knowledge of the true universal21, but gives itself a content which opposes this 
universal. The bad conscience has a choice between acting in accordance with the good, 
or elevating its own, subjective, contingent, preferences above the good; and it opts for 
the latter. For example, if I am aware that I shouldn’t steal and, despite this, I rob a 
bank, I am acting in bad conscience. I am prioritising my subjective preferences – 
greed, the desire not to work, etc. – above the universal good. And I do this consciously. 
Hegel writes that bad conscience makes “a knowing comparison” between the universal 
and the opposing, particular action it wishes to pursue, and decides in favour of the 
particular action (1991:171R). It consciously wills what is at odds with the universal 
and is, therefore, aware of itself as evil. We could say that this is the ‘simplest’ and 
most honest form of evil there is: to know what is right, and to do the opposite.  
                                                 
21
 Whether or not bad conscience knows objectively what is universally good is questionable (we are still 
in the sphere of morality). Hegel remarks that this “knowledge” could take the form of a “feeling of right 
and duty” or a “more advanced knowledge” (1991:171 my italics). However, what is important here is the 
form of bad conscience: that it claims to have knowledge of the universally good (whether or not it 
actually does) and yet, despite this, it wills the opposite. This also applies to hypocrisy and probablisim.   
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Of course, when we speak of a ‘bad conscience’ nowadays, we are usually 
referring to a feeling which follows a morally-dubious action; most likely a feeling of 
guilt or remorse. For example, if I lie to a friend, I could claim to have a ‘bad 
conscience’ afterwards. This, in our modern vocabulary, amounts to saying that we feel 
guilty, or that we regret the action. But this is not the way to understand bad conscience 
within the Philosophy of Right. In Hegel’s terminology, bad conscience simply means 
to know what is right and to do the opposite. It says nothing about regret, remorse or 
guilt. Instead of thinking about bad conscience as ‘conscience feeling bad’, we should 
think of it as ‘conscience gone bad’, i.e. conscience choosing to give itself a content 
which does not conform to the universal good. 
The second type of evil, hypocrisy, goes one stage further than bad conscience: 
the hypocrite knows he is acting in a way which opposes the universal (just like the bad 
conscience), but he tries to represent what he does as good to others. So, as Hegel 
writes, “the evildoer pretends in all external respects to be good” (1991:172R). 
Hypocrisy, therefore, involves an element of untruthfulness. Not only is the hypocrite 
consciously acting against the universal, but he is disguising this fact. The hypocrite 
wants to appear to others as conscientious, virtuous, or pious. But, as Hegel writes, this 
is “merely a trick to deceive others” (1991:172R). In reality, the hypocrite is simply 
pretending that an action is good, when he knows it is not. To invoke the above 
example of stealing: the hypocrite knows it is wrong to rob the bank, yet he does so, 
and, moreover, attempts to present his action to others as morally justifiable. Trying to 
appear noble to the outside world is the mark of the hypocrite. However, this element of 
untruthfulness can become even more subtle, and take the form of the hypocrite 
deceiving himself about the acceptability of an action. Hegel refers to the Jesuit doctrine 
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of probabilism as an example of this kind of deception. According to Hegel’s 
interpretation of probabilism, an act can be done “in good conscience” if the moral 
subject can find any good reason for doing it; even if this reason is outnumbered by 
reasons not to do it (1991:172R). An example of such a reason could be, “the authority 
of a single theologian, … even if other theologians are known to diverge very 
considerably from the former’s judgement” (1991:173R). In this example, the 
permission of one theologian is enough to convince the subject that he is acting with a 
good conscience. It provides a reason to act in a particular way. Of course, we could 
argue that, in Probabilism, the very fact that the moral subject wishes to base his moral 
decisions on reasons, means he wants to do what is objectivity good; that the moral 
conscience seeks an objective justification for his actions and is, therefore, not evil. But 
this suggestion is clearly flawed, since the moral subject purposely chooses a reason 
which justifies his action even though this reason is accompanied by many other 
reasons, which prescribe the opposite. In a somewhat complex move to deceive himself 
that he is acting in good conscience, the moral subject consciously selects a reason that 
legitimates what, in reality, he knows to be a bad action. So the presence of a reason, in 
itself, doesn’t justify the probabilist; for the decision to follow this reason (as opposed 
to that reason), is a subjective decision. Hegel writes that “subjectivity … is the decisive 
factor” (1991:173R). The probabilist can always find a reason for acting in such a way 
that simply furthers his own, subjective desires.  
Bad conscience, hypocrisy and probabilism are all types of evil, since, in all 
three instances, the moral subject consciously wills what is opposed to the universal 
good. However, in all three of these cases, there is still an objective distinction between 
right and wrong. In bad conscience, the moral subject knows what is good, but decides 
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to will the opposite. And, in hypocrisy, the moral subject knows what is good, wills the 
opposite, and tries to pretend to others (or, in the case of probabilism, to himself), that 
the action is, in fact, good. In all three cases, there is the presence of an objective good, 
which, for subjective reasons – needs, desires, greed, etc. –, is ignored. So, for example, 
even though the hypocrite chooses to commit a wrong action, he does so against an 
objective backdrop of right and wrong; and it is precisely this objective backdrop that 
classifies him as a hypocrite. However, as we progress to the fourth type of evil, which 
I call good intention, this objective distinction between right and wrong disappears, and 
it is the moral subject itself who becomes the standard of right and wrong. The evil 
which lies at the heart of good intention, conviction and irony is not the choice to 
commit an action which is objectively wrong, but the choice to elevate one’s 
subjectivity to such an extent that it can never be wrong, i.e. to make oneself the sole 
standard of good and evil. In these three moments of evil, the moral subject doesn’t 
simply claim the right to give itself a content (as in bad conscience, hypocrisy and 
probabilism), it claims that whatever it wills is right. And this, for Hegel, is the most 
worrying type of evil. Let us explore this idea further.  
Good intention is the fourth moment of evil. At first glance, it may seem 
counterintuitive to categorise ‘good intention’ as a type of evil; after all, when I act with 
good intentions, I am, sincerely, trying to be good. To describe this as ‘evil’ appears 
somewhat absurd. Of course, on one level, this is true: good intentions, by themselves, 
are admirable. Hegel is definitely not criticising the idea that we act on good intentions 
(he certainly doesn’t want us to act on bad ones!). However, what Hegel is criticising, is 
the idea that we can appeal to our good intentions to justify any action, even if this 
action is objectively wrong. For Hegel, it is perfectly acceptable to have good 
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intentions, but we must be willing to accept their fallibility, i.e. that it is possible to 
make an objectively incorrect moral judgement, even if this judgement is based on good 
intentions. If we do not accept this fallibility, then we elevate our intentions to such an 
extent that they become the sole moral authority on our action; as long as we meant to 
do the right thing, we acted correctly. To put it another way: if our intention was good, 
our action was also good. In such circumstances, the objective distinction between good 
and evil disappears, and subjectivity becomes the measure of moral truth; for, if only 
our intentions matter, then, what we actually do is irrelevant to our moral culpability. 
We can justify theft, violence and murder, so long as our intentions are admirable. And 
it is precisely this idea – that we can legitimate any action based on our intentions – that 
Hegel categorises as evil, “merely … to have a good intention in one’s action is more 
like evil than good” (1991:175 my italics).  
With the same underlying criticism, Hegel continues to discuss the fifth type of 
evil, conviction. Conviction leads on from good intention and further erodes the 
objective distinction between right and wrong. During this moment of evil, the moral 
subject equates the good with its own conviction; as long as the moral subject is 
convinced of something, it cannot be wrong. This is, of course, worrying for Hegel. It is 
all very well to have convictions, but, as a moral subject, I must be willing to accept 
that my convictions are fallible (just as, in the case of good intention, I must be willing 
to accept that my intentions could be wrong). If I do not accept this possibility, and I 
insist on the infallibility of my convictions, then I place my convictions at the centre of 
all moral truth: simply because I sincerely and passionately believe that an action is 
right, the action is right. I elevate my convictions and, therefore, my actions, beyond all 
moral criticism. In doing so, I attribute myself with a type of moral invincibility; I can 
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never be wrong. And it is precisely this move to which Hegel objects. In a society in 
which the good is determined solely on the basis of conviction, there is no room for 
ethical objectivity. The good becomes completely dependent on the convictions of its 
members; and, because convictions are purely subjective, there is no guarantee that 
these convictions will coincide. Hegel writes that, in such a society, “the determination 
of the good is the responsibility of the subject. Under these circumstances, any 
semblance of ethical objectivity has completely disappeared”  (1991:177R).  
Of course, as with good intention, the problem with categorising conviction as a 
type of evil is that, if I am convinced of something – for example, that there should be 
equal rights for women, that we should allow homosexual marriage, etc. – then I believe 
sincerely and passionately that I am right, and that my conviction can improve society. I 
am acting with honourable intentions. To be convinced of something is to genuinely 
believe (with no hint of hypocrisy) that an action is part of the universal good. This is 
what makes conviction so morally ambiguous; there is no doubt that, when I am 
convinced by a moral action, I am acting out of sincerity. However, having said this, it 
is clearly apparent that a conviction, although sincerely and passionately held, can be 
wrong (unfortunately, we do not have to search very hard to find examples of this). For 
example, if I partake in religious fundamentalism, there is little doubt that my actions 
are misguided. Yet these actions are also based on conviction. Hegel maintains, 
therefore, that simply because my convictions are sincere, this does not place them 
beyond moral reproach. The evil which lies at the heart of conviction in the Philosophy 
of Right is precisely this attempt to deny the fallibility of my own moral opinions.  
Conviction is an important dialectical moment in the Philosophy of Right, 
because it is the moment at which the good is directly equated with subjectivity: simply 
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because the moral subject believes an action is right, the action is right. Hegel writes 
that, with the onset of conviction, “Subjective opinion is at last expressly acknowledged 
as the criterion of right and duty” (1991:176R). We have reached a stage at which all 
action is subjectively justified. Of course, whilst Hegel recognises the importance of 
subjectivity within an ethical system, in his opinion, a system based entirely on the 
subjective convictions of its members is dangerous, for it removes something essential 
from an ethical community: the presence of objective standards by which to judge our 
action. Without these objective standards, the ethical sphere  is reduced to the subjective 
preferences of moral subjects, and there is no recourse beyond moral conviction. Hegel 
believed that the intellectual climate of his time was in danger of falling victim to this 
radical subjectivity. In section 140, Hegel describes such a subjective morality as 
intimately connected to the “self-styled philosophy” of Fries and other proponents of 
the Gefühlsphilosophie, prevalent in Prussia at the time Hegel was writing (1991:177R). 
This type of philosophy, which “denies that truth … can be recognised” and “equates 
the ethical with the distinctive outlook of the individual and his particular conviction” 
has, in Hegel’s view, permeated the sphere of ethics to such an extent that it is no longer 
possible to maintain an objective distinction between good and evil (1991:177R). In this 
section, Hegel laments the days in which the most prevalent form of evil was not 
conviction, but hypocrisy; because at least hypocrisy is accompanied by an appreciation 
that certain acts are wrong in themselves. In a society in which hypocrisy is the 
dominant form of evil, it is recognised that certain acts are criminal and that one should 
be held responsible for one’s misdemeanours. The hypocrite acts incorrectly, but the 
objective distinction between right and wrong remains. However, once we move to a 
society in which conviction prevails, there ceases to be any such thing as an objectively 
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wrong act. Instead, the truth is determined on a purely individual basis. It “wells up 
from each individual’s heart, emotion and enthusiasm” (Hegel 1991:15). This romantic 
idea, central to Fries’ Ethics of Conviction (to which I will return in more detail), 
amounts to the claim that any action can be subjectively justified; for each person 
creates his/her own moral truth. When I sincerely believe an action is right, I make it 
right. Hegel thus claims that, “if a good heart, good intentions, and subjective 
conviction are said to be the factors which give actions their value, there is no longer 
any hypocrisy or evil at all … the element of conviction renders it good” (1991:178R). 
Hegel is adamantly sceptical of such a subject-centred morality; for he believes that 
many objectively wrong acts, which violate both the right of personality and welfare – 
for example, the murder of the Russian diplomat and playwright, Kotzebue, in 1819 –, 
can be committed under the guise of conviction.  
We can now appreciate why Hegel categorises conviction as a type of evil: 
because, if I equate the good with my conviction, I can justify any action subjectively 
(even if this action is objectively wrong). However, having said this, conviction stops 
short of irony because, when I act out of conviction, it is still the conviction itself which 
motivates my action. For example, if I am convinced that we should implement all-
women short lists for MPs, then it is my sincere belief about all-women short lists that 
guides my behaviour. Of course, it is wrong for me to deny that this conviction is 
fallible (this is the ‘evil’ at the heart of conviction), but, at least I can claim that I am 
sincerely motivated by a particular issue and that my conviction will, most likely, 
remain constant over time. However, once we move to the sixth type of evil, irony, even 
the nature of conviction changes; for the ironic subject is convicted of only one thing, 
and this is its ability to determine good and evil.  
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Unlike the subject with good intentions or convictions – who, by refusing to 
admit the fallibility of their beliefs, unwittingly place their subjectivity at the centre of 
morality – the ironic subject consciously assumes the power to determine right and 
wrong. The ironic subject knowingly claims that anything it wills is good, simply 
because it wills it. In doing so, it thinks of itself as the only available moral authority. 
Hegel writes, “… it knows itself as the absolute” (1991:182R). Even though its beliefs 
may change over time, its belief in its own moral supremacy remains stable. Therefore, 
the ironic subject can turn good into evil, and evil into good, if it so wishes. In section 
140, Hegel provides us with a rather colourful description of this type of unrestricted 
moral subjectivism:  
 
I am … beyond this law and can do ‘this’ or ‘that’ as I 
please. It is not the thing that is excellent, it is I who 
is excellent and master of both law and thing; I 
merely play with them as with my own caprice, and in 
this ironic consciousness in which I let the highest of 
things perish, I merely enjoy myself. (1991:182) 
  
Irony marks that culmination of evil within the Philosophy of Right, and I 
believe that – unlike good intention and conviction – the evil in question here is fairly 
unambiguous; any notion of sincerity has disappeared. The ironic subject does not value 
its convictions qua convictions, but simply as expressions of its own subjectivity. It 
values itself so highly as a moral authority that it can “play” with its convictions. This, 
in Hegel’s opinion, is an expression of vanity. For Hegel, the ironic conscience marks 
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the most extreme and dangerous moment of subjectivity: the point at which the moral 
subject consciously places itself above the universal and recognises only itself as a 
moral authority. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, such an approach to morality 
can have a potentially damaging effect on society.  
However, let’s not forget why we discussed evil in the first place. We have to 
remember that this moment of irony – and the five preceding moments of evil – is a 
logical development of the formal nature of conscience. It is the fact that conscience 
gives itself content, and that this content is only contingently linked to its universal 
nature, that means it can will evil in the first place, i.e. that conscience can give itself a 
content that does not accord with the universal good. And the ironic conscience can go 
one stage further, and claim the right to self-certainty as part of this conviction. The 
formal conscience is, thus, always in danger of becoming ironic. This is a paradoxical 
situation, for, in trying to will the good, the formal conscience has the possibility to turn 
into one of the most dangerous forms of evil possible: that of putting one’s own 
convictions beyond criticism. But this paradox highlights (and is, in fact, a result of), 
the paradox at the heart of morality: that the moral will cannot be what it wants to be. 
We first entered the sphere of morality in an attempt to reconcile the universal good 
with the particularity of the will and provide a determinate content to the notion of duty. 
The idea was that, by uniting its universal and particular moments, the moral subject 
could become good, and the good could become actual. But this unification cannot take 
place. The moral will is perpetually formal. It realises its obligation to will the good, 
but it can never fulfil this requirement. The harder it tries, the more it reinforces the 
mutual externality of its universal and particular moments. At the end of morality, we 
find ourselves in the realm of abstract subjectivity (the moment of irony). This, for 
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Hegel, is the farthest point imaginable from the goal of morality. The formal 
conscience, simply because it is formal, cannot reliably produce determinate duties 
which accord with its universal nature. In order to to this, the formal conscience of 
morality must become the true conscience of ethical life. Hegel writes, “The obligation 
which is … present in morality is fulfilled only in the ethical realm” (1991:137A).  
In the next chapter, I shall present my reading of the Aufhebung from the formal 
conscience of morality to the true conscience of ethical life.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Aufhebung from Moral Conscience to the True Conscience of Ethical 
Life 
 
In the previous chapter, we established that the moral conscience is necessarily formal 
and that, because of this, it is always in danger of giving itself a content which is evil. 
Let us now specify exactly what we mean when we talk of the moral conscience being 
‘formal’. I define the formal conscience as follows:  
 
Formal conscience 1. gives itself a particular content, which is 2. only 
contingently related to the moral subject’s universal nature as a free 
being.  
 
There are two parts to the formal conscience. The first part – that it gives itself a 
content – follows from the fact that the moral subject requires particular duties on which 
to act. Duty, by itself, is indeterminate and cannot provide specific duties, so the moral 
subject looks to its own subjectivity for guidance. It gives itself content and decides for 
itself what is good. This is the moral subject’s right: to consult its conscience and 
produce its own convictions. Of course, it is another question as to whether these 
convictions are correct (and the moral subject shouldn’t place these convictions beyond 
criticism), but, the right to consult its conscience and produce convictions is a necessary 
part of freedom within The Philosophy of Right. The second part of formal conscience – 
that its content is only contingently linked to the universal nature, i.e. to what is 
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universally good – is what makes formal conscience problematic. We have already 
established that the formal conscience has a right to give itself a content, but, as we also 
discussed in the previous chapter, this content is not guaranteed to be good. At this 
stage in the logical progression of the text, the universal and particular moments of the 
subject, though both internalised, remain separate. As such, the formal conscience can 
logically give itself a particular content which opposes the universal. The formal 
conscience has the potential to will evil. And, moreover, contained within this potential 
to will evil, is the potential for the formal conscience to insist on the infallibility of its 
own convictions; to insist that whatever it wills is right. The more the formal conscience 
insists on the correctness of its own contingent content, the further it diverges from its 
universal nature. The culmination of this attitude is the ironic conscience, which 
knowingly elevates its own moral authority to such an extent that it can never be wrong. 
During the moment of irony, the moral subject is at the farthest point possible from 
realising the goal of morality. This shows that, if we take the formal conscience to its 
logical conclusions, instead of uniting its universal and particular moments, it forces 
them further apart. The formal conscience cannot fulfil the obligation which permeates 
the entire moral sphere.  
Paradoxically, the goal of morality – to align the universal and particular 
moments of the will – can only be achieved once we leave morality and enter ethical 
life. In ethical life, the will thinks of its freedom differently. Unlike the moral will, 
which identifies its freedom with subjectivity, i.e. with its own ability to determine the 
good, the ethical will recognises that freedom is both objective and subjective. It is 
objective, since it is present in the laws and institutions around it, but it is also 
subjective, because the ethical will recognises itself in these institutions, and recognises 
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that these institutions are the actualisation of its own freedom. In this sense, the 
universal and particular moments of the will are united: the ethical will recognises that 
both its status as a particular will and a universally free being are embodied in the 
objective institutions around it. We shall, of course, return to the structures of ethical 
life in more detail, but, for now, it is important to establish what this move into the 
ethical sphere means for conscience. Hegel is clear that the ethical conscience is 
different from the moral conscience. In section 137, he claims that morality contains 
only the formal conscience, whereas ethical life contains the “true conscience” 
(1991:164). Conscience  itself changes with the dialectical move into ethical life. Just as 
morality is sublated [aufgehoben] by ethics, so the formal conscience is sublated by the 
true conscience of ethical life. Conscience undergoes a process of Aufhebung. But what 
exactly is involved in this transition from the formal conscience to the true conscience? 
Which aspects of formal conscience remain, and which are lost? And what does this 
Aufhebung mean for the role of true conscience within the ethical sphere?  
In my opinion, this dialectical move from formal conscience to true conscience 
is a key moment in the Philosophy of Right, because, by examining this progression, we 
can help solve the notorious problem of whether Hegel allows enough room for 
subjective freedom within the ethical sphere. If we can establish that, during this 
dialectical move, true conscience retains all the positive features of formal conscience 
and has a meaningful role to play within ethical life, then we can undermine the claim 
that Hegel dismisses the right of subjective freedom within the ethical realm. As we 
discussed in the previous chapter, the significance of this dialectical move is also 
recognised in current Hegel scholarship22. It is generally accepted amongst Hegel 
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commentators that the transition from formal to true conscience is a central and 
illuminating feature within the Philosophy of Right. But, even so, this transition has not 
yet received sufficient attention and, as a result, commentators still disagree widely on 
the role of true conscience within ethical life. Allen Wood23, for example, claims that 
true conscience can take a radically critical role within ethical life, whereas Frederick 
Neuhouser24 attributes true conscience with the power of gradual reform. Daniel 
Dahlstrom25 argues that the formal conscience is not lost with the transition into ethical 
life, whereas John Findlay26 claims that formal conscience must “surrender” with the 
onset of ethics. Other commentators, such as Sidney Hook27, accuse Hegel of restricting 
the role of conscience within ethical life, whilst commentators such as Karl Popper28, 
Ernst Tugendhat29 and Rudolf Haym30 go as far as to say that Hegel’s ethical system 
allows no room for conscience at all. There is still a lot to be said about the role of 
conscience within ethical life.  
With this in mind, I shall now present my reading of the Aufhebung from formal 
to true conscience within the Philosophy of Right. In order to do this, we need to return 
our attention to the definition of formal conscience at the beginning of this chapter. My 
argument is that, with the move from formal conscience to true conscience, we retain 
the first part of formal conscience – that it gives itself content – , but we lose the second 
part – that the content of conscience is only contingently linked to the will’s universal 
nature. I argue that, if we understand the process of Aufhebung in this way, the move 
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from formal conscience to true conscience is not worrying; for we retain what makes 
formal conscience the fruition of subjective freedom, but we lose the aspect of formal 
conscience that makes it a potentially dangerous guide for ethical action; the idea that it 
can insist on the infallibility of its convictions. The fact that formal conscience gives 
itself content (irrespective of the particular content) is what marks it as the pinnacle of 
subjective freedom within the morality section of the text: conscience claims the right to 
abstract from the world, to examine its own subjectivity and to produce its own, moral 
convictions. I argue that this right is not lost within ethical life. There will always be 
times when the ethical will needs to think for itself how to act. The political and social 
world which Hegel describes, though built on the fundamental principles of freedom, is 
not static; it develops alongside new empirical discoveries and new technologies. As 
such, the ethical will is always going to be faced with unprecedented situations and 
choices. It is for this reason that true conscience must retain the ability to distance itself 
temporarily from the determinate world and consider, for itself, what is right. True 
conscience retains the right to produce its own convictions. However, what we do lose 
in the process of Aufhebung, is the contingent nature of these convictions. The ethical 
will understands its freedom differently from the moral will. Unlike the moral will, the 
ethical will, by willing the institutions of ethical life, has learned to align its particular 
and universal moments. Therefore, the particular content it gives itself, as opposed to 
being contingent, will be in line with its universal nature as a free being. In other words, 
the content of the true conscience will be good in itself. Formal conscience cannot claim 
this ability. Whereas both the formal conscience and the true conscience can decide for 
themselves what is good, i.e. they can both give themselves content, only the true 
conscience can claim that this content is good in itself. Thus, Hegel writes in section 
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137, “True conscience is the disposition to will what is good in and for itself” 
(1991:164).  
I also wish to argue that the disposition to will what is good in and for itself does 
not mean that true conscience will make the correct decision in every particular 
situation. True conscience can still make mistakes. Instead, I claim that an essential part 
of willing what is good in itself is recognising that the good is not completely 
subjective. This has two implications. Firstly, it requires that true conscience recognise 
the society it inhabits as already fundamentally rational, and that it locate its ethical 
standards within society itself (I shall return to this idea in Chapter Five). Secondly, the 
very fact that the ethical will conceives of the good as both subjective and objective 
(and positively affirms the objective institutions of ethical life) means that, unlike the 
moral will, it cannot think of its own convictions as the only available moral authority. 
The true conscience has a right to produce its own convictions, but, unlike the formal 
conscience, it cannot insist on the infallibility of its findings. It has to accept the 
possibility that it could be wrong. Therefore, instead of clinging to its own convictions, 
true conscience refers its convictions back to the state. It allows them to be discussed by 
public institutions, because it understands that these institutions are fundamentally 
good. As such, true conscience plays a meaningful role in preserving (and improving) 
the social and political world, without indulging in the potentially destructive act of 
moral heroism. This is the fundamental difference between the formal and the true 
conscience. The formal conscience can, logically, elevate its own convictions to such an 
extent that it equates its own subjectivity with the universal good. But the true 
conscience cannot do this, for it recognises that the universal good is both subjective 
and objective.  
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The process of Aufhebung I describe above remains faithful to the logical 
structure of the Philosophy of Right and also allows true conscience to play an active 
role within the ethical sphere. I shall, of course, expand on these ideas as my thesis 
continues, but, for now, it is important to present the fundamental, dialectical move. My 
argument is that true conscience retains the positive element of formal conscience (that 
it can give itself content), but it loses the negative aspect (that this content is only 
contingently related to the universal good). True conscience claims the right to produce 
its own convictions, but it is also able to guarantee that these convictions are good (if 
not in their particular content, then by the appreciation that its convictions are not 
beyond criticism). In order to look more concretely at this process of Aufhebung, I 
would now like to outline the structures of ethical life, and how these structures relate to 
the previous two sections of the text.  
Ethical life [Sittlichkeit] is the synthesis of abstract right and morality. In 
abstract right, the will conceived of its freedom objectively (in property ownership) and, 
in morality, the will conceived of its freedom subjectively (in the right to self-
determination). However, in ethical life, the will thinks of its freedom as both subjective 
and objective. It understands that its freedom is objectified in the social and political 
institutions around it, and, because of this, the ethical will positively affirms these 
institutions. However, it also recognises its own subjectivity in these institutions. The 
ethical will recognises that these objective institutions not only allow it to be universally 
free, but also allow it to be the particular will that it is. Therefore, in ethical life, the 
particular and universal moments of the will are finally united in a non-contingent 
manner: the ethical will recognises that the objective institutions of ethical life facilitate 
its existence as both a particular will – with its own specific interests, desires, 
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ambitions, etc. – and also its existence as a universally free being. Ethical life unites the 
concept of the will, i.e. freedom, with the will’s particular existence. Let us put this into 
the context of Hegel’s overall system.  
In Hegel’s system, the institutions of ethical life – family, civil society and the 
state – are the objective manifestations of the idea of freedom. At the beginning of the 
Philosophy of Right, we learn that the truly free will is “the free will which wills the free 
will” (1991: 57). In other words, the truly free will recognises it is free and commits 
itself to willing this freedom. As we progress through the various stages of the 
Philosophy of Right, the free will learns to understand its freedom properly, and it 
transforms the objective world accordingly; for example, the abstract will appropriated 
property and drafted contracts, whereas the moral will tried to form the objective world 
around its own, subjective idea of the good. The ethical will, however, understands that 
its freedom is best secured by the objective structures of the family, civil society and the 
state. So, within Hegel’s system, these institutions are the necessary, objective result of 
the unfolding of the concept of freedom. As such, they are fundamentally rational: 
“their determination … issues from the nature of the thing [Sache]” (1991:189A). These 
institutions do not emerge overnight. Instead, they reveal themselves through a 
deliberative process, whereby the will comprehends its own freedom and also 
comprehends what it is to live in a world with other free wills. They are, therefore, 
“endowed with a consciousness” (1991:144A). They are not alien to the ethical will. 
Hegel writes that, “On the contrary, the subject bears spiritual witness to them as to its 
own essence … and lives in its element which is not distinct from itself” (1991:191). 
The ethical will recognises that the institutions of ethical life reflect its own essence as a 
free being. They allow it to be free. As such, Hegel writes in section 142, “Ethical life is 
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accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing [vorhandenen] world 
and the nature of self-consciousness” (1991:189). 
Of course, as readers of the Philosophy of Right, from the perspective of our 
twenty-first century world, we may disagree that the specific institutions Hegel 
describes are in fact the best way to organise society. We may, for example, deny the 
importance of the traditional family unit, or disagree with the concept of hereditary 
monarchy (a necessary part of Hegel’s state). However, what is important here is not 
whether we agree or disagree with the institutions of ethical life per se, but whether or 
not Hegel’s description of these institutions remains faithful to his notion of freedom. 
Throughout my thesis, I have presented a highly systematic reading of the Philosophy of 
Right; discussing each dialectical moment in relation to the will’s freedom and the 
overall, logical structure of the text. It is important that we judge Hegel’s description of 
ethical life within this context, and not in isolation. In other words, we need to assess 
the legitimacy of ethical life from within Hegel’s system itself. So, given that Hegel has 
a specific notion of what it is to be free, do the structures of ethical life facilitate this 
freedom in the objective world? Do they follow logically from the preceding moments 
of the text? And, moreover, do they preserve sufficiently the necessary forms of 
freedom contained within abstract right and morality? It is this type of immanent 
critique I shall use to assess the process of Aufhebung from the formal conscience of 
morality to the true conscience of ethical life. 
Before we turn our attention to the role of true conscience within the ethical 
sphere, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the three stages of ethical life.  
As with the two previous sections of the Philosophy of Right, ethical life 
contains within it its own dialectical movement: the family, civil society and the state. 
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The family represents the first truly ethical moment within the Philosophy of Right, for 
it is the first time that the particular will identifies itself with the universal, which, at 
this stage, is the family unit. As such, the family captures what it is to be ethical; which 
is to conceive of oneself as part of a larger substantiality. Within the family, individuals 
do not relate to each other as contracting parties, but as members of a greater whole, in 
which they find their essential identity. Hegel writes, “Thus, the disposition [appropriate 
to the family] is to have self-consciousness of one’s individuality within this unity as 
essentiality which has being in and for itself, so that one is present in it not as an 
independent person … but as a member” (1991:199). He later refers to the family as the 
“first ethical root” of the state (1991:272).  
The family unit Hegel describes comprises a heterosexual, married couple, who 
unite through love and objectify this love by having children. To put it into modern 
terminology, we could say that the type of family Hegel presents in ethical life is the 
‘traditional, nuclear family’. Of course, as we discussed earlier, it is distracting for us to 
question whether or not this institution is good per se (we might argue that non-
traditional family set-ups are just as valuable as traditional ones). However, for Hegel, 
the traditional family fulfils the rational structure which permeates his entire, logical 
system: the unification of two, distinct opposites (in marriage) and the objectification of 
this unity (in the production of children). It is for this reason that Hegel advocates the 
traditional family unit as the ideal family unit31. 
As we discussed previously, the family is the first moment in which the 
particular will identifies itself with the universal (the family unit) and views this 
universal as an essential part of its own identity. Members of a family do not work 
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against each other; instead, they view themselves as a unity and strive for a common 
goal. This is why, for Hegel, the family represents “ethical spirit”, in which “the family 
is a single person and its members are its accidents” (1991:203R). However, even 
though the particular will identifies itself with the universal, family unit, this 
identification is immediate, since it is based on the feeling of love. The ethical will does 
not reflect on its status as part of a family; it simply feels an immediate connection to 
the other family members. As such, the identification of the particular and the universal, 
within the family, is natural and immediate. It is based on a feeling (for this reason, 
Hegel clearly distinguishes this type of identity from the identity found in the state, 
which is fully comprehended, and mediated through reason and law). Love, precisely 
because it is a feeling, can fade. The family is, therefore, always in danger of 
disbanding. Another problem for the family unit is that (male) children grow up to 
become free citizens in their own right, and, thus, leave the family. Therefore, in order 
to allow the next generation take their place in the social and political world, the family 
unit has to dissolve. It is for this reason that the family, although the first essentially 
ethical moment, necessarily leads onto civil society.  
Civil society is an ethical sphere, distinct from the state, in which the ethical will 
can further its freedom as a particular will. In civil society, the will pursues its own 
welfare and seeks to protect its own rights. The first stage of civil society is the system 
of needs, which we could describe as the modern, free market economy. Within the 
system of needs, the ethical will identifies itself with the universal (which, in this case, 
is the larger, economic community), but its relationship to the universal is no longer 
immediate; instead, it is mediated by the will’s own, particular welfare. In the system of 
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needs, the ethical will views the universal purely as a means to satisfy its own interests. 
It does not recognise the universal as an end in itself. As such, the system of needs is the 
sphere in which the ethical will is primarily concerned with its own particularity and 
can exercise its own subjective freedom: it can choose its own vocation and pursue 
those activities which it finds rewarding and satisfying. Hegel is adamant that 
everybody eligible to work (which, unfortunately, excludes women)32 has the right to 
work, so that everybody has the necessary resources to further their status as a particular 
individual.  
In this respect, the system of needs is the sphere in which the right to subjective 
freedom is given expression. Within the system of needs, the ethical will can decide for 
itself what it desires and, within certain constraints, use the universal in order to satisfy 
these interests. The system of needs is, therefore, an ethical manifestation of the right at 
the heart of morality: it is the sphere in which subjectivity is central. In his article, 
“Hegel’s Critique of morality”, Allen Wood claims that civil society “gives ethical 
reality to the standpoint of morality itself … and shows how an ethical life which 
includes this standpoint is higher and freer than all other forms of ethical life” 
(2005:151). Hegel ensures that the subjective rights of morality are included, albeit in a 
sublated form, within the sphere of ethics. Of course, it is still contested as to whether 
Hegel limits subjective freedom to the sphere of civil society, or whether he allows it a 
public role in the state. One could argue that the right to select one’s vocation and make 
decisions about one’s private life does not amount to a meaningful role for subjective 
freedom; and that, by restricting to subjective freedom to civil society, Hegel allows the 
political sphere to function completely independently of subjective reflection. I believe 
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these claims are valid, and, throughout my thesis, I will argue that Hegel should and, 
indeed, does, grant subjective freedom a political function.  
Although the system of needs is fundamental to the will’s fulfilment of its 
particular freedom, it is, essentially, a limited structure. This is because it relies on the 
right to work, which is, by the very nature of the system of needs, unobtainable. In the 
free market economy, the ethical will prioritises the satisfaction of its desires above the 
universal. It strives to meet its own needs. However, as these needs are met, the desire 
for new things emerges, and this leads to a “multiplication and expansion of needs” 
(Hegel 1991:231). This, in turn, results in the specialisation of labour, which, inevitably, 
forces some workers out of the labour market. The very concept of the system of needs 
– that everybody looks after their own interests – results in necessary, structural 
unemployment and poverty. As such, there will always be those who are unable to work 
and, thus, unable to fulfil their particular freedom. So, built into the very concept of the 
system of needs is that a section of society remain ‘unfree’; and this unfreedom results 
from a misplaced emphasis on particular interests over the universal. In order to 
influence the system of needs, so that people concentrate more on the universal than 
their own, particular interests, we move to the second and third stage of civil society: 
the administration of justice, and the police and corporations.  
The administration of justice repairs infringements of the rights that underlie the 
system of needs. As we discussed previously, the relationship between the particular 
will and the universal is no longer immediate (as in was in the family); instead, it is 
mediated by the will’s particular needs and desires. Therefore, the possibility exists that 
the ethical will pursues a particular interest which is not in line with its universal nature. 
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In other words, in the striving to fulfil its own, particular ambitions, it is possible that 
the will commits crime. The administration of justice cannot prevent crime, but it can 
restore the universal by punishing the criminal. We will discuss Hegel’s description of 
the legal system at length in Chapter Six, but, one important thing to mention here is 
that Hegel insists on trial by jury. Jury trials ensure that justice remains in the hands of 
the community, and not an elite power. This is inextricably linked with Hegel’s demand 
that law be accessible to everybody, not simply a select few.  
Given that the administration of justice can only restore the universal in 
retrospect, we require institutions that help prevent infringements of justice, i.e. 
institutions that enable the will to recognise the universal as an end in itself, and not 
simply as a means to an end. Even though the will has a right to pursue its own 
interests, Hegel admits that the “more blindly it immerses itself in its selfish ends, the 
more it requires … regulation to bring it back to the universal” (1991:262R). This is the 
job of the police. The police in Hegel’s system have a much wider function than the 
police of today. In the Philosophy of Right, the police mediate between the individual 
and the universal. They help to regulate the market economy so that the welfare of each 
will is secured. The police oversee education and monitor the upbringing of children. 
They also contribute to society’s infrastructure; for example, by providing street 
lighting and bridges. Another function of the police is to regulate the pricing of daily 
commodities, and they also play a part in the provision of public healthcare. Hegel 
recognises a necessary tension between regulation and the mechanisms of the free 
market economy, but, ultimately, he falls on the side of securing freedom for all: “...the 
freedom of free trade should not be such as to prejudice the general good” (1991:263A). 
As such, the police are a necessary, regulating, public authority.  
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However, even in a regulated economy, society is still driven by competition 
and people’s desire to out-do one another (in order to secure their own welfare). 
Because of this, there will always be a section of society that remains unfree. In order to 
dampen this desire to pursue one’s own good at the expense of others, Hegel introduces 
the corporation. The corporation is a fundamental structure within the Philosophy of 
Right, since it provides its voluntary members with a universal identity, whist 
facilitating their place within the market economy. As such, it forms a bridge between 
civil society and the state. Hegel describes the corporation as a “second family”, 
because, within the corporation, individuals relate to one another as members of a 
larger, ethical community; not simply as private individuals with private interests. The 
member of a corporation learns to dampen his private interests and promote the interests 
of the corporation for their own sake (and not simply as a means to an end). The 
individual is not forced to become a member of a corporation; on the contrary, he feels 
honoured to be part of a universal which provides his “individual trade” with an “ethical 
status, …. admitting it to a circle in which it gains strength and honour” (1991:273A). 
Hegel goes as far to say that, outside of a corporation, the individual will cannot realise 
his freedom, for he remains in the “selfish aspect of his trade” and his livelihood 
“lack[s] stability” (1991:272R). He will also claim that individuals only have a right to 
vote as part of a corporation. For Hegel, the corporation enables the will to view itself 
as part of a larger, rational community. It is, therefore, a precursor to the state. 
However, the corporation and the state differ in a fundamental way: the corporation is 
still a particular universal. Each corporation, though considered as a universal, has its 
own particular interests, which may conflict with the particular interests of other 
corporations. The corporation is not truly universal. As such, it is ultimately deficient, 
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and must give way to the state. In the state, the individual will can reconcile its 
particularity with a more comprehensive universal: it can acquire an identity as a 
citizen.  
The state is the synthesis of the family and civil society. In the state, the ethical 
will relates both immediately and mediately to the universal. It relates immediately 
through the feeling of patriotism, which Hegel also calls the “political disposition” 
(1991:288). Patriotism in Hegel’s sense is different from the way we understand 
patriotism today. In our current political climate, we associate patriotism with highly 
emotive and demonstrative – perhaps even exclusionary – acts of national solidarity. 
However, in the Philosophy of Right, patriotism is more of an underlying disposition, 
whereby the citizen immediately identifies the universal good of the state with his own 
good. Hegel writes that patriotism is “a volition which has become habitual”. He also 
describes it as “consciousness” and a feeling of “trust”  (1991:288). The patriotic citizen 
lives with an underlying assurance that his own interests are in line with the state’s 
interests. However, Hegel also writes that such a political disposition is “based on 
truth”, which means that it relies on the institutions of the state actually being good and 
securing the freedom of their citizens (1991:288). Patriotism in a repressive state is 
misplaced. The feeling of patriotism can only emerge if the ethical will recognises that 
the institutions of the state are, in fact, objective manifestations of its own freedom. So, 
the relationship between the individual and the state is also mediated: the citizen must 
understand the state as rational. The state therefore combines the positive features of 
both the family and civil society: in the state, the citizen feels an immediate affinity 
with the universal (as in the family), but it also understands this universal as securing 
and protecting its own particular good (as in civil society). The citizen of Hegel’s state 
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has finally learned to understand its freedom properly, i.e. as part of its own nature and 
also as existing in the world around it.  
Having provided an overview of the structures of ethical life, I will now return 
to the dialectic of conscience. I would first like to ascertain whether or not the formal 
conscience of morality (in its non-aufgehoben form) has a place within the ethical 
sphere. In order to do this, let us first examine the idea of duty within ethical life. The 
importance of ‘doing one’s duty’ was first revealed in the moral sphere; but it became 
evident that, within morality, the obligation to produce particular, binding duties could 
not be fulfilled. This obligation is only fulfilled in ethical life. But, in ethical life, how 
does the will know what its duties are? Where does it look to find them?  
Unlike the moral will, which looked inwards, towards its own subjectivity, in 
order to create particular duties, the ethical will looks outwards and discovers its duties 
in the objective institutions of its society. The ethical will does not create duties, 
instead, it recognises them as already inherent in the institutions of ethical life; namely, 
the family, civil society and the state. So, in order to know what the good is, the ethical 
will simply has to comprehend and adhere to the rational practices of its community. 
Hegel calls this ethical disposition rectitude. He writes that, “In an ethical community, it 
is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are he has to fulfil in order to 
be virtuous. He simply must do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him 
within his situation” (1991:193R). The ethical will has to will the institutions of ethical 
life. This contrasts with morality, in which there existed a perennial obligation to 
determine the good subjectively. Hegel underlines this difference, and distinguishes the 
“ethical theory of duties … in its objective sense” from the theory of duties as 
“supposedly comprehended in the empty principle of moral subjectivity, which in fact 
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determines nothing” (1991:192-3R). Hegel’s claim is that, with the transition into 
ethics, we learn to comprehend our duties properly, i.e. we recognise them as objective, 
rather than subjective. In ethics, we locate our duties in the fundamentally rational 
structures of society, and not in the individual, contingent conscience (i.e. the formal 
conscience). As such, being ethical simply involves living in accordance with the 
rational practices of our community. 
It is important to clarify at this point that rectitude does not amount to blind 
obedience. Even though Hegel maintains that the ethical will should adhere to the 
institutions of ethical life, he is clear that the ethical will should understand these 
rational structures and adhere to them precisely because they are rational. Being ethical 
is, therefore, not the same as unreflectively following the commands of any given 
authority. In fact, we learn from an earlier passage in the Philosophy of Right that only 
the “uncivilised [ungebildete] human being lets everything be dictated to him by brute 
force and natural conditions” (1991:136A). Hegel is against this type of unreflective 
rule-worship. It is essential that the ethical will is educated to understand the customs of 
its society and to recognise their fundamentally rational nature (although, unfortunately, 
Hegel says little about the role of education within Sittlichkeit)33. The ethical disposition 
is, therefore, not reducible to servility; the ethical will must comprehend the rationality 
of the objective world it inhabits.34 Having said this, there is still a fundamental 
difference between the ethical perspective and the moral perspective; because, even 
though the ethical will understands the rationality of the society in which it lives – and, 
                                                 
33
 See Knowles [2002:265] 
34
 This comprehension can take the form of “more or less educated insight”, but must be based on the 
“consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and 
end of the other (in this case, the state)” [1991:288 my italics] 
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therefore, understands the rationality behind its duties – the ethical will, unlike the 
moral will, does not create these duties. Instead, it finds them in the objective world. 
The difference between what it is to be ethical and what it is to be moral is 
essential to understanding the dialectic of conscience within the Philosophy of Right, 
and will underpin my reading of the Aufhebung from the formal to the true conscience. 
The ethical disposition I have described – in which one’s duties are objectively 
determined – clearly contrasts with the moral position, in which duties are subjectively 
produced. The moral will wants to determine for itself what is good and, in order to do 
this, it consults its own, individual conscience. Therefore, the ethical attitude we have 
been describing – in which the good is simply recognised in pre-existing institutions –, 
when seen from a purely moral perspective, is potentially unsatisfying. Hegel writes 
that, “from the point of view of morality, rectitude can easily appear as something of a 
lower order” (1991:193R). This is because the moral will associates the good with its 
own subjectivity and its own ability to determine its duties; but, within ethical life, the 
good is not determined purely subjectively. The emphasis is no longer on the individual 
and the individual’s ability to produce binding convictions. The obligation which 
permeated the entire sphere of morality – to align one’s particularity with the universal 
good – is no longer present, because, in ethical life, the good is already actualised in the 
objective structures of society. Therefore, the ethical will, unlike the moral will, no 
longer has to assume the responsibility of determining the good all by itself. Willing the 
good ceases to be a process of continuous introspection and moral discoveries. Instead, 
it becomes a “custom”, “habit” or “second nature” (1991:195).  
Hegel acknowledges that, “from the point of view of morality”, rectitude can 
appear as a “lower order” (my emphasis), but, of course, this is not a view that Hegel 
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shares. For Hegel, ethical life is the actualisation of freedom in the objective world, and 
it is therefore absolutely proper that the ethical will conceives of its duties objectively. 
The reason that, from a moral perspective, this may seem worrying, is that, within 
Hegel’s dialectic, the moral will has not yet progressed to a stage where it understands 
its freedom properly, i.e. as objectified in the institutions around it. The moral will still 
associates its freedom with its own ability to determine the good; and, even though this 
is a necessary stage in the dialectic of freedom (the will has a right to recognise its own 
subjectivity as a part of freedom), for Hegel, this is, ultimately, an incomplete way to 
conceive of the good. In Hegel’s system, the moral sphere is sublated by the ethical 
sphere, in which the good is objectively present in the institutions of society. These 
institutions guarantee the will’s freedom and the will recognises that, in adhering to 
these institutions, it adheres to its own freedom. Therefore, in such an ethical society, it 
is unnecessary to attempt to determine the good subjectively. As well as being 
unnecessary, it is also potentially damaging, since, in assuming the ability to determine 
duties purely subjectively, one ignores the rational structures of one’s community (we 
shall return to this idea).  
Hegel is notoriously scathing of the individual who takes it upon himself to 
determine the good subjectively and insists on the infallibility of his convictions, even if 
these convictions run contrary to the objective structures of society (in which the good 
is actually already present). I will refer to such a figure as the ‘moral hero’. Hegel 
accepts there will be times in which this type of action is perfectly legitimate, but, on 
my reading of the Philosophy of Right, such occasions are only appropriate if we have 
not yet reached the stage of ethical life, or if we have somehow allowed ethical life to 
decay. In a pre- or non-ethical society, it is entirely legitimate to adopt the stance of a 
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moral hero. Hegel writes that, “in uncivilised societies … the ethical and its 
actualisation depend more on individual discretion and on the distinctive natural genius 
of individuals” (1991:193-4R). He also praises Socrates as the individual who appeared 
“at the time when Athenian democracy had fallen into ruin”, and “retreated into himself 
in search of the right and the good” (1991:167A). However, in such circumstances, we 
are not in ethical life. We are in “uncivilised” societies, or societies that have “fallen 
into ruin”. Hegel also writes that, in the states of antiquity, society “had not yet evolved 
into [a] free system of self-sufficient development and objectivity” and that “this 
deficiency had to be made good by the distinctive genius of individuals” (1991:194R). 
But, once again, we only rely on the “distinctive genius of individuals” because we are 
in a pre-ethical society. Once we enter the sphere of ethics, the good does not have to be 
determined in such a way, because the structures of society are rational.  
Hegel is adamant that, within an ethical society, doing one’s duty does not 
involve gallant quests of moral heroism, and he is extremely suspicious of anybody who 
tries to elevate his moral opinion above the social order. We learn from an early section 
of the text that the “rational is the high road which everyone follows and where no one 
sticks out from the rest” (1991:49A). And, in section 150, Hegel claims that the 
“craving to be something special [Besonderes] is not satisfied within the universal” 
(1991:193R). In other words, there is no room in an ethical society for those who claim 
a privileged access to moral truth. Within Sittlichkeit, anybody who can understand and 
will the institutions of the community, can be ethical. There is no longer any need to 
determine the good by oneself, and, moreover, it could be dangerous to do so. In the 
same paragraph, Hegel questions the motives of those who “invent” unnecessary moral 
challenges for themselves within an ethical society; his implication is that the moral 
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hero acts out of vanity, rather than a genuine attempt to will the good. He writes that, 
“moral reflection can invent collisions for itself wherever it likes and so give itself a 
consciousness that something special [Besonderem] is involved and that sacrifices have 
to be made” (1991:193R). Already we can identify Hegel’s distrust of the moral hero 
emerging. For Hegel, moral heroism, within an ethical society, is misplaced; there is no 
need to make such moral sacrifices, for the good is already present in rational, objective 
institutions.  
Let us recap briefly. We have been discussing what it is to ‘do one’s duty’ 
within an ethical society. We have established that, in an ethical society, doing one’s 
duty amounts to affirming the rational, objective principles of one’s community (this 
contrasts with morality, in which the moral will attempts to produce its duties 
subjectively). With this in mind, let us return our attention to the dialectic of conscience. 
Given that the ethical will locates its duties in the objective sphere, and not in its own 
subjectivity, can the formal conscience of morality play a role within ethical life?  
I wish to argue that the formal conscience of morality does not have a place 
within the ethical sphere. This does not mean that there isn’t a role for conscience 
within ethics, but it does mean that there isn’t space for the formal conscience, as 
defined at the beginning of this chapter. In my opinion, the formal conscience cannot 
coexist alongside the requirement that the ethical will affirms the objective institutions 
of ethical life. And this is because the content of the formal conscience is contingent 
(we are reminded in section 152 that, “at the level of morality, [subjectivity] is still 
distinct from its concept” (1991:196A)). I will argue that this notion of contingency is 
what disqualifies the formal conscience from a role within the ethical sphere. Let us 
explore this further.  
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What exactly does it mean to say that the content of the formal conscience is 
contingent? Logically, it means that the particular content of the moral will is not 
necessarily linked to its universal nature as a free being (as we discussed in the previous 
chapter). But, what does this mean in practice for the formal conscience within an 
ethical community? Firstly, it means that the formal conscience can give itself a content 
which is not guaranteed to coincide with the rational principles of society. In other 
words, the formal conscience can give itself a content which is objectively wrong. If it 
does this by mistake, then the formal conscience is simply misguided, but, if it does it 
intentionally, then the formal conscience has committed evil. We could argue that, if 
this were the only consequence, then the notion of contingency isn’t too debilitating; 
one could claim that, even within the sphere of ethics, it is possible to make mistakes (I 
will later argue that true conscience can, mistakenly, give itself an incorrect content). 
One could also argue that, built into the sphere of ethics is the acknowledgement that, 
from time to time, the ethical will may intentionally will something opposed to the 
rational principles of society, i.e. commit crime. After all, this is why we have an 
administration of justice. These objections are valid. It is true that, built into the very 
concept of ethical life is the assumption that it is possible to diverge temporarily from 
the rational. The police, corporations and the administration of justice exist in order to 
either prevent or repair infringements of this very possibility. But, what the ethical 
sphere does rely on, is an underlying respect for rational institutions as rational, i.e. as 
institutions that secure the will’s own freedom and well-being. Therefore, if the ethical 
will, mistakenly, gives itself an incorrect content, it should welcome being corrected. 
And, if the ethical will commits crime, it should recognise this as wrong, and accept the 
punishment issued to it by the courts. This is because, ultimately, the ethical will 
 101 
recognises that its own interests are secured by, and not threatened by, the universal. 
This fundamental sense of identity (between the individual and the universal) forms the 
basis of ethical life. So, even though ethical society can cope with the fact that, once in 
a while, the ethical will is objectively wrong (either intentionally or unintentionally), 
what it does require is that the ethical will, at no point, lose its underlying appreciation 
of the rational nature of objective institutions. The ethical will is, therefore, always 
prepared to stand corrected.  
This is where the formal conscience faces problems, because, as a consequence 
of its contingent nature, it can also claim (as part of its content) that its convictions are 
infallible. Because the formal conscience can give itself any content, it can insist that, 
simply because it holds a conviction, this conviction is correct. This is where the notion 
of contingency becomes damaging. As we established in the previous paragraph, ethical 
life can accommodate the possibility that conscience gives itself a content which is 
objectively wrong. However, what ethical life cannot accommodate, is formal 
conscience declaring that whatever it wills is good. These two scenarios are very 
different. Once the formal conscience insists on the infallibility of its own convictions, 
it elevates its subjectivity to such a level that it, and not the objective institutions of the 
community, becomes the standard of what is right and wrong. Formal conscience can 
claim that, simply because it holds a conviction, this conviction is good. This attitude is 
characteristic of the final three types of evil we discussed in the previous chapter: good 
intention, conviction and irony. Of course, it is true that, in the moments of good 
intention and conviction, formal conscience acts out of sincerity. As such, its claim to 
infallibility is only implicit and results from a genuine attempt to do good. But, however 
well-intentioned, the claim to infallibility is still present: the ‘convinced’ conscience is 
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still unwilling to stand corrected. Therefore, we shouldn’t underestimate the potential 
risk these moments pose to an ethical society. It is during the third moment of evil, 
irony, that the formal conscience knowingly puts itself at the centre of all moral truth 
and claims that, simply because it believes something, this makes it right. The ironic 
conscience acts on the belief that its subjectivity alone is enough to make something 
good. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the ironic will is motivated, not by a 
genuine cause, but by the self-important attempt to exist as the sole source of good and 
evil. As such, the ironic conscience completely extinguishes ethical objectivity.  
On my reading of the dialectic of conscience within the Philosophy of Right, the 
potential for formal conscience to claim infallibility is what renders it unethical and 
prevents it obtaining a public function within ethical life. It is simply impossible for the 
formal conscience to both insist on the infallibility of its own subjectivity whilst 
simultaneously respecting the rationality of the objective institutions around it (a 
requirement of Sittlichkeit). The formal conscience has the ability to stick to its 
convictions come what may; even if these convictions run contrary to the institutions of 
ethical life. The formal conscience can, therefore, posit itself against society. It  can 
view itself as a moral hero, disregard the objective structures of the community and 
maintain that it holds the key to moral truth. In a pre-ethical society, such an attitude 
could be helpful (there are, no doubt, repressive states that could benefit from moral 
heroism). But, in an ethical society, where the objective institutions are already rational 
and secure the freedom of the ethical will, this type of heroism can only damage the 
bond between the individual and the universal. It is for this reason that I maintain that 
ethical life cannot accommodate the formal conscience. I argue that, with the Aufhebung 
from morality into ethical life, formal conscience, as defined at the beginning of this 
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chapter, is lost. This thesis is supported by Hegel’s claim in Section 152 that, with the 
move into ethics, “the self-will of the individual and his own conscience in its attempt 
to exist for itself and in opposition to the ethical substantiality, have disappeared” 
(1991:195-6).  
It is easy to misread the above quotation and protest that Hegel is eradicating all 
types of conscience from ethical life.35 Such a misreading could give rise to claims that 
Hegel ignores the right of subjectivity within ethics, or that he advocates a repressive 
political structure. But such claims are unfounded, because Hegel is not denying a role 
for conscience per se within the ethical realm. He is simply denying a role for the type 
of conscience that “attempt[s] to exist for itself and in opposition to the ethical 
substantiality”, i.e. the type of conscience that adheres to its own, subjective 
convictions, even if these convictions oppose the objective, rational structures of society 
(1991:196 my emphasis). In other words, he is denying a role for the formal conscience. 
I wish to argue that the loss of formal conscience within ethics is no worrying matter. 
After all, there is no guarantee that formal conscience will get things right. And, as we 
established above (because of its contingent character), formal conscience has the 
potential to elevate potentially misguided convictions above the universal. Even more 
worrying than this, is formal conscience’s potential to develop into the ironic 
conscience, which merely plays with its conviction, so that it can always remain at the 
centre of moral truth.36 In this situation, ethics is reduced to the vanity of the self-
righteous, though, not necessarily righteous, individual. It is not the case that the formal 
conscience will always mutate into this type of evil, but, logically, it has the potential to 
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do so. Whilst this type of radical self-certitude and subjective authority could be helpful 
in a pre-ethical world – Hegel writes that, “uncivilised” societies sometimes rely on the 
“genius of individuals” (1991:194R) –, within the sphere of ethics, this attempt to 
elevate oneself above the rational principles of society is potentially harmful, and, in 
Hegel’s words, a demonstration of “vanity” (1991:184A). There is simply no 
requirement to oppose the objective structures of society, if these structures are rational. 
To do so is to ignore the rationality within the objective world and, therefore, to ignore 
one’s own freedom.  
The loss of formal conscience within ethics should, therefore, not be viewed as a 
weakness in Hegel’s dialectic. With the transition into ethics, we lose only the negative 
aspects of conscience; namely, the contingent nature of conscience and, thus, the danger 
that conscience sticks unreservedly to a misguided conviction. In his article, The 
‘Aufhebung’ of morality in Ethical Life, Ludwig Siep also argues that this aspect of 
conscience is, legitimately, lost within the ethical realm. He writes that, “what [Hegel] 
rejects is simply the veneration for the decisions of conscience as beyond criticism” 
(1983:153). Frederick Neuhouser is of the same opinion. In his book, The Foundations 
of Hegel’s Social Theory, he also claims that ethical life cannot accommodate the 
formal conscience, and that this is entirely legitimate. He describes the formal 
conscience as a “debased form of [conscience], one informed by an exaggerated version 
of the individual’s claim to moral sovereignty” (2000:247). So, like Siep, Neuhouser 
identifies formal conscience’s “moral sovereignty” as the feature which strips it of any 
ethical validity. Of course, we must bear in mind that the formal conscience is a product 
of morality and, therefore, has nothing other than its own subjectivity on which to base 
its decisions (it has not yet learned to align its particular content with objective, social 
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practices). It is, therefore, to be expected that the formal conscience awards itself moral 
sovereignty, for it views itself as the only moral authority available. But this is precisely 
the point: the formal conscience is a product of morality, in which the good is 
determined entirely subjectively. And such a moral phenomenon has no place within the 
ethical sphere, in which the good is already present in objective institutions. In Hegel’s 
dialectic, it is ultimately inadequate to view the good as entirely subjective. For Hegel, 
the sphere of morality, although a necessary part of the will’s freedom, eventually gives 
way to a more comprehensive understanding of the good, in which the will recognises 
its freedom as objectified in the practices of ethical life. Therefore, if we continue to 
insist that our own, subjective opinion should be the source of all good, we remain at an 
incomplete understanding of our own freedom.  
Hegel is famously critical of subjective moralities. His preface to the Philosophy 
of Right is primarily a critique of the type of “superficial philosophy”, which equates the 
good with subjective feelings (1991:18). The primary target of this attack is Hegel’s 
contemporary and rival, J.F. Fries and his Ethics of Conviction. Although Fries believes 
that conscience is “educable”, the Ethics of Conviction ultimately holds that, if one’s 
conviction is morally genuine, it cannot be wrong (1818:214). Like Fichte before him, 
who said that the binding principle of morality was to “Act according to your best 
conviction of your duty, or: Act according to your conscience”, Fries believes that 
conscience is essentially infallible (1907:164). This is where Hegel’s account of 
conscience differs, because, according to Hegel, conscience can be objectively wrong. 
In Hegel’s dialectic, formal conscience has a contingent content, which is not 
guaranteed to coincide with the objective good. It is, therefore, inappropriate to award 
conscience the final say on ethical matters. Within Hegel’s dialectic, subjective moral 
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philosophies, such as the Ethics of Conviction, rely on an inadequate comprehension of 
the good, i.e. they mistakenly believe that the good is purely subjective in character.  
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Hegel feared that the intellectual 
climate of his time was adopting such a misguided conception of the good. He was 
notoriously sceptical of the romantic sentiment thriving in the 
Studentenburschenschaften and further promulgated by their figurehead, J. F. Fries. In 
an allusion to Fries’ speech at the Wartburg Festival of 1817, Hegel claims that such 
subjective moralities “reduce the complex inner articulation of the ethical … to a mush 
of ‘heart, friendship and enthusiasm’” (1991:16). In Hegel’s opinion, it is misguided to 
mistake a conviction, albeit strongly held, for a rational, ethical principle. Hegel 
continues to highlight the absurdity of attributing ethical validity to a subjective 
conviction; he writes that, if we adhere to the “declamations and presumptions of 
outbursts against philosophy which are so common in our time”, then the “most 
criminal convictions – since they are also convictions – are accorded the same status as 
[law]” (1991:19). Here, Hegel reinforces the idea that conscience can get things wrong. 
Unlike Fries, who deems conscience infallible, Hegel maintains that subjective 
convictions are only contingently related to the good (as we described above). It is, 
therefore, entirely possible that conscience gives itself a “criminal conviction”. Because 
such misguided convictions are still convictions, they are – irrespective of their 
particular content – elevated to the sphere of ethics. In other words, in a subjective 
philosophy, any principle is legitimised, so long as it is strongly believed37.  
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 It is likely that, in this quotation, Hegel is making reference to the murder of the Russian playwright 
and diplomat, Kotzebue, who was killed by Sand, a member of the Studentenburschenschaften, in 1819. 
Sand regarded Kotzebue as an enemy to the ‘progressive’ cause of German unification, and defended his 
action on purely subjective grounds. In a letter of condolence to Sand’s mother, de Wette (then a 
theologian at Berlin University) added weight to this subjective justification, claiming that the “pious and 
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Far from respecting the right of subjectivity, Hegel believes that prioritising 
convictions to such an extent, within an ethical society, “lead[s] to the destruction of 
inner ethics and the upright conscience”, by which he means the true conscience of 
ethical life (1991:18 my emphasis). This passage is illuminating, for it confirms the idea 
that Hegel is not eliminating all types of conscience and inner contemplation from the 
ethical sphere. Far from it; Hegel wants to protect the “upright conscience” and “inner 
ethics”, and it is for this reason that he warns against the purely formal conscience. For 
Hegel, it is still imperative that we maintain a role for conscience and subjective 
freedom within ethical life, but he does not view subjective moralities as the best way to 
achieve this. As opposed to facilitating the role for subjectivity within ethical life, Hegel 
believes that subjective moralities actually destroy the possibility for subjective 
freedom. This is because, within the ethical sphere, subjective freedom and objective 
freedom do not work in opposition. In order to exercise its subjective freedom, the 
ethical will does not need to oppose the objective institutions around it. Such an attempt 
to do so actually hinders the subjective freedom of the will, for it is precisely these 
rational, objective structures that protect its status as a subjective will and allow it to be 
free. The true conscience of ethics does not place itself above the objective structures of 
ethical life (we shall turn to this in the next chapter).  
At this point, I would like to reiterate that conceiving of one’s duties objectively 
relies on the objective institutions of society actually being rational. In Hegel’s 
dialectic, the institutions of ethical life (the family, civil society and the state) are the 
actualisation of freedom in the objective world. As such, the will identifies with them 
and recognises that they secure its own freedom. The ethical will is not restricted by or 
                                                                                                                                               
virtuous” Sand was “certain of his cause. He believed it was right to do what he did, and so he did right.” 
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alienated from objective institutions. Instead, it views them as a necessary part of its 
own essence as a free being. Hegel writes that, in ethical life, the will “...lives in its 
element which is not distinct from itself” (1991:191). This is fundamental to my reading 
of the dialectic of conscience. In claiming that, in ethical life, we conceive of the good 
objectively, Hegel is not advocating that we adhere to the prescriptions of any given 
society. Society must be rational. As such, it must secure the freedom and well-being of 
the ethical will (we shall return to the difference between the existing state and the 
actual state in the next chapter).  
In this chapter, I have argued that, because of its contingent content, the formal 
conscience of morality, as defined at the beginning of this chapter, is not retained with 
the transition into ethical life. However, this does not mean that there is no room for 
conscience within the sphere of ethics. With the move into ethics, the formal conscience 
of morality is sublated by the true conscience of ethical life. I have argued that, in this 
process of Aufhebung, the ability for conscience to produce its own convictions is 
preserved (part one of my definition of formal conscience – that conscience ‘give itself 
a particular content’). True conscience maintains the right to think for itself, and, as 
such, the right of subjective freedom is retained within ethical life (I shall expand on 
this in the next chapter). However, I have also argued that, with the move into ethical 
life, the contingent nature of conscience is lost (part two of my definition of formal 
conscience). True conscience, as an ethical phenomenon, has aligned its particular 
identity with the universal. It recognises that the good is already present in the rational 
structures of society and, thus, that the good is not entirely subjective. Therefore, whilst 
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maintaining the right to produce its own convictions, true conscience also affirms the 
rational structures of ethical life: it wills what is good in and for itself.  
In the next chapter, I shall examine exactly what it means to say that true wills 
what is good in and for itself within the rational structures of ethical life.  
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Chapter Five 
 
True Conscience within Ethical Life 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged that, within the Philosophy of Right, Hegel says little about 
the precise role of the true conscience of ethical life38. He introduces the concept of the 
true conscience within the morality section of the text, during a discussion of the formal 
conscience, but only to “indicate its different character” and to anticipate what will 
follow in the ethical realm (1991:165R). However, once we reach the discussion of 
ethical life, Hegel seldom refers to the true conscience or the precise role it can play 
within society. It appears as though the idea, to which he alluded in morality, doesn’t re-
emerge within ethics. It is perhaps for this reason that Hegel is often accused of 
ignoring the importance of conscience within ethical life, or of advocating a state which 
does not value the subjective input of its citizens. I would like to argue against these 
accusations. I believe that, despite the infrequency of Hegel’s direct references to true 
conscience, there is a fundamental and meaningful function for true conscience within 
the ethical sphere. Up until now, this specific function has not been drawn out. But, by 
carefully examining the logical structure of the text and conscience’s process of 
Aufhebung, and by understanding the concrete institutions of ethical life, I aim to do 
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 Dahlstrom 1993 p. 185, “”Hegel has … notoriously little to say about this genuine conscience as such 
within the third part of the Philosophy of Right”. Neuhouser 2000 p.256 “[there is] not much in the 
Philosophy of Right about conscience’s right to discuss and criticise the social order”.  
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exactly this. I wish to present true conscience as an irreducible and essential part of the 
ethical realm. 
I would first like to establish whether true conscience finds its place in the 
private realm of civil society or the public realm of the state. As we discussed in the 
previous chapter, civil society is the realm of ethical life which preserves the right at the 
heart of morality: the right of subjective freedom. In civil society, the ethical will 
actualises its own subjectivity by pursuing its own welfare and needs. It makes 
decisions about its own, private life and furthers its status as a particular will; for 
example, it decides which career to pursue, which interests to develop, etc. It is by 
making such decisions, for itself, that the ethical will expresses its subjective freedom. 
The sphere of civil society, as a space in which the ethical will can give expression to its 
own subjectivity, is an essential part of ethics, and one which Hegel values highly. For 
Hegel, it is a fundamental part of a modern society that individuals are able to make 
their own decisions about their own lives: “subjective freedom, which must be 
respected, requires freedom of choice on the part of individuals” (1991:286A my 
emphasis). In fact, it is precisely for this reason that Hegel frequently criticises Plato’s 
conception of the state. In Hegel’s opinion, Plato’s Republic ignores the right of 
subjectivity and, therefore, falls short of the ethical ideal; in particular, Hegel laments 
that Plato denies the individual a free choice of vocation: “In Plato’s Republic, 
subjective freedom is not yet recognised, because individuals still have their tasks 
assigned to them by the authorities” (1991:286A). The sphere of civil society, in which 
individuals enjoy subjective freedom, is what differentiates Hegel’s conception of 
ethical life from the ethical life of ancient Greece, in which individuals related 
immediately to the state. As such, it marks the difference between the modern and the 
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ancient society. As Allen Wood writes, “Civil society, … by displaying modern society 
as a higher and freer social order than any previous one, … shows how an ethical life 
which includes this standpoint is higher and freer than all earlier forms of ethical life” 
(2005:151).  
Because civil society is the sphere in which morality achieves its ethical reality, 
it could be assumed that this is also the sphere in which the formal conscience of 
morality is sublated by the true conscience of ethical life. In other words, it could be 
argued that true conscience finds its home within civil society, in helping the ethical 
will make decisions about its own welfare and needs. This is an understandable 
assumption, but, in my opinion, one that is ultimately mistaken. I do not believe we can 
restrict the role of true conscience to civil society, because, in civil society, not all the 
aspects of subjective freedom are present. It is true that, in making decisions about its 
own well-being, the ethical will exercises its subjective freedom; but, in the Philosophy 
of Right, subjective freedom is a broad concept. It includes the moments of ‘purpose 
and responsibility’, ‘intention and welfare’ and ‘the good and conscience’ (see Chapter 
Two). And, as Ludwig Siep remarks, civil society “contains only the stages purpose, 
intention and welfare” (1983:149). It contains purpose and intention, because, by 
pursuing its own, particular needs in civil society, the ethical will has the right to 
understand its actions properly, i.e. as contained within its intention and purpose. And, 
by claiming the right to find satisfaction in its actions, and by pursuing only those 
activities which it finds satisfying, the will pursues its right to welfare. It is in this 
respect that the ethical will exercises its subjective freedom in civil society; it decides, 
for itself, which actions will best secure its happiness. This is an essential part of 
subjective freedom, but it is not the whole story. Whilst civil society preserves an 
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essential part of what it is to be subjectively free – deciding how to best fulfil one’s 
own, particular welfare – it does not extend to the final stage of subjective freedom: the 
good and conscience. Because of this, we cannot claim that civil society preserves all 
the aspects of morality. As Ludwig Siep remarks, “The manner in which morality is 
superseded in the realm of civil society is incomplete” (1983:149). I wish to argue that 
the final stage of morality, the good and conscience, are only superseded once we reach 
the third stage of ethical life: the public sphere of the state.  
In order to develop this idea, let us examine section 264 of the Philosophy of 
Right. Hegel writes:  
 
Individuals … embody a dual moment, namely the extreme of 
individuality which knows and wills for itself, and the extreme of 
universality which knows and wills the substantial. They can therefore 
obtain their right in both of these respects only in so far as they have 
actuality both as private and as substantial persons. In the spheres in 
question [i.e. family and civil society], they attain their right in the first 
respect directly; and in the second respect, they attain it by discovering 
their essential self-consciousness in [social] institutions (1991:287). 
 
This passage clearly states that, in the sphere of civil society, the ethical will 
obtains its right to make decisions for itself. It pursues its own, particular welfare and 
has actuality as a private person. This is one side of the “dual moment”, which Hegel 
describes above: the right to will for itself. However, the other side of this dual moment 
is that the ethical will has actuality as a substantial person; that it recognises its identity 
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as essentially part of the objective, social institutions around it. In recognising this and 
by affirming the social structure it inhabits, the ethical will wills what is good in itself. 
This is the right which is fulfilled in the state.39 So, in civil society, the ethical will 
achieves its status as a private person, and, in the state, the ethical will achieves its 
status as a substantial person. These two moments make up what it is to be a free, 
ethical will. However, if we assume, for the moment, that the true conscience has its 
home within civil society, then we limit the true conscience to deciding what is good for 
itself. This, of course, is an essential part of conscience – the ability to make its own 
decisions – but it does not capture the full extent of true conscience, defined in section 
137 as, “the disposition to will what is good in and for itself” (1991:164). As well as 
willing the good for itself, the true conscience also wills what is good in itself. This 
means that, as well as the ability to make its own decisions, true conscience also makes 
decisions which are objectively correct (we shall return to this idea shortly). This 
requirement cannot be fulfilled in the sphere of civil society, in which the ethical will 
pursues its own, particular welfare and, in doing so, has the potential to place its own 
desires above the universal (it is for this reason that we need the administration of 
justice, and the police and corporations). In civil society, the ethical will is not 
guaranteed to will what is good in itself; it is simply guided by its own needs and 
desires. For this reason, I argue that true conscience is not part of civil society and does 
not play a role in guiding the ethical will’s pursuit of its own welfare.  
Perhaps it could be argued that, instead of assisting the ethical will in the pursuit 
of its own welfare, true conscience plays a role in promoting the welfare of others. In 
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 In the corporation, the ethical will begins to exist as substantiality, since it identifies its end with the 
universal end of the corporation. However, as we discussed in Chapter Four, the corporation is only a 
particular universal and, as such, the ethical will only reaches true substantiality in the state.  
 115 
other words, it could be suggested that true conscience finds its home in the act of 
charity. In section 242, Hegel describes the role that charity can play in alleviating 
poverty within the state. Because poverty, for Hegel, is an undesirable yet inevitable 
part of the modern, free market economy, he acknowledges charity as an integral part of 
society.40 Unfortunately, there shall always be those in need of charitable assistance. He 
writes that, “poverty, and in general … every kind of want to which all individuals are 
exposed … also requires subjective help” (1991:265). He then continues to claim that 
charity is a “situation in which, notwithstanding all the universal arrangements, morality 
finds plenty to do” (1991:265). So, even in the presence of rational, political 
institutions, charity plays an essential role. Given this, perhaps we could locate true 
conscience within the charitable sector. Is this where true conscience finds its proper 
function? 
I do not believe it is, because, even in the act of charity, the ethical will does not 
will what is good in and for itself. Charity, rather than an example of true conscience, is 
an example of morality, as preserved within civil society (recall Hegel’s quotation 
above that, in charity, “morality finds plenty to do”). This is because, in charity, the will 
acts as a particular will. It makes its own, personal choices about the particular 
charitable work it undertakes. Charity is, therefore, part of civil society; the only 
difference being that, instead of pursuing its own welfare, the will pursues the welfare 
of others. So, although charity is an honourable activity, it remains the activity of a 
particular will. Hegel writes that charity displays a “particularity of emotions” and a 
“contingency of its own disposition” (1991:265R). In charity, the will decides for itself 
how to promote the welfare of others and is, therefore, not guaranteed to make 
                                                 
40
 Hegel [1991:265-267] 
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objectively correct decisions. For this reason, Hegel believes the state should do 
everything it can to reduce the need for charity. In his opinion, the less reliant the state 
is on particular acts of charity, the more rational the state. He writes, “public conditions 
should be regarded as all the more perfect the less there is left for the individual to do 
by himself [für sich] in the light of his own particular opinion” (1991:266R). This 
quotation confirms the fact that, within the Philosophy of Right, charitable actions stem 
from the will’s particular preferences. It is for this reason that I argue that charity is a 
part of civil society and that, when acting charitably, the will only wills what is good for 
itself. True conscience, on the other hand, wills what is good in and for itself. It is only 
once we move to the third stage of ethical life, the state, that the will can achieve this; 
for, in the state, the ethical will understands itself as both a particular will and as part of 
a greater substantiality. It recognises that its identity is fundamentally connected to the 
rational, social structures around it, and, by affirming these structures, it also wills what 
is good in itself.  
I would therefore like to argue that the true conscience, which wills what is good 
both in and for itself, has its proper function in the public sphere of the state, in which 
the ethical will fulfils its status as both a private and a substantial individual. I view this 
as a necessary consequence of the logical development of freedom within ethical life. 
As well as following the logical structure of the text, I believe my thesis will also 
reassure those commentators who fear that Hegel limits the role of ethical conscience to 
the private life of the individual. The idea that matters of conscience are restricted to the 
particular realm – which vocation to choose, which interests to pursue, etc. – is 
somewhat unsatisfying, for this entails that conscience has no role to play in public 
matters, such as the development of law, or the refining of the constitution. This is not 
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to de-value the particular life of the individual; it is simply to express the importance of 
conscience being present when public decisions are made (decisions, which will, no 
doubt, impact on the private realm, too). In order to preserve conscience in a meaningful 
way within ethics, Hegel must allow it a voice in public policy. In his book, Hegel and 
the Philosophy of Right, Dudley Knowles also insists that the ethical conscience should 
fulfil a public role. He writes that, “Hegel must find some genuine space for subjectivity 
and conscientious affirmation in his account of the … state. It is not good enough  … to 
distinguish decisions on matters of public policy and decisions on matters of 
conscience” (2002:214). Although Knowles eventually claims that the role of 
conscience is limited in Hegel’s account of the state (as assertion that I will dispute), his 
requirement that Hegel should allow conscience a public function is significant. If we 
are to take Hegel’s claims about subjective freedom seriously, it is essential that 
conscience – the fruition of subjective freedom41 – has a role within the state. Unlike 
Knowles, I believe that there is a meaningful, public function for true conscience within 
the Philosophy of Right. 
Having established that true conscience has a public function in the state, let us 
now examine this function in more detail.  
It is sometimes suggested that the role of the true conscience can be reduced to 
the “political disposition”, which Hegel describes in section 268 (1991:288). Ludwig 
Siep, for example, writes that “political sentiment … should be seen as the ethical form 
of conscience, as the ‘true conscience’” (1983:149). As we discussed in the previous 
chapter, the political disposition (which Hegel also refers to as patriotism) describes the 
citizen’s immediate identification with the state; the citizen’s underlying faith that the 
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 See Chapter Three for a discussion of conscience as the culmination of subjective freedom.   
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state secures its own freedom. This, of course, relies on the state actually being rational 
and the citizen recognising this rationality (and, as such, cannot be reduced to misplaced 
obedience), but, even so, I believe it is a mistake to equate the true conscience with the 
political disposition. In my opinion, this immediate identification doesn’t capture the 
essence of conscience, which is the process of subjective reflection; the ability to 
consider, for oneself, what is in the interests of the society in which one lives. Patriotism 
certainly forms part of true conscience’s function – it is essential the conscience trusts 
the institutions of the state – but it is not the whole story. If it were, then conscience 
would lose its ability to give itself content; an aspect of formal conscience which I argue 
is retained in the Aufhebung into ethical life. Therefore, I believe it is a mistake to say 
the true conscience is simply the process of trusting the objective institutions of one’s 
society (even if this trust is based on an understanding of the institutions’ rationality). 
True conscience must be able to produce its own convictions. 
But, in a society in which the objective institutions of the state are already 
rational, why does conscience need to produce its own convictions? We have already 
established that, in an ethical community, ‘being ethical’ simply consists in following 
the rational practices of one’s society.  So, why does the conscience need to give itself a 
content and, moreover, how can we reconcile this fact with the demand that conscience 
affirms the objective structures of the state? 
I believe there will always be a need for true conscience to give itself content, 
because, even though Hegel’s state is rational, it inhabits a world of contingency. In 
section 258, we are told that, “The state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and 
hence in a sphere of arbitrariness, contingency, and error...” (1991:279A). The state, as 
inhabited by the citizen, is not an abstract concept; it is the concept of freedom which 
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exists in the real world. And, for Hegel, the real world will always involve an element 
of contingency and arbitrariness, because it is a human world. It is the world of the 
finite will. As Wood writes, “All things human are marred by contingency, particularly 
the contingency of the finite will” (1990:149). Therefore, even though the state is 
fundamentally rational, it exists in a sphere in which contingency and arbitrariness are 
necessarily present; in other words, it exists in a temporal, spatial and, ultimately, 
human world. If we invoke Hegel’s metaphor from the Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Right, we could say that the state is related to freedom as the body is related to the soul, 
i.e. the state is the embodiment of freedom. It is the process of ‘embodiment’ that brings 
with it the contingencies of life. However, as Hegel remarks, “A soul without a body 
would not be a living thing” (1991:25A). The state cannot remain as pure concept. It 
requires an existence in a real, albeit imperfect, world.  
The fact that the state inhabits a world of contingency does not mean that the 
state is not fundamentally rational. Hegel believes that, even in the presence of 
contingent deficiencies,  it is possible to recognise the rational structures the state 
embodies. In a (somewhat politically-incorrect) passage in section 258, Hegel remarks 
that, “the ugliest man, the criminal, the invalid … is still a living human being; the 
affirmative aspect … survives in spite of such deficiencies” (1991:279A). In other 
words, even if the rational principles of the state are somehow obscured in their existing 
form, they are still present, and they are still rational. All it means is that these 
principles are not comprehended as they should be in the existing world. To put it into 
Hegelian terms: the state, as it exists, is not actual. This is an important distinction. The 
actual state is the state in which the rational principles of freedom have been fully 
comprehended and manifested in their pure form. This is the rational standard to which 
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freedom aspires: to be actualised in the world. In an actual state, the objective 
institutions are the perfect embodiment of freedom. However, as we saw above, Hegel 
accepts that the rational principles of freedom are always embodied in a contingent 
world, and, thus, will never achieve actuality42. In his book, Hegel’s Ethical Theory, 
Wood writes, “Hegel insists that every existing state, standing as it does in the sphere of 
transitoriness and contingency, is disfigured in some way … and fails … to be wholly 
actual” (1990:8). The state, in its existing form, is not actual. This is the fundamental 
difference between existence and actuality in Hegel’s account of objective freedom. 
Actuality refers to the state in so far as it is what it should be, i.e. to an objective state in 
which the rational principles of freedom have been fully comprehended and manifested; 
whereas existence refers to the state as it is, i.e. to an objective state in which the 
rational principles of freedom are inherent, but somehow obscured by contingency. So, 
in any fundamentally rational state, there will always be a disparity between the actual 
and the existing.  
I would like to argue that true conscience finds its place in this disparity between 
the actual and the existing. It is precisely because the state, as it exists, has the 
possibility to diverge from the actual, that true conscience has an integral part to play in 
ethical life. We have already established that, in an existing, rational state, the 
fundamental principles of freedom are inherent, but somehow obscured by contingency. 
I believe it is the function of true conscience to recognise these inherent, rational 
principles and to transform the existing world to accord with them. In other words, the 
true conscience attempts to keep the existing in line with the actual. And it is precisely 
for this reason that the true conscience retains the ability to give itself content: having 
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identified the rational principles of society, conscience has to decide, for itself, how to 
implement these principles in the contingent world. In doing so, the true conscience 
gradually transforms the existing world so that it corresponds to the rational principles 
on which it is based. Thus, it is the true conscience which fulfils the command of 
Hegel’s Preface: “to recognise reason as the rose on the cross of the present” (1991:22). 
True conscience recognises the rationality inherent within the state and reforms the 
existing, objective structures so that they conform to these principles.  
By transforming the existing world so that it adheres to the rational principles 
inherent within it, the true conscience performs an immanent critique of the social 
structures it inhabits. It does not attempt to overhaul these structures. On the contrary, it 
recognises their essential rationality and it is precisely this rationality which it adopts as 
its ethical standard. In other words, the true conscience transforms the structures of 
society so that they conform more faithfully to their own, rational essence; so that their 
existence corresponds to their actuality (which we could describe as a “purified version 
of existing reality” (Neuhouser 1998:44)). As such, true conscience operates with an 
internal, and not an external, ethical standard. It locates the rational principles of 
freedom within the state itself. It does not attempt to transcend the temporal state in 
which it lives in order to construct abstract conceptions of how the state ‘ought to be’. 
In Hegel’s system, this type of abstract construction represents an unsatisfying and 
ultimately instable way to think about a fundamentally rational society. Instead of 
opposing society with abstract conceptions of an ‘ideal’ state, one should seek 
rationality in the state of one’s own time. In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel writes:  
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As far as the individual is concerned, each individual is in any case a 
child of his time; thus, philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended 
in thoughts. It is just as foolish to imagine that any philosophy can 
transcend its contemporary world as that an individual can overleap his 
own time or overleap Rhodes. If his theory does indeed transcend his 
own time, if it builds itself a world as it ought to be, then it certainly 
has an existence, but only within his opinions – a pliant medium in 
which the imagination can construct anything it pleases.  
 
Hegel’s claim is that, instead of imposing abstract, normative principles on the 
state – declaring, from an external perspective, how the state ‘ought to be’ – one should 
recognise the rationality which is already present in one’s own society. This is the 
process of “reconciliation with actuality”, which Hegel describes in his Preface 
(1991:22). Being ethical, for Hegel, consists in reconciling oneself to the objective 
structures of one’s society (as we discussed in the previous chapter). This notion of 
reconciliation has received harsh criticism over the years, by those who worry that it 
endorses the ‘status quo’ of any given society. It is feared that reconciliation prevents 
social criticism or change; because, instead of improving deficient aspects of society, 
one simply has to resign oneself to the fact that they exist. It is suggested that such 
reconciliation results in a state in which nothing is challenged and, thus, in which 
nothing is improved or progressed. The most notorious of these critics is Tugendhat, 
who writes that, “The possibility of an independent and critical relation to the 
community or state is not admitted by Hegel” (1986:315). Whilst such criticism is 
understandable – a misreading of Hegel’s terminology could easily suggest that Hegel is 
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making such claims – it is ultimately misguided, for Hegel at no point advocates a state 
in which we resign ourselves to what exists. What this criticism fails to notice is that the 
object of reconciliation is the actual, and not the existing. Hegel wants us to recognise 
and affirm the rational principles of the state “as they aspire to be” or as they “in 
principle are” (Neuhouser 2000:259). In other words, he wants us to reconcile ourselves 
with the actual state. This involves fully comprehending the rational principles of 
freedom and how they can manifest themselves in the objective world. And, far from 
excluding social criticism, reconciling ourselves with the actual indeed necessitates 
criticism; for, in recognising the principles of freedom in their pure form, the true 
conscience is obliged the transform the existing institutions accordingly. True 
conscience reconciles itself with the actual, and not the existing state.  
I therefore argue that the ethical disposition (or reconciliation), in which the true 
conscience recognises and affirms the rational principles inherent in the state, does not 
exclude social criticism. In fact, it necessitates it. Both Frederick Neuhouser and Allen 
Wood identify the proper object of reconciliation as the actual and not the existing, and 
recognise that this opens up a space for social criticism within Hegel’s account of the 
state. Allen Wood writes that, “The Philosophy of Right clearly leaves room for rational 
criticism of what exists, and also for practical efforts to improve the existing state by 
actualising it, bringing it more into harmony with its own rational essence or concept” 
(1990:8-9). And Neuhouser writes that, “Criticism and reform are consistent with 
Hegel’s theory, insofar as they aim at transforming institutions so as to make them 
conform more faithfully to the rational principles already implicit in them” (1998:44). 
So, clearly, the objection that Hegel endorses a state in which critical reflection is 
excluded, is, by-and-large, refuted in current Hegel scholarship. However, what both 
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Wood and Neuhouser fail to suggest is that such social criticism is the function of the 
true conscience. If we define true conscience’s function in this way (which I think is 
entirely consistent with both the logical structure of the text and the concrete institutions 
described within it), then we further disarm the charge that Hegel presents a state which 
excludes social criticism. 
Of course, because true conscience performs an immanent critique on the state, 
this rules out the possibility of true conscience engaging in radical criticism of the social 
order. By ‘radical criticism’, I mean that true conscience either, 1. rejects the rational 
principles on which the state is based, or, 2. recognises these rational principles but 
insists that the existing institutions are incapable of realising them43. Both of these 
scenarios imply that the true conscience is alienated from the state in some way; either 
from the rational principles on which the state is based, or from existing institutions, 
which are supposed to embody these principles (we shall return to this very shortly). 
But this type of radical critique is incompatible with the type of critique in which true 
conscience engages; an immanent critique requires recognition of the state as rational, 
and recognition that the existing institutions go some way to realising these principles. 
In other words, true conscience seeks its ethical standard – the rational principles of 
freedom – from within the state itself, and modifies existing, social structures so that 
they conform more faithfully to these principles. It does not aim to give the state new 
rational principles, nor to completely overhaul existing, social structures. Instead, it 
transforms the existing world to reflect the rational principles that are already present. 
As such, I would like to argue that Hegel’s state can accommodate gradual reform, but 
not radical criticism. This thesis is supported by Neuhouser, who writes that, 
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“reconciliation is not incompatible with a type of social criticism that is directed at the 
reform, as opposed to the radical overhaul, of existing institutions” (1998:44). A 
precondition of true conscience reforming the existing world is that it recognise the 
fundamentally rational principles inherent within existing institutions. This is 
incompatible with the type of radical criticism that attempts to build a state from 
scratch, and, in doing so, negates the rationality inherent within the existing state.  
It is at this point that the difference between the formal conscience of morality 
and the true conscience of ethical life becomes increasingly clear. As we discussed in 
the previous chapter, the formal conscience has exactly this ability to negate the 
existing, social institutions of its community, for it seeks the good from within its own 
subjectivity, and not from within the state itself. By sticking unreservedly to its own, 
subjective convictions, formal conscience imposes an external, moral standard on the 
state. It attempts to overrule the existing, rational structures of society with its view on 
how the state ‘ought to be’. To invoke the passage we quoted above, formal conscience 
attempts to “transcend his own time” (Hegel 1991:22). True conscience, on the other 
hand, locates its ethical standards within the state itself. These are the “fixed 
principles”, which Hegel attributes to the true conscience in section 137 (1991:164). It 
recognises the fundamentally rational nature of the community in which it lives, and 
attempts to reform society accordingly. It is in this sense that the true conscience wills 
what it good in itself, i.e. it correctly recognises the good as already present in the 
objective structures of society (albeit in an imperfect form) and it attempts to reform the 
existing world according to this standard. This is the essential difference between the 
formal and the true conscience: the formal conscience locates the good within its own, 
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subjective convictions, whilst the true conscience locates the good within the state itself. 
True conscience, unlike the formal conscience, therefore, wills what is good in itself.  
So, on my reading of the dialectic of conscience, radical criticism cannot be 
accommodated within a fundamentally rational state. This is not a limitation in Hegel’s 
account of ethical life. It is imply a consequence of, 1. the state being fundamentally 
rational, 2. the true conscience recognising the rational principles inherent in the state 
and, 3. the true conscience using these rational principles to guide its reform of the 
existing world. I argue that, in a fundamentally rational state, radical overhaul of the 
existing institutions is both unnecessary and, moreover, damaging. This furthers the 
argument I presented in the previous chapter, in which I denied formal conscience a 
public role in the ethical state. The formal conscience, because of its contingent nature, 
can fail to recognise the rationality inherent within the state and, what is worse, can 
insist on the infallibility its own, subjective principles. As such, it has the potential to 
posit itself in opposition to the state, and to offer its subjective conviction as an 
alternative to actuality. This type of moral heroism alienates the individual from a 
society which is, in fact, rational. It also has the potential to result in disastrous political 
consequences, if these convictions are adopted, by the other members of the state, as a 
substitute for actuality. In Hegel’s opinion, such widespread, misplaced opposition to 
actuality can result in catastrophic, political events, such as the Reign of Terror of the 
French Revolution.44 So, whilst Hegel attributes a fundamental role to conscience 
within ethics, he cannot accommodate the type of conscience which opposes the 
existing structures of its society. This thesis is supported by Alan Patten when he writes 
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 See Philosophy of Right, Paragraph 5 and Phenomenology of Spirit, Paragraphs 599-610 
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that, “so long as they recognise an objective reality in ethics, [conscience and 
deliberation] remain indispensable components of freedom” (1999:60 my emphasis).  
In his article, Hegel’s Critique of morality, Allen Wood argues that Hegel’s state 
can accommodate radical criticism. In response to charges that Hegel’s state prevents 
reflection, Wood claims that, “a closer look shows that Hegel does not reject radical 
moral criticism of an ethical order” (2005:155). Wood then continues to cite from 
Section 138 in order to defend his thesis: “in epochs when what is recognised as right 
and good in actuality and custom [Sitte] is unable to satisfy the better will, this will no 
longer finds itself in the duties recognised in this world and must seek to recover in 
ideal inwardness alone that harmony which it has lost in actuality” (1991:166A). I 
believe that, in his attempt to defend Hegel, Wood is mistaken to claim that Hegel’s 
state can accommodate radical criticism. It is evident from Section 138 that Hegel 
believes there are times in which conscience should turn against actuality; when 
conscience should present its own conviction as an alternative to the existing social 
order. However, this is only in times when “what is recognised … is unable to satisfy 
the better will”. In other words, this demand only occurs when the rational state has 
ceased to be rational. And, in such times, we are no longer in an “ethical order” (Wood 
2005:155). If the ethical will no longer recognises that its freedom is secured by the 
state, then it is perfectly legitimate to oppose the objective institutions of society. Hegel 
does not deny the possibility of the state deteriorating in such a way; in fact, it is a 
necessary consequence of the state inhabiting a world of contingency that the existing 
state has the possibility to drift from the actual (Socrates appeared at a time when the 
Athenian state had “fallen into ruin”). However, in a state in which the objective 
institutions are fundamentally rational, it is damaging to set one’s conscience in 
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opposition to existing social structures. Perhaps it is more illuminating to look at 
another passage from Section 138, in which Hegel claims that, “Only in ages when the 
actual world is a hollow, spiritless, and unsettles existence [Existenz] may the individual 
be permitted to flee from actuality and retreat into his inner life” (1991:166-7A my 
emphasis). It is only in a fundamentally non-rational society that the conscience has a 
right to oppose the state with its own, subjective convictions.  
At this point, I would like to reiterate that there are certain situations in which it 
is legitimate to engage in radical social criticism. It would be absurd to claim that, in a 
repressive society, conscience had no right to oppose deficient, existing structures. 
Hegel acknowledges that such deficient societies can arise – societies in which 
“actuality and custom is unable to satisfy the better will” – and, in such scenarios, he 
urges the individual to consult his own conscience (1991:138A). However, in such 
circumstances, positing one’s convictions in opposition to the state is unlikely to make 
the state any worse, because the state is no longer fundamentally rational. As such, the 
individual is already alienated from the social structures it inhabits; it no longer 
identifies with the state nor trusts the state to secure its own freedom. In such a 
fundamentally non-rational society, radical criticism is justified. In his article, Hegel on 
Justified Disobedience, Mark Tunick writes that, “Obligations truly dissolve … when 
the state … no longer is our home. On Hegel’s view, noncompliance or resistance is 
justified if the state is not rational” (1998:529-530). However, in a state in which the 
existing institutions are fundamentally rational, radical criticism is unjustified. As well 
as being unjustified, it should also be undesirable to oppose society in such 
circumstances. In a truly ethical society, in which the ethical will feels at home, social 
critique takes the shape of reform, in which conscience transforms the exiting 
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institutions so that the comply more accurately to the rational principles they embody. 
Of course, a precondition for such an immanent critique is that, even if the existing 
institutions are deficient in some contingent respect, they are rational enough that the 
true conscience can recognise the rational principles inherent within them. This 
distinguishes a fundamentally rational society from a fundamentally non-rational 
society. Neuhouser writes that, “what is required … is that existing institutions come 
close enough to realising their own ideals so as to be recognised as genuine, albeit 
imperfect, embodiments of the actual (rational) social order or as on their way to 
becoming such” (1998:45). 
Let us recap briefly. We have established that, because the state inhabits a world 
of contingency, the existing state has the potential to drift from the actual state. I have 
located true conscience’s function in this disparity between the existing and the actual. I 
have argued that, by recognising the rational principles of the state and by transforming 
existing institutions so that they conform more faithfully to their own, rational essence, 
true conscience performs an immanent critique on the society it inhabits. I have also 
argued that this type of immanent critique is incompatible with radical social criticism 
(although I maintain that in a fundamentally non-rational society, radical criticism is 
justified). Because true conscience affirms the rational principles of ethical life, true 
conscience wills what is good in itself. And, because true conscience makes its own 
decisions about how it should best reform the existing social institutions, true 
conscience also wills what is good for itself. This reading, I believe, fully encapsulates 
Hegel’s definition of true conscience in Section 137: “the disposition to will what is 
good in and for itself” (1991:164).  
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I would now like to look more closely at the idea that conscience wills what is 
good for itself. As we discussed in chapter three, the right to will what is good for itself 
– which we could also describe as the right to produce its own convictions, or to give 
itself content – is what marks conscience as the fruition of subjective freedom; it is, 
therefore, a feature which I argue should be preserved in the Aufhebung from morality 
into ethical life. Of course, in morality, formal conscience was defined entirely by its 
right to decide for itself what is good (which eventually led to its own downfall). 
However, within ethics, conscience’s right to will what is good for itself is preserved in 
a sublated and non-destructive form, for it is accompanied by the right to will what is 
good in itself. True conscience still refers decisions to its own subjectivity, but it also 
recognises that the good is already present in the objective institutions of its own 
society. Therefore, deciding what is good for itself does not amount to a “perennial 
obligation” to determine the good purely subjectively (as it did in morality). Instead, it 
amounts to deciding for itself how best to reform the existing institutions so that they 
remain faithful to the good which is already inherent within them. In this respect, true 
conscience wills what is good in and for itself: it affirms the good which is embodied in 
existing institutions, but it also makes its own decisions about how to actualise this 
good in society.  
It is especially important that true conscience retains this right to produce its 
own convictions, because, in the existing state, conscience will always be faced with 
unprecedented situations, in which it needs to think for itself how best to actualise the 
good.  Society, in its existing form, is continually developing. Even though the rational 
state is built on “unmoved”, universal principles, it exists in an empirical world, in 
which discoveries are made and technology improves (1991:275). Such contingent 
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developments need not effect the rational essence of the state – as Hegel remarks: the 
“large and ancient tree” of reason still “puts out more branches without thereby 
becoming a new tree” – but they do confront the conscience with new situations and 
dilemmas (1991:249A). In such circumstances, conscience has no objective precedent. 
It must decide, for itself, whether such empirical developments conflict with the rational 
principles already present in the state; or, it must decide, for itself, how to best integrate 
empirical developments into society, whilst ensuring the that rational basis of the state 
is not threatened. In his article, “Die Verwirklichung meiner Autorität”, Dean Moyar 
argues that, because conscience will always be confronted with new situations, it 
remains “experimental”.45 In other words, conscience must be able to consider a diverse 
range of empirical situations, and to reconcile new developments with the rational 
principles inherent within the state. It is, therefore, essential that true conscience retain 
the ability to produce its own convictions; for there will always be circumstances in 
which the true conscience must think, for itself, what is the best way to actualise the 
good. 
Of course, because true conscience retains the right to produce its own 
convictions, it is possible that true conscience can be mistaken about the best way to 
actualise the good, i.e. it is possible that true conscience gives itself an incorrect 
content. It could be argued, therefore, that true conscience has the potential to fall into 
exactly the same trap as formal conscience: that it could adhere unreservedly to an 
objectively wrong belief and threaten the rational nature of the state. However, this 
                                                 
45Moyar [2004:235], “Natürlich denkt Hegel, dass es immer neue Situationen geben wird und keine 
moderne Gesellschaft so festgelegt sein kann, dass wir im Vorhinein wissen, wie jede Person in jeder 
Situation hendeln sollte. Deshalb wird das Gewissen immer experimentell bleiben” Translation: Of 
course, Hegel believes that there will always be new situations, and that no society can be so fixed that 
we know in advance what every person should do in every situation. Therefore, conscience will always 
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danger does not apply to the true conscience, because the true conscience also wills 
what is good in itself. This is not to say that true conscience will never be wrong. But, 
what it does mean, is that true conscience will never put its convictions beyond 
criticism. This is because true conscience recognises the state it inhabits as 
fundamentally rational; and it is precisely this rationality which true conscience affirms 
in its attempt to actualise the good. True conscience, therefore, will not posit its own 
convictions in opposition to the state. It would be inconsistent to do so. If true 
conscience has the conviction that society needs to change in some way, it implements 
these changes through the existing institutions of the state; institutions which it 
acknowledges as manifestations of reason (albeit imperfect manifestations). In concrete 
terms, this could mean referring its convictions to public organisations, or allowing its 
convictions to be discussed in the public assembly (we shall return to this in the next 
chapter). In other words, true conscience trusts the current, existing institutions to 
incorporate and develop its own convictions. Unlike the formal conscience, true 
conscience does not elevate its own convictions above the state (for it recognises that 
the state is rational). Instead, it allows its convictions to be evaluated by the objective 
institutions in society. If its convictions are rejected, then true conscience stands 
corrected. At no point does true conscience insist on the infallibility of its own, 
subjective beliefs.  
We have arrived at the fundamental difference between the formal conscience of 
morality and the true conscience of ethical life. Whilst both types of conscience have 
the ability to consult their subjectivity and produce their own convictions, formal 
conscience can further insist that its convictions are beyond reproach. True conscience, 
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on the other hand – because it affirms the good which is already present in the state –, 
cannot insist on the infallibility of its convictions. Instead, true conscience refers its 
own, subjective findings back to the state and allows them to be discussed by public 
organisations. It reforms existing institutions through the institutions themselves. In a 
fundamentally rational society, the inability to cling to one’s subjective convictions 
does not represent a loss of freedom; on the contrary, it reflects the higher freedom of 
trusting a state, whose structures are rational and secure the freedom of its citizens. It is 
only in a fundamentally non-rational society that one is entitled to elevate one’s 
convictions above the state. In ethical life, the right to subjective freedom is preserved, 
but in a way that respects the rational principles already present in the state. In other 
words, true conscience has the right to produce its own convictions and to have these 
convictions publicly evaluated. It does not, however, have the right to put these 
convictions beyond criticism.  
In the next chapter, I shall apply this reading to the concrete institutions of the 
state’s rational constitution. I shall argue that true conscience’s function is located in the 
legislative power.  
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Chapter Six 
 
True Conscience within the Legislative Power 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that true conscience’s function was to actualise the 
existing institutions of a fundamentally rational state. I would now like to look more 
closely at how true conscience performs this function within the concrete institutions 
which form the state’s rational constitution (namely, the sovereign, the executive and 
the legislative powers). I will argue that, because freedom is given an objective 
existence in the positive laws of the state, true conscience’s function is located in the 
legislative procedure. I believe that, by developing new laws and reforming the legal 
code, true conscience helps to shape the existing state so that it conforms more 
accurately to the rational principles within it. The legal code is in constant need of 
improvement. As the existing, particular world develops, so the universal principles of 
law need to be comprehended and applied to new situations. It is through this immanent 
process of understanding and refining laws that true conscience brings the existing 
world closer to the rational principles on which it is based. Of course, the legislature 
cannot operate without the sovereign, executive and the estates; however, I shall argue 
that, at every stage of the law-making process, true conscience is present (if not directly, 
then through representation). I will begin this chapter by describing the relationship 
between positive law and the principles of freedom. I shall then continue to discuss the 
way in which the legal code can be reformed, and function of the sovereign, executive 
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and estates within this process. I shall conclude by evaluating the system of 
representation within the legislative procedure. Let us first turn to the relationship 
between freedom and the law.  
The whole of the Philosophy of Right describes the will’s attempt to understand 
its own freedom and to transform the existing world accordingly. By the time we reach 
ethical life, the will understands that, in order to secure its own subjective and objective 
freedom, it needs to establish a system of positive law. Far from limiting the will’s 
freedom, these laws enable the will to live in a society in which both its particular and 
universal status is respected. Law, therefore, is a necessary part of freedom. Hegel 
writes that law is “right in itself”, which has been “posited in its objective existence” 
(1991:241). In other words, law is the objective manifestation of the concept of 
freedom. Once the will has understood properly what freedom entails, it creates a legal 
system in order to implement this in the existing world. Laws are not repressive or alien 
structures. They are, on the contrary, objective manifestations of the will’s essence as a 
free being. Of course, in order to create a legal system that properly secures its freedom, 
it is imperative the will understands its freedom properly. Hegel is keen to point out that 
freedom should be “determined by thought for consciousness and known [bekannt] as 
what is right and valid” (1991:241). Without this understanding, the will could 
implement a legal system that is fundamentally non-rational (as is the case in pre- or 
non-ethical states). However, once the principles of freedom are comprehended 
properly and understood as universally valid, they are given a determinate existence and 
posited as law.  
Given that law is the objective manifestation of freedom, it is not surprising that 
Hegel believes that every civilised nation is entitled to develop a legal code. In Section 
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211, he claims that, “to deny a civilised nation, or the legal profession within it, the 
ability to draw up a legal code would be among the greatest insults one could offer to 
either” (1991:242R). The term “civilised” is important here. As we discussed above, the 
development of a non-alienating legal system relies on the will achieving a sufficient 
understanding of its own freedom. Hegel is claiming that, in every civilised nation, this 
understanding will have been reached. His assertion is simply that, once the will has 
recognised what is right in itself – as is the case in a civilised nation – it should not 
subsequently be prevented from providing freedom with a determinate existence as law.  
In order to draw up a legal code, the ethical will examines how freedom is 
already manifest in the rational, customary principles of its society. There is no 
obligation to produce laws subjectively, since, in an ethical (or “civilised”) society, 
freedom is already inherent in the customary structures of the community. Transforming 
these practices into law simply involves recognising them as rational and declaring 
them as universally valid. Hegel writes that this procedure, “does not require that a 
system of laws with a new content should be created, but only that the present content of 
the [customary] laws should be recognised in its determinate universality – i.e. grasped 
by means of thought – and subsequently applied to particular cases” (1991:242-3R). So, 
producing a legal code is not about creating laws, but recognising the laws that are 
already implicit within society. This clearly relates to our discussion in chapter four, in 
which we established that the ethical will no longer assumes the moral obligation to 
produce normative principles purely subjectively. The ethical will understands that the 
fundamental principles of freedom are already present in the customary practices of its 
community. Therefore, instead of creating new laws, the ethical will simply grants 
universal validity to the rational, customary laws that already exist. It is only once these 
 137 
laws are “apprehended in terms of thought” that they become a legal code in the “proper 
sense” (1991:242R).  
Thus far we have established that positive law is the objective manifestation of 
what is right in itself (i.e. of freedom), and that every ethical society has the right to 
develop a legal code. We have also established that, in order to produce this legal code, 
the ethical will does not have to create new laws; instead, it has to recognise and 
comprehend the rational practices which are already inherent in its own society.  
I would now like to discuss Hegel’s claim that what is right in itself may not 
always correspond precisely to its existing manifestation as law. In an important 
passage in Section 212, Hegel remarks that, “Since being posited constitutes the aspect 
of existence [Dasein] in which the contingency of self-will and of other factors may 
also intervene, what is law may differ in content from what is right in itself” (1991:243). 
In other words, once freedom is comprehended and posited in the existing world (as 
law), it becomes susceptible to contingency; for example, the particular will of the 
legislator or possible corruption (although these factors will be minimised in a well-
functioning, rational society). This means that, although the legal code is fundamentally 
rational (since it emerges from an enlightened comprehension of the basic principles of 
freedom), it may differ in some external respects from the rational principles on which it 
is based. Law is right in its existing form; and there is a potential disparity between right 
as it exists, i.e. as law, and what is right in itself.46 An implication of this, is that the 
legal code is always capable of improvement. Here we have, in concrete form, the 
disparity between the actual and the existing that we identified in the previous chapter. 
Because law is freedom in its existing form, it has the potential to differ from freedom 
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in its actual form. In the previous chapter, I located true conscience’s function in the 
gap between the actual and the existing. I argued that, in bringing the existing state in 
line with the actual state, true conscience reformed the state so that it conformed more 
faithfully to the rational principles it embodies. It is now possible to see how this 
function manifests itself within the concrete structures of the state: I wish to argue that 
true conscience reforms the laws of the state so that they resemble more accurately what 
is right in itself (i.e. the concept of freedom, of which they are an objective 
manifestation). In doing so, true conscience keeps the legal code in line with the 
fundamental principles of freedom.  
In my opinion, it is essential for true conscience to play a role in reforming the 
law, because, only by doing so, can freedom in its existing form be transformed into 
freedom in its actual form. It is through the construction and refinement of a legal code 
that the ethical will understands what it is to be free and how it should determine this 
freedom in the existing world. This is what Hegel means when he claims that, “what is 
legal is therefore the source of cognition of what is right [Recht], or more precisely, of 
what is lawful [Rechtens]” (1991:244R). Even though our legal code, as an existing 
structure, can differ from what it right in itself, it is still fundamentally rational (since it 
embodies the fundamental principles of freedom) and it is still the means by which we 
relate to our own freedom; the legal code, albeit imperfect, is our connection to what is 
right in itself. The more we refine the legal code so that it corresponds to the concept of 
freedom, the better we understand what it is to be free. In his book, Hegel’s Political 
Philosophy, Thom Brooks identifies that, within the Philosophy or Right, the legal code 
is a measure of the ethical will’s understanding of right in itself. He writes, “part of 
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[Hegel’s] criteria for how well developed different states have become relates to each 
state’s ability to transform their laws simply from statements of legality to embody 
justice. Those states that have laws more commensurable with justice are held in higher 
regard by Hegel than those that have fared less well.” (2009:86). By “justice”, Brooks is 
referring to what is lawful, or what is right in itself. His claim is that, within Hegel’s 
system, the more accurately a state’s laws correspond to the standard of what is right in 
itself, the more developed the state. If true conscience is able to continually monitor 
and, where necessary, refine and improve the legal code so that it remains faithful to 
what is right in itself, it can play a vital role in this development; in other words, it can 
play a vital role in actualising freedom within the state.  
Given that the legal code is the objective form of freedom and that, by refining 
it, true conscience actualises freedom in the state, it is absolutely essential that the laws 
of the state are accessible to all and publicly understood. Hegel insists that the legal 
system should not be limited to the elite. He writes that it would be a mistake to “hang 
the laws at such a height that no citizen could read them” or to “bury them in an 
extensive apparatus of learned books .. so that knowledge [Kenntnis] of the laws 
currently in force is accessible to only those who have made them an object of scholarly 
study” (1991:246-7R). Hegel criticises the common law in England for precisely this 
reason, claiming that the “unwritten laws” in court verdicts force judges to “act as 
legislators” and render the legal system esoteric (1991:242R). Law is based on freedom 
and, if properly monitored and reformed, secures the freedom of its citizens. It is, 
therefore, essential that all citizens understand the law and what the law demands of 
them (we shall return to this later in the chapter). In section 247, we are told that, 
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“Right47 is concerned with freedom, the worthiest and most sacred profession of man, 
and man must know about it if it is to have a binding force for him” (1991:247A my 
emphasis). Instead of restricting the knowledge of law to a few, learned professionals, 
Hegel claims that laws should be “made universally known” (1991:246).  
In order to achieve this, the law should be codified in such a way that makes it 
intelligible to all citizens. Hegel writes that the legal code should form a “complete and 
self contained whole”, and that it should consist of “simple and universal 
determinations” (1991:247). A clear and comprehensible legal code keeps the law 
accessible to everybody. Another way to ensure that the law is universally known is to 
insist on the publicity of the administration of justice. This is achieved in two ways. 
Firstly, court proceedings themselves should be open to the public. By dispensing 
justice publicly, all citizens are able to observe how the legal code is applied to 
particular situations, which helps to maintain public trust and confidence in the legal 
system. Whilst the particularities of the case may not be of interest to all, Hegel claims 
that the universal content within it “is of interest to everyone” (1991:254). Secondly, 
Hegel insists on trial by jury. Jury trials entrust the public with the power of judgement 
and ensure that legal proceedings are kept in the hands of the citizen. Instead of 
submitting the defendant to the verdict of an alien authority, jury trials ensure that the 
defendant is judged by members of his own community. As such, the defendant is less 
likely to reject or feel alienated from his punishment. Jury trials also necessitate that the 
language of law remain accessible. If this were not the case, the legal process could 
become the property of an elite class, which has the potential to “make itself exclusive 
even by the terminology it uses, inasmuch as this terminology is a foreign language for 
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those whose rights are at stake” (1991:258R). Law is applicable to all and should, 
therefore, remain intelligible to all. In other words, it should remain “universally 
known”.  
Although we could question the sense in which law can be ‘known’ 
universally48, it is worth noting at this point that Hegel’s demand for the transparency 
and publicity of law is something to be praised. Hegel is adamant that law, as the 
existing form of freedom, should be the intellectual property of everybody, not just the 
elite. This is an admirable claim, especially considering that neither the publicity of 
court proceedings nor trail by jury was a feature of the legal system in early nineteenth-
century Prussia. Hegel appreciates the necessity of a legal system that is accessible to 
all. In his book, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Dudley Knowles also applauds Hegel for 
his views on legal transparency. He writes, “it is worth emphasising, no doubt for the 
umpteenth time, the merit of [Hegel’s] contribution which lies in his insistence that, at 
all points … the legal system must be transparent and intellectually accessible to all 
citizens” (2002:282). This is an important point to bear in mind as we progress 
throughout this chapter.  
We have now established that, because law is freedom which is posited in an 
existing, contingent world, the legal code may differ from what is right in itself. 
However, we have also established that, despite its imperfections, the legal code is 
fundamentally rational and an essential part of freedom. For this reason, it is important 
that the legal code is intellectually accessible to all citizens and does not become the 
property of an elite class. I would now like to discuss how true conscience can reform 
                                                 
48
 Knowles claims that Hegel continually shifts between two different conceptions of knowledge: that of 
being familiar with a law and its demands, and that of understanding the rationality behind the law. The 
latter, he argues, is a philosophical type of knowledge, of which not all citizens are capable [1991:275-7]. 
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the legal code so that this discrepancy between right as it exists, i.e. law, and right in 
itself is minimised. In other words, I would like to describe how true conscience can 
reform the legal code so that it actualises freedom within the state. In order to do this, 
we first need to examine the idea that the legal code is a structure capable of reform. For 
this, we need to turn our attention to section 216.  
In paragraph 216, Hegel acknowledges that, because the law has to remain 
applicable to a continually developing and contingent world, the legal code will always 
be in need of improvement. Although the legal code aims to form a “complete and self-
contained whole”, the nature of the contingent world, with its changing environment 
and technological discoveries (what Hegel refers to as the “finite material”), entails that 
an infinite array of unprecedented situations may emerge; and these situations require 
legal regulation.49 He writes that, “the nature of the finite material in question leads to 
endless determinations … there is a constant need for new legal determinations” 
(1991:247). In other words, there is always a need for new laws. It is, therefore, naïve to 
think that the law can be codified exhaustively and remain immune to change (an 
attitude which Hegel describes as a “predominately German affliction” (1991:248R)). 
The legal code shall never reach full completion, because it exists in a world in which 
new situations continue to arise. As such, it is “mistaken to demand that a legal code 
should be comprehensible in the sense of absolutely complete and incapable of any 
further determinations” (1991:248R). The legal code is always in need of reform. 
However, this does not imply that, at any given time, the legal code should not be 
respected. Hegel believes it is misguided to assume that, because the legal code has not 
reached full completion, we should “wait for the missing part to be added” and ignore 
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the current laws (1991:248A). What we perceive as a ‘perfect’, future legal code will 
only ever be a “perennial approximation to perfection”, because it is in the very nature 
of a legal code that it can always benefit from future improvement (1991:248R). As 
such, we should always respect the current legal code we have as an objective 
manifestation of freedom, whilst acknowledging that, as the particular world changes, 
the legal code will adapt accordingly. In other words, “it is possible to imagine what is 
most glorious, exalted, and beautiful as being more glorious, exalted, and beautiful still” 
(1991:249A).  
So, Hegel is emphatic that the legal code is not a fixed structure and that, 
because we can always add new laws to it, the legal code is always capable of 
improvement. But in what manner do we add new laws to the legal code? When we are 
confronted with a new, particular situation, for which there is no current legislation, 
what are the criteria for implementing a new law? I wish to argue that, in order to 
produce new laws, the true conscience examines the rational principles which are 
already present in the legal code and adapts these principles to new situations. In other 
words, I wish to argue that true conscience  improves the legal code from within the 
legal code itself. Let us explore this idea further.  
In paragraph 216, Hegel claims that the production of new laws is the result of a 
process of “specialisation of universal principles which themselves remain unchanged” 
(1991:247). This is an important insight into the process of codification. Unsurprisingly, 
Hegel does not advocate the implementation of arbitrarily-selected laws; it is not the 
case that, when faced with the need for new legislation, we pick laws ‘out of the air’, or 
look to our formal conscience, whose content is entirely contingent (see chapter four). 
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 Providing that they fall into the category that which can be legislated. Hegel does not extend 
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There has to be a rational basis for the production of new legislation. And, in section 
216, Hegel clearly identifies that, in order to produce new laws, we look to the existing 
legal code itself. This is because the legal code within a truly ethical society is already 
fundamentally rational. And the universal principles inherent within it are the 
objectification of freedom in the existing world. It is by recognising such principles and 
‘specialising’ them, so that they apply to new situations, that the true conscience can 
implement new laws. Through this immanent critique, whereby true conscience 
recognises the rational basis of law and extends the legal code according to this internal 
standard, the existing legal code is changed to more accurately resemble the rational 
principles inherent within it.  
At this point, I think it is worth recognising the recent contribution that Thom 
Brooks has made to the discussion on legal codification within the Philosophy of Right. 
In his book, Hegel’s Political Philosophy, Brooks describes Hegel’s account of law as 
an “internalist natural law theory” (2009:87). Although the ‘natural law’ part of this 
definition is compatible with the reading I present in this thesis50, it is the ‘internalist’ 
aspect of Brooks’ description that is most relevant to our current discussion. When 
Brooks refers to Hegel’s account of law as ‘internalist’, he means that “the normative 
standard we use to evaluate law is internal, not external, to law” (Brooks 2009:87). In 
other words, the legal code contains within it its own rational principles by which we 
evaluate it. When we seek to extend the legal code and produce new laws, we look to 
these principles as our normative standard, and not an external authority. As such, we 
                                                                                                                                               
legislation to the “realm of inwardness”, i.e. matters of morality, as narrowly construed (1991:245).   
50
 Brooks’ definition of natural law is based on the following three assumptions: 1. that Hegel 
distinguishes between “law [Gesetz]“ and “true law [Rechtsgesetz]” (what I refer to as existing law and 
right in itself), 2. that the more accurately the law coheres with what is right in itself, the more rational the 
law, and 3. that this standard holds universally for all communities [2009:87].  
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develop our legal code through an understanding of the existing law and the normative 
principles within it. This is also what Hegel means when he says that “what is legal is 
therefore the source of cognition of what is right [Recht], or more precisely, of what is 
lawful [Rechtens]” (1991:244R). The legal code contains its own normative standards. 
By recognising these standards, and by ensuring that all laws aspire to meet them, we 
refine the legal code so that it conforms more accurately to its own, rational basis. In 
other words, we perform an immanent critique on the legal code.  
Thom Brooks’ perceptive suggestion that the legal code contains its own, 
internal normative principles supports my reading that, by comprehending the rational 
principles within the legal code, we can reform the legal code to correspond more 
faithfully to its own, rational essence. In an ethical society, we do not have to look 
outside the existing law in order to locate a normative standard for the production of 
new laws; the normativity is already inherent within the legal code itself. What Brooks 
refers to as “internal normative standards”, I equate to the “universal principles”, which 
Hegel describes in section 216. These universal principles are already inherent in the 
legal code. They have to be recognised and comprehended, but, once comprehended, 
can be specialised to apply to new and developing particular situations. The universal 
principles (or, to put it another way, the rational principles) within the legal code 
remain constant; but they give rise to new, particular legal determinations, which, as we 
have learned, are an essential feature of any legal code. Therefore, when we talk of 
‘new’ legal determinations, we are not describing laws with a new rationality, or a new 
normativity; we are simply describing new, particular determinations of universal 
principles that, up until now, had not been rendered explicit. As Thom Brooks remarks, 
“what is new in any determination of law’s normative content is only the implicit aspect 
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of this content that had not been recognised previously” (2009:89). The legal code is 
reformed so that the implicit, rational, universal principles within it are exposed. This, 
of course, is part of the immanent development of freedom within the Philosophy of 
Right, and reflects Hegel’s methodology whereby freedom “develops out of itself and is 
merely an immanent progression and production of its own determinations” (1991:59). 
In order to further his depiction of the immanent progression of the legal code 
within the Philosophy of Right, Brooks describes the law as a “seamless web” 
(2009:89). As we comprehend the universal principles inherent within the existing legal 
code and apply these to new laws, we ‘fill in the gaps’ in this web and embark on the 
task of codification. By creating new legal determinations and rendering explicit the 
implicit, rational principles of law, we help to bring our legal code closer to what is 
right in itself and resolve any internal contradictions that may be present within it. We 
help to make our legal code a more comprehensive, rational structure and play a part in 
the law’s “perennial approximation to perfection” (as we discussed previously) 
(1991:248R). As we have already established, Hegel is adamant that, because of the 
nature of the existing world, there will always be a need for new, legal determinations. 
To invoke Brooks’ metaphor, there will always be a need to “fill in the gaps of the legal 
web” (2009:89). An example that Brooks appeals to is the arrival of the internet. He 
writes that, “the internet as a new medium of global trade and interaction brought with it 
a corresponding recognition of additional legal gaps” (2009:89). There was no 
legislation in place to regulate the use of this technological development. However, in 
the absence of such legislation, it is misguided to look outside the existing legal code 
for normative principles; instead, we look towards the universal principles which are 
already inherent within existing law. As an example, Brooks writes that “in online trade 
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disputes, we might seek to validate certain laws and precedents in a manner similar to 
more conventional trade disputes” (2009:89). And if there is more than one rational 
principle which seems relevant, we could “appeal to one that brings out what we believe 
to be a superior understanding of justice immanent to our law that brings better 
coherence to our legal system as a whole” (2009:89). We will return to this quotation 
shortly, but, for now, it is important to establish that we locate our normative standards 
within the legal code itself. In this way, we develop the legal code so that it more 
accurately reflects the rational principles inherent within it. Once again, we can put this 
into the context of Hegel’s overall methodology: “to consider something rationally 
means not to bring in reason from outside in order to work upon it, for the object is 
rational in itself; it is the spirit of freedom … which here gives itself actuality and 
engenders itself in the existing world” (1991:60R).  
Let us recap briefly. We have established that, because the particular world is 
continually developing, the legal code will always be in need of new legal 
determinations. I have argued that, when implementing new laws, we do not look 
towards an external authority for normative principles; instead, we look to the universal 
principles which are already present within the existing legal code. Once we recognise 
and understand these universal principles, we can apply them to new, particular 
situations (this is what Hegel refers to as “specialisation” in section 216). In this way, 
we enrich our understanding of law and reform the legal code so that it conforms more 
faithfully to the rational principles within it; in other words, we perform an immanent 
critique on the legal code. I compared my thesis with Thom Brooks’ internalist reading 
of Hegel’s account of law. I argued that the “internal, normative standards”, which 
Brooks describes as part of the “seamless web” of law, are equivalent to the “universal 
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principles” which Hegel describes in section 216. When we are faced with 
unprecedented, particular situations which require legislation (the arrival of the internet, 
for example), we identify the relevant, universal principles and apply them accordingly. 
By doing so, we render explicit the rationality which is already implicitly contained 
within our legal system. We transform the legal code so that it conforms more 
accurately to what is right in itself.  
Of course, having established that new laws are simply a specialisation of 
universal principles which are already present within the legal code, the question of 
which universal principles we apply to new situations still remains. Let us take 
euthanasia as a relevant, if somewhat controversial, example. Advances in medical 
technology have made euthanasia possible, but there is a distinct lack of legislation to 
regulate its use. New legal determinations are required. However, the difficulty is 
deciding which universal principle to apply to this particular situation. For example, do 
we extend the principle that it is wrong to murder? Or do we extend the principle that 
every adult has the right to choose what happens to his/her body? It is not the case that 
we can apply both principles, for, in this particular instance, they are contradictory. 
Thom Brooks writes that, when selecting an appropriate, universal principle, we should, 
“appeal to one that brings out what we believe to be a superior understanding of justice 
immanent to our law that brings better coherence to our legal system as a whole” 
(2009:89). But, in my opinion, it is precisely this decision that poses a difficulty. In the 
euthanasia example, which universal principle is it that “brings out what we believe to 
be a superior understanding of justice”? In order to establish this, we first need to decide 
if, in fact, we believe that euthanasia is murder. Only then can we decide under which 
principle we subsume new laws. But this decision is not a mechanical one; on the 
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contrary, it reflects our subjective belief about life and when to end it. Codification is 
not a mechanical process. The decision of which universal principle we extend to new 
legislation is not prescribed; it is subjective. There is, therefore, an essential role for 
subjectivity within the creation of new laws; for, when implementing new legislation, 
we have to decide which universal principle best extends to an unprecedented situation. 
And it is precisely this, subjective decision which I attribute to the true conscience. True 
conscience has to think for itself which principle to select. I have always argued that the 
ability to make decisions for itself is an aspect of conscience which remains in ethical 
life, and here we can see this moment in its concrete context. I believe that, within 
ethical life, true conscience plays an essential role in the creation of new legislation. In 
deciding which principle to extend to new laws, true conscience exercises the moment 
of conscience that Hegel describes as “an exalted point of view” and “a sanctuary which 
it would be sacrilege to violate” (1991:164R). It consults its subjectivity and decides, 
for itself, how best to actualise the good. 
A necessary consequence of this is that true conscience may get things wrong. It 
is possible that, in deciding for itself how to best codify the law, true conscience gives 
itself an incorrect content. In other words, true conscience could make a mistake about 
which universal principle best applies to a new situation. But, in my opinion, this is not 
a reason to deny subjectivity a role in the codification process. Hegel is well-aware that 
codification is not an exact science, but is, on the contrary, “the work of centuries” 
(1991:313A). And, as Thom Brooks remarks, it is perfectly possible that “mistaken 
choices may be made along the way” (2009:89). What is important is that these 
mistaken choices are themselves reformed through further immanent critique, so that the 
legal code continues to resemble more accurately what is right in itself. In his book, 
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Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Dudley Knowles describes codification as a process of 
“trial and error” (2002:279). Very perceptively, he writes that “we should not believe 
that the sort of immanent criticism which takes us along the path of reason from reality 
to actuality is an exact science” (2002:279). Codification is an immanent yet essentially 
fallible process.  
Having outlined my reading of true conscience’s function in the codification of 
law, I would now like to reiterate briefly the ways in which the true conscience of 
ethical life is different from the formal conscience of morality. Throughout my thesis, I 
have argued that the formal conscience does not have a public role to play within ethical 
life. I based this claim on the fact that, because of its contingent nature, formal 
conscience can give itself any content and, moreover, it can insist that this content is 
infallible. Even though formal conscience contains the necessary moment of deciding 
for itself what is good, it does not combine this with the recognition of objective, ethical 
standards, which is a necessary part of the sphere of ethics. Instead, formal conscience 
simply insists on the supremacy of its own, subjective convictions. True conscience, on 
the other hand, recognises that the good is already present within existing, ethical 
institutions. Even though it decides for itself how to best actualise the good, it does not 
conceive of the good purely subjectively; instead, it acknowledges the good that is 
already present in the objective structures around it. Let us put this into concrete terms. I 
have argued that true conscience plays a part in the codification of law. This entails that 
true conscience think for itself about which universal principles to extend to new 
legislation. However, it also entails that true conscience recognise these universal 
principles as present within the existing legal code. True conscience regards the existing 
legal code as fundamentally rational, and it uses this rationality in order to develop new 
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laws. In other words, it performs an immanent critique on the law. This critique 
involves an essential moment of subjectivity – deciding which universal principles are 
relevant to new legislation – but it also requires the awareness that the good is already 
present in the existing legal code (albeit in an imperfect form). As such, true conscience 
locates its normative standard (what is right in itself) within the existing law itself. 
Codification therefore becomes a process by which the true conscience reforms the 
legal code so that it more accurately resembles its own, essential rationality; as opposed 
to changing the legal code to conform to an arbitrarily-selected, external ideal. This is 
what Hegel means when he says that true conscience wills what is good in itself.  
It is now possible to see why the formal conscience is unable to fulfil this 
function. Formal conscience could think for itself about new legislation, but there is no 
guarantee it would recognise the good as already present within the legal code. Unlike 
the true conscience, formal conscience does not will what is good in itself. This means 
that it does not endorse the objective structures of ethical life (which includes the legal 
code) as fundamentally rational. As such, there is no guarantee that the formal 
conscience would recognise the essential rationality already inherent within existing 
law. Formal conscience could implement any law, according to its own, purely-
subjective standards and, moreover, it could insist that this law is beyond criticism 
(perhaps with good intentions, as in the case of ‘intention’ and ‘conviction’, or with 
sinister motivation, as in the case of ‘irony’). As we have often remarked, this type of 
radical subjectivity ignores the rational which is already present within existing, ethical 
institutions and contradicts the value of ethics, which is the “comprehension of the 
present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which exists God knows 
where” (Hegel’s Preface 1991:20). Of course, it is perfectly legitimate to oppose the 
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existing legal system in a society which is not fundamentally rational; but, within true 
ethical life, this is both unnecessary and undesirable.  
Let us now return to the true conscience. Having presented my reading of true 
conscience within the legislative process, I would now like to examine its function 
within the concrete structures of the constitution of the state. In order to do this, it is 
first necessary to provide a brief outline of the state’s constitution. 
The constitution of the state (or the “political constitution”, as Hegel sometimes 
refers to it) contains three main powers: the sovereign, the executive and the legislative. 
These three powers are not arbitrary structures; instead, they represent “developed and 
actualised rationality” and follow necessarily from the concept of freedom itself 
(1991:287). The political constitution is rational, and it remains rational so long as it 
“differentiates and determines its activity within itself in accordance with the nature of 
the concept” (1991:305). In other words, the constitution remains rational so long as it 
embodies all of the necessary components of freedom. With this in mind, each part of 
the constitution has its own, logical significance. The sovereign is the moment of 
individuality, the executive is the moment of particularity (which, as we will see, 
mediates with the universal) and the legislative is the moment of universality. Whilst it 
is necessary that each power is differentiated and has its own, specific function, Hegel is 
adamant that no one power is self-sufficient. The three powers are distinguished simply 
as different moments of the same concept. They share an identity as components of 
freedom and they strive together for the same, universal end. It is in this context that 
Hegel refers to the state as an “organism”; each moment, with its own particular 
function, works with a united purpose as part of an interconnected whole (1991:290). 
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Therefore, it is a mistake for any one power to attempt to exist independently of the 
others.  
Interestingly, for the purposes of discussion, Hegel reverses the logical order of 
the constitutional powers and begins with an account of the sovereign. Hegel is an 
advocate of constitutional monarchy, which he describes as “the achievement of the 
modern world” (1991:308). The sovereign within the Philosophy of Right is a 
constitutional monarch, who provides the state with individuality. For Hegel, it is a 
necessary part of the concept of freedom that the state is represented by a single human 
being, without which the people would be a “formless mass” (1991:319). The monarch, 
who contains the moments of subjectivity and particularity, unites the state in one 
person. 
The sovereign has a role to play within the legislative process. However, the 
extent of the sovereign’s power in the law-making procedure appears to vary, depending 
on whether one reads the main text and Hegel's remarks in the Philosophy of Right, or 
the accompanying lecture notes.51 Knowles claims that, “the texts and the lecture notes 
together sustain two very different readings” (2002:329). What Knowles refers to as the 
“hard reading” in the main text describes the sovereign as having ultimate power in the 
legislative process. In section 279, Hegel refers to the sovereign as a power whose 
“simple self supersedes all particularities, cuts shorts the weighing of arguments 
[Gründe] and counter-arguments … and resolves them with its ‘I will’, thereby 
initiating all activity and actuality” (1991:317R). And, in section 300, Hegel refers to 
the sovereign as “the power of ultimate decision” (1991:339). On this reading, the 
                                                 
51The lecture notes (marked as Additions) in the Cambridge text (1991) are taken from an edition of the 
Philosophy of Right compiled by Eduard Gans and first published in 1833. The lecture notes themselves 
were compiled by H. G. Hotho, who attended Hegel’s lectures of 1822-1823, and K. G. von Griesheim, 
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sovereign exercises complete control over the implementation of new law; he can 
decide, perhaps against advice, to either support or dismiss new legislation. However, if 
one reads the lecture notes, what Knowles refers to as a “soft reading” is presented. On 
this reading, the sovereign performs more of a symbolic function. In the addition to 
section 279, we are told that the sovereign has “nothing more to do than to sign his 
name”, and, in section 280, we are informed that “all that is required in a monarch is 
somebody to say ‘yes’ and to dot the ‘i’” (1991:321A/323A). Here the sovereign is 
presented as a figurehead, whose presence is more-or-less a formality (Knowles 
compares such a sovereign to the current Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain). But, even 
though this reading presents the sovereign in a more symbolic role, Hegel is keen to 
emphasise the necessity of this symbol. Having claimed that the sovereign has “nothing 
more to do than to sign his name”, Hegel continues to claim that “this name is 
important” because it “constitutes the difference between the ancient and modern 
worlds” (1991:321A). Therefore, even on the ‘softer reading’, Hegel is not undermining 
or dismissing the need for monarchy.  
There is, clearly, a disparity between the readings presented in the main text and 
the lecture notes, but I don’t think this amounts to a debilitating ambiguity in Hegel’s 
account of the sovereign. I think the difference is one of emphasis, as opposed to a 
qualitative inconsistency. What Hegel describes in the ‘hard reading’ is the power 
available to the sovereign if required. The sovereign, as the head of state, has the 
potential to dismiss legislation if he so wishes (and, it has to be noted, with good reason 
and good conscience)52. However, as we learn in the ‘softer reading’, this display of 
constitutional power is seldom necessary in a society whose legislative and executive 
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powers are operating properly. In the addition to section 280, we are told that, “in a fully 
organised state, it is only a question of the highest instance of formal decision” 
(1991:323A my emphasis). And, in the same paragraph, it is also claimed that, “In a 
well-ordered monarchy, the objective aspect is solely the concern of the law, to which 
the monarch simply has to add his subjective ‘I will’” (1991:323A my emphasis). In 
other words, within a well-functioning, rational state, the sovereign will usually adopt a 
symbolic role, as is the case is many Western-European monarchies today. But, as we 
mentioned above, the symbolic role of the monarchy is still an essential feature of 
individuality in any modern state. I therefore maintain that the hard reading and the soft 
reading are compatible, but that the soft reading describes more accurately the function 
that the sovereign performs in a well-functioning, rational society.  
The second power in the political constitution is the executive, which includes 
the administration of justice, the police and the government authority (civil servants and 
ministers). The function of the executive is to mediate between the sovereign and the 
citizens. Hegel writes that this involves the “execution and application of the 
sovereign’s decisions” and the “continued implementation and upholding of earlier 
decisions, existing laws, institutions, and arrangements to promote common ends” 
(1991:328). In other words, the executive acts as an intermediary between the universal 
and the particular: it applies the universal law to particular cases, and it also helps the 
people understand how their particular lives relate to the universal. It does this in a 
number of ways; for example, the provision of education and public services, necessary 
regulation in the market economy, enforcement of law, etc. Members of the executive 
are appointed by the sovereign, but, importantly, admission into the executive is not 
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 See paragraph 285 [1991:327] 
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based on birth or financial status. Hegel is adamant that gaining a position in the 
executive relies on “knowledge and proof of ability” and that individuals are “not 
destined by birth or personal nature to hold a particular office” (1991:332). This ensures 
competence, but, more importantly, “guarantees every citizen the possibility of joining 
the universal estate” (1991:332). So, theoretically, within Hegel’s political constitution, 
every citizen is capable of attaining a place in the executive, provided that he can 
demonstrate the required skill and competence53.  
The third power in the political constitution in the legislative. I have argued that 
true conscience plays a fundamental role in the legislative power, so Hegel’s account of 
this structure is of particular relevance to my thesis. Hegel writes that the legislative 
power “has to do with laws as such, in so far as they are in need of new and further 
determination” (1991:336). As we discussed above, the legal code is always in need of 
further determination, and the legislative power is responsible for implementing new 
laws and reforming existing laws where necessary. As such, it helps to maintain a body 
of law that is both rational and relevant to the modern world. It is also responsible for 
determining which services the state can demand from the citizen.54 In order to function 
properly, the legislative power presupposes the constitution, of which it is a part. So, in 
this respect, the constitution “lies outside” the legislative power (1991:336). However, 
Hegel is also clear to point out that the constitution can itself be reformed through the 
legislative process (i.e. by constitutional means), by the “further evolution of the laws 
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 Bearing in mind, of course, that Hegel’s definition of ‘citizen’, in the strict political sense, does not 
include women, and, debatably, does not extend to the non-educated members of the immediate, 
agricultural estate (see Knowles 2002:333-5).  
54
 The right of subjectivity dictates that the state cannot demand particular services from the citizen (the 
citizen has the right to select his own vocation). Therefore, in a modern society, the only resource claimed 
by the state is money (the “universal aspect” of various professions) and, when necessary, military service 
[1991:338].  
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and the progressive character of the universal concerns of government” (1991:336). So, 
although the constitution is a precondition for the legislative power, the legislative 
power has the ability to amend the constitution. This is an immanent change, which 
occurs “over a long period of time” in a “peaceful and imperceptible manner” 
(1991:337A).  
The function of the legislative power is to produce new laws. Earlier in this 
chapter, I argued that the production of new laws was a process of specialisation, 
whereby the legislator recognised the universal, rational principles already present in 
the existing legal code and extended these to new legislation. I also argued that, in 
deciding which universal principles to select, the legislator exercised the right to 
subjectivity and referred the decision to his true conscience. For this reason, I claimed 
there was an essential and irreducible role for true conscience within the production of 
new laws. Having presented my reading that true conscience has a necessary function 
within the legislative process, the central question now becomes: who can partake in the 
law-making procedure? How widely is this moment of true conscience extended? Is it 
the case that every citizen can contribute to the implementation of new legislation, or is 
this a prerogative that Hegel restricts to a select few? In order to answer these questions, 
I will now explore the legislative structure in its concrete detail. I wish to argue that, 
whilst Hegel, understandably, does not include every citizen in the legislative 
procedure, he makes every attempt to ensure that the subjective convictions of all are 
accounted for in the representative structure of the estates and, thus, the public 
assemblies.  
There are three parts to the legislative process: the sovereign, the executive and 
the estates. The sovereign has the power of “ultimate decision” on whether a new law 
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should be passed; however, as we discussed above, this power is most likely to assume 
a symbolic function in a  modern, well-functioning society (1991:339). The executive, 
with its “concrete knowledge and oversight” of the particular world, advises the 
sovereign on new legislation and ensures that universal matters of law are applied 
correctly in particular cases (1991:339). The third part of the legislative power is the 
estates, and it is through the estates that participation in the legislative process is 
extended to the ethical community as a whole (the specifics of which we shall discuss 
shortly). The first two estates form the parliamentary body of the legislative process. 
They comprise the two houses of the public assembly, in which proposed legislation is 
discussed and voted upon. Hegel writes that the function of the estates is to “bring the 
universal interest into existence not only in itself but also for itself, i.e. to bring into 
existence the moment of subjective freedom … the views and the thoughts of the many” 
(1991:339). This is an important quotation, for it highlights the objective and subjective 
responsibilities of the estates within the legislative procedure. Let us discuss this 
further.  
When Hegel claims that the estates “bring the universal interest into existence in 
itself”, he means that, through public discussion and voting, the estates play their role in 
reforming the legal code so that it more accurately resembles what is right in itself. In 
other words, the estates help to implement laws that provide freedom with an objective 
reality and, in doing so, they actualise freedom within the existing world (as we 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter). However, Hegel also claims that the role of 
the estates is to “bring the universal into existence … for itself, i.e. to bring into 
existence the moment of subjective freedom … the views and the thoughts of the 
many”. By this, he means that, as well as implementing objectively valid laws, the 
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estates also give expression to the subjective freedom of the citizens, i.e. that, when 
discussing new legislation, the estates consider the subjective views of wider ethical 
community. This is significant, for, although Hegel often emphasises the right of 
subjectivity as a necessary component of freedom, in this quotation, he presents it as an 
irreducible moment of the law-making procedure (which is precisely what I argue in 
this chapter). Hegel specifically remarks that the estates take into consideration the 
wider, subjective consciousness when voting on new law. This is important, because, in 
order to remain faithful to the right of the subjective will55, which permeates the entire 
sphere of morality, it is not enough that the law simply exists; the citizen has to 
recognise the law as good and as part of his own essence as a free being. Without this, 
the law exists as an alien, authoritative structure. Recognising the law as good involves 
understanding the law and its rationality, but, crucially, it also involves being 
subjectively present when new legislation is implemented. This ensures that the law 
remains rational, and that the citizen continues to claim it as his own. Moreover, it 
implies that, over time, the legal code can be reformed so that it becomes more rational, 
i.e. so that it more accurately resembles the rational principles inherent within it. In the 
above quotation, in which we are told that the estates give expression to the “views and 
thoughts of the many”, Hegel makes direct reference to subjectivity as an essential 
moment of the legislative process. It is precisely this moment that I have described as 
true conscience’s role within the legislative body. When discussing and voting on new 
legislation, the estates take into consideration the subjective considerations of their 
citizens. In other words, it is in the public operations of the estates that the true 
conscience of the citizen is given expression. 
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 [1991:158]: “The right of the subjective will is that whatever it [the will] is to recognise as valid should 
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But, how is the moment of true conscience incorporated into the estates? Hegel 
insists that the subjective views of “the many” are given expression in the estates, but, is 
it the case that every citizen has a direct say in the implementation of new law? Can 
every citizen voice his opinion in the assembly? Well, unsurprisingly, the legislative 
process does not allow every citizen a direct voice in the law-making procedure; but, it 
does ensure that the subjective views of the wider ethical community are conveyed via a 
structure of representation. It is through the representatives of the estates that the citizen 
expresses his “views and thoughts” (1991:339). The idea of representation, in itself, is 
an accepted part of modern, political societies. But, of course, the extent to which the 
subjective considerations of the ethical community are present in the legislative will 
depend on how Hegel constructs this system of representation. Is the system of 
representation adequate? Does it provide every citizen with a channel (albeit an indirect 
one) to express his subjective opinion in the assemblies? It would be disingenuous to 
claim that Hegel’s representative system is without flaws, but, I wish to argue that, 
taken in its entirety, the representative system that Hegel describes allows a meaningful 
place for true conscience within the law-making procedure.  
In order to pursue my argument, I would now like to examine the structure of 
the estates and the representative system in more detail.  
Hegel divides civil society into three estates: the land-owners and agricultural 
workers, the tradesmen, manufacturers and businessmen, and the civil servants and 
public officials. However, it is only the first and second estates which make up the two 
houses of the public assembly, since the third estate – the civil servants and public 
officials – is part of the executive. The estates do not represent different social classes 
                                                                                                                                               
be perceived by it as good.” 
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as such, but they group together similar professions, all of which share a distinctive 
approach to work. Knowles recommends that we think of estates as “cultures”, since 
they denote “vertical sections of civil society, gathering together all those who earn 
their living on the land, or by way of trade, or as civil servants” (2002:271). Hegel 
claims that the three estates correspond to the moments of immediacy, reflectiveness 
and universality. The first estate, the land-owners and agricultural workers, is 
immediate, since this estate adopts a non-reflective and generally accepting attitude to 
what is given by nature. The members of this estate do not consider how they can 
transform nature, instead, they concern themselves with subsistence. The second estate, 
the tradesmen, manufacturers and businessmen, is reflective, since it views nature as a 
raw material to be transformed for monetary gain. Depending on their particular, chosen 
profession (small-scale baker, factory owner, etc.), the members of this estate reflect on 
how they can best use natural resources in order to maximise their financial return. 
Their relationship with nature is no longer immediate; instead, it is mediated by their 
own, particular will. The third estate, the civil servants and public officials, is universal, 
since its members concern themselves with the universal matters of government. 
Members of this estate are paid by the state.  
It is the first two estates that form the two houses of the public assembly. Hegel 
argues that separating the estates into two houses “provides an increased guarantee of 
mature decisions and eliminates the contingent quality which the mood of the moment 
possesses” (1991:351). The idea being that two estates with two distinctive mentalities 
will facilitate diverse deliberation and, eventually, arrive at a law suitable for all. But 
how does the system of representation function in the two houses? Hegel writes that the 
first estate can, “on the whole”, be divided into “the educated section and the estate of 
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farmers” (1991:345A). Unsurprisingly, the representatives of this estate are part of the 
“educated section”; male heads of important, wealthy, land-owning families. These 
representatives are not elected, but inherit the position via the institution of 
primogeniture. As such, parliamentary positions are retained within select families, and 
passed down through the generations. Admittedly, we could question whether the 
appointment of representatives through non-elected means has a place within a modern, 
ethical society. It is, without question, anti-democratic to qualify by birth for a 
parliamentary position. Hegel is aware of this, and, overall, does not support the idea 
that power can be inherited (recall his discussion of the executive: “Individuals are not 
destined by birth or personal nature to hold a particular office … The objective moment 
in their vocation is knowledge and proof of ability” 1991:332). His argument, in this 
case, is simply that hereditary representation secures the stable operation of parliament, 
and, therefore, best serves the interests of the members of the agricultural estate. He is 
keen to point out that primogeniture is “desirable only in a political sense”, and that this 
desirability is based on the fact that people of independent means, who are “not limited 
by external circumstances”, can devote themselves entirely to the matters of state 
(1991:346). The justification does not rest on “possession of resources” as such, but 
simply the idea that wealthy, heads of families can dedicate themselves more effectively 
to the service of parliament. 
Of course, given the unreflective nature of the agricultural estate, it is not 
surprising that Hegel advocates hereditary representation. If we take Hegel’s claim 
seriously, that the non-educated section of the first estate inhabits an “immediate ethical 
life” in which “reflection and the will of the individual play a lesser role”, it is 
inconsistent to expect elected representation (which relies on reflection). As it stands, 
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the “educated” and wealthy members of the estate – who understand the demands of the 
agricultural sphere – look after the interests of those who cannot reflect for themselves. 
So, perhaps it is not hereditary representation per se that we should be questioning, but 
Hegel’s claim that all agricultural work is immediate; in other words, perhaps we should 
question the logical categories of the estates themselves. This, of course, is a complex 
issue which falls outside the scope of my thesis, but, for now, it is worth considering 
that the problem with the first estate runs deeper than the method by which 
parliamentary power is transferred. The claim that all agricultural work is non-reflective 
is, itself, open for discussion. But, given that Hegel makes this claim and given that the 
(non-educated) members of the first estate are incapable of reflecting on elections or 
standing for parliament themselves, we have to take seriously Hegel’s claim that the 
agricultural estate is best served by hereditary representation; that the members of the 
assembly look out for and secure the interests of those who cannot speak for 
themselves.  
The method of representation is different in the second, reflective estate. Within 
this estate, members are granted the reflective capability to elect representatives (or 
deputies, as Hegel refers to them) who have the necessary “disposition, skill, and 
knowledge” to hold a parliamentary position (1991:349R). These representatives, who 
have proved themselves in the sphere of trade and industry, look out for the interests of 
the members of the second estate. However, unlike most current-day elections, 
representatives are not elected through geographical constituencies. Instead, they are 
elected by the members of the corporation, of which they are a member. It is, therefore, 
as a member of a corporation that the representatives of the second estate appear in the 
public assembly. Hegel is adamant that voting should take place via the corporation, 
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because, only in this way, does society “act as what it is” (1991:346). As we discussed 
in chapter four, it is only as a member of a corporation that the citizen attains an 
awareness of his universal identity56, and it is, therefore, only as a member of a 
corporation that the citizen should elect a representative. For example, when I vote in 
an election, I vote as a shopkeeper, or as a factory owner. Hegel claims that, in doing 
so, we embrace an electoral and parliamentary system that accurately reflects the 
rational structures of society. The alternative is to vote not as members of a corporation, 
but as “individual atomic units” (1991:346). But, for Hegel, this is an artificial method, 
which reflects only our generic status as persons, ignores the rational structure of the 
corporation and undermines the concept of ethical identity.  
Since representatives of the second estate are elected on their ability and 
knowledge and the requirement that they have “proved their worth in practice”, it is the 
case that every member of the second estate has the potential to be elected for 
parliamentary office (1991:349). Family heritage plays no (direct) role; all that is 
required is that the citizen demonstrates sufficient proficiency in his chosen profession. 
So, in this respect, Hegel ensures an inclusive representational structure in the second 
estate. However, it is also worth noting that the citizen’s choice of profession is itself 
subjective. Hegel is adamant that every citizen has a right to particularity, and this 
involves deciding, for himself, which profession to pursue (as we discussed in chapter 
five). It is for the citizen himself, and not the state, to decide on a vocation. So, given 
that the citizen can decide for himself which profession to enter, it follows that the 
citizen can also decide for himself to which estate he belongs. For example, if I opt for a 
career in the banking industry, I assign myself to the second estate; however, if I opt for 
                                                 
56
 [1991:347]: “it is within the sphere of his corporation … that the individual first attains his actual and 
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a life in agriculture, I assign myself to the first estate.57 Theoretically, one’s choice of 
estate is subjective. Of course, it would be naïve to pretend that circumstances do not 
play a role. Hegel is clear that a lot will depend on one’s background, where one is born 
and natural talents. However, Hegel still maintains that the ultimate criterion for 
membership of an estate is one’s own, subjective choice: “the question of which 
particular estate the individual will belong to is influenced by his natural disposition, 
birth and circumstances, although the ultimate and essential determinant is subjective 
opinion and the particular, arbitrary will, which are accorded their right, their merit, 
and their honour in this sphere” (1991:237). Since the membership of an estate rests on 
the subjective choice of profession, it is theoretically possible that the public assembly 
(at least the house of the second estate) is open to all.  
Let us recap briefly. Earlier in this chapter, we established that not every 
member of the estates has a direct voice in the public assembly. This is a fairly 
uncontroversial claim, since facilitating this would amount to direct democracy (and 
this is seldom endorsed as a feasible or desirable system). Instead of direct democracy, 
Hegel presents a version of representational democracy; however, the structure of 
representation varies depending on the estate. In the agricultural estate, representatives 
are appointed via the institution of primogeniture, but, in the estate of trade and 
industry, representatives are elected through their corporations. Since deputies in the 
second estate are elected on ability, it is the case that every member of the estate has the 
potential to sit in the public assembly. Moreover, since the choice of estate is, itself, a 
                                                                                                                                               
living determination as universal” 
57
 However, it remains questionable whether one could ‘reflect’ on the advantages of joining the 
‘unreflective’ estate, and then cease to reflect in one’s vocation. It appears as though the first, unreflective 
estate  (if, indeed, unreflective) is one into which people are born, and do not choose to enter. But this is 
open for discussion.  
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subjective decision, it is theoretically possible that every citizen can attain a seat in the 
parliament.  
I would now like to relate Hegel’s account of representation within the estates to 
the role of true conscience within the legislative procedure. As we establish above, it is 
the estates that incorporate the moment of subjectivity into the law-making process 
(they “bring into existence … the view and thoughts of the many” 1991:339). In other 
words, the estates bring the moment of true conscience into the legislative procedure. 
But, since each member of the estate is unable to voice his subjective concerns 
personally in the assembly, it is the responsibility of the representative to present these 
convictions on his behalf. Whether elected or non-elected, we must take seriously 
Hegel’s claim that the representatives of the estates convey to parliament the subjective 
considerations of their constituents. Hegel writes that, “[the estates] have a distinctive 
function of ensuring that, through their proper participation in [the government’s] 
knowledge, deliberation, and decisions on matters of universal concern, the moment of 
formal freedom attains its right in relation to those members of civil society who have 
no share in government” (1991:351). The representatives speak for those who have no 
direct voice in the assembly. Because the members of the second estate are elected 
through the corporations and have demonstrated outstanding ability in their chosen 
profession, it is ensured that the representatives will understand the needs and 
requirements of the citizens they represent. It is also the case that, despite the fact that 
the representatives of the agricultural estate are non-elected, they nevertheless 
appreciate the needs of the those who work on the land. This enables the citizens to trust 
their representatives; and trust is the foundation of the representative process. It is 
essential that members of the estates have faith in their representative and trust he will 
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provide expression to their subjective concerns in parliament. It is via this process of 
representation, based on trust, that the true conscience of the citizen is manifest in the 
estate. Through representation, the convictions of the ethical community as a whole are 
presented and discussed in the houses of the public assembly. Hegel describes this 
moment of representation in section 309: “I can trust a person if I believe he has 
sufficient insight to treat my cause [Sache] as if it were his own, and to deal with it in 
light of his own best knowledge and conscience” (1991:348A my emphasis). Here we 
have further textual evidence that true conscience has a role within the estates and, thus, 
within this section the legislative procedure.  
Let us return to the legislative procedure as a whole. Once parliament has voted 
on proposed legislation, it is the responsibility of the sovereign to either approve or 
dismiss the prospective law. He must “sign his name”, “say yes”, or “dot the ‘i’” before 
proposed legislation can become part of the legal code (1991:321,323,323A). Once the 
proposed legislation is approved by the monarch, it can become law. As such, it can 
become part of the objective manifestation of what is right in itself. Therefore, the 
sovereign has significant power (even if this power is more-or-less a formality in well-
established and well-run societies). Within Hegel’s account of the legislative, the 
sovereign has the final decision on whether proposed legislation is accepted as law. In 
other words, the sovereign has the final decision on whether legislation becomes part of 
the legal code, which is valid “in and for itself” (1991:327). However, this isn’t a 
decision taken lightly or selfishly. There is textual evidence in the Philosophy of Right 
to indicate that the moment of true conscience is present even at this final level of the 
legislative process. Hegel writes that, “the universal in and for itself … is present 
subjectively in the conscience of the monarch” (1991:327). The sovereign bases his 
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final decision on his true conscience. So, at this decisive level of legislative 
proceedings, the sovereign exercises the subjective right to consider, for himself, 
whether the proposed legislation conforms to what is right in itself. I have always 
argued that this right was not lost with the move into ethics. And here we can see that, 
not only does Hegel retain the right to conscience within ethical life, he awards it a 
place at the very top of the legislative process. The implementation of legislation relies 
on the true conscience of the sovereign.  
In this chapter, I have argued that it is the function of true conscience to reform 
the legal code so that it more accurately reflects what is right in itself. Because true 
conscience is an ethical phenomenon and wills what is right in itself, it recognises that 
the objective institutions of ethical life are already fundamentally rational. As such, 
when it seeks to reform the legal code, it does not look outside the existing law for 
arbitrary, external normative standards; instead, it identifies the rational principles 
which are already inherent within the legal code itself. In order to produce new laws, 
true conscience identifies which existing rational principle can be extended to new 
legislation. As such, it develops its understanding of the legal code and reforms it so 
that it conforms more faithfully to its own, rational essence. I have argued that the 
process of identifying which universal principle to extend to new legislation is 
essentially subjective and, therefore, a necessary role for the true conscience. However, 
given the concrete structure of the legislative process Hegel describes, it is impossible 
that every citizen is present in the public assembly to convey his moment of true 
conscience personally. Instead, this moment of true conscience is given expression by 
the representatives of the estates. These representatives ensure that the subjective 
convictions of their constituents are expressed in the public assembly. After public 
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discussion and deliberation, the proposed legislation is presented to the sovereign, who, 
once again consults his true conscience before deciding whether to implement new law. 
True conscience, therefore, is present throughout the entire legislative procedure. It is 
for this reason that I claim that true conscience has a meaningful and irreducible 
function within the legislative power in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel does not ignore 
this fundamental right to subjectivity; instead, he awards it an essential role in 
reforming the legal code so that every citizen can live in a state that remains faithful to 
the fundamental principles of freedom. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have presented a highly systematic reading of the dialectic of conscience 
within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which concentrated primarily on the Aufhebung of 
moral conscience into the true conscience of ethical life. I have argued that, with the 
transition into ethics, conscience retains the right of subjective freedom; it retains the 
right to give itself content and produce its own convictions. It continues to will the good 
for itself. However, since true conscience is a part of the ethical realm and recognises 
the good as already present in rational, objective institutions, willing the good for itself 
does not amount to determining the good purely subjectively. True conscience 
recognises that its own convictions are not beyond criticism. Instead, true conscience 
identifies the good which is already present in fundamentally rational (albeit imperfect) 
institutions and transforms the existing world so that it accords more accurately its own, 
rational essence. In other words, true conscience decides, for itself, the best way to 
actualise the good which is already inherent in society. In doing so, true conscience 
reduces the disparity between the actual and the existing state and wills what is good 
both in and for itself. 
 I have argued that this function is best understood as part of the legislative 
procedure. By developing new and reforming existing laws, true conscience helps to 
maintain a comprehensive legal code, which accurately reflects the principles of 
freedom. Because the existing world is continually developing, there will always be a 
need for new laws. I have argued that, when confronted with the need for new 
legislation, true conscience identifies a universal, legal principle which it believes best 
extends to the new, particular situation. In doing so, true conscience performs an 
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immanent critique on the legal code. Although true conscience cannot be directly 
present in the legislative assemblies, I have argued that Hegel’s system of political 
representation facilitates the expression of conscience within the deliberative process. I 
have also argued that true conscience is present in the sovereign and, thus, that it fulfils 
a function in the final and definitive stage of the legislative procedure.  
 I believe that, having presented true conscience as an irreducible part of the 
legislative process, I have refuted claims that Hegel allows insufficient room for 
conscience within the political realm. I have, therefore, further disarmed that charge that 
Hegel’s state is based on authoritarian structures.  
 Having described the logical structure and role of true conscience within Hegel’s 
state, we might like to reflect on whether this corresponds to the conception conscience 
in our current society. We certainly value the right to refer decisions to our conscience 
and to produce our own convictions; and never more so than when we wish to influence 
current or future legislation. There are various ways in which we convey our subjective 
convictions to our political representatives: we partake in peaceful protests, write to our 
MP, make use of the free press, etc. In all these cases, we exercise our right to 
determine for ourselves how best to actualise the good, whilst maintaining a respect for 
law. I also believe that, when we consider future legislation, we obtain our ethical 
standards from within the legal code itself. To this extent, we value our current legal 
code as a comprehensive and fundamentally rational structure. For example, when 
considering proposed legislation on issues such as identity cards or surveillance, we 
appeal to existing laws on privacy. And, when considering more controversial 
examples, such as euthanasia, we appeal to existing laws on personal autonomy or 
murder. Our convictions, to this extent, are guided by existing legislation; and this 
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demonstrates a fundamental awareness that our current legal system goes some way to 
securing the good. For this reason, I argue that true conscience, as described in the 
Philosophy of Right, is at work in our current society. 
 However, I believe there are also instances in which we exercise our conscience 
in such a way that threatens the relationship between the individual and the state. For 
example, when we partake in violent or politically-obstructive direct action, or when we 
indulge so far in political satire that we render the entire political system ridiculous. In 
the first case, we demonstrate an intentional disregard for law and, in the second, we 
purposely seek to undermine the political community. I am not claiming that these acts 
aren’t justified; but perhaps they suggest that our ethical identity (and therefore our 
ethical system itself) is not as developed as that which Hegel describes in the 
Philosophy of Right. There are still occasions in which we actively seek to destroy the 
connection between the individual and the universal. In other words, there are still 
occasions when we consider it necessary to exercise our formal conscience and put our 
subjective opinions beyond objective criticism.  
 Having said this, I think that, generally, we recognise our society as 
fundamentally rational, and we view with caution those who seek to elevate their 
subjective convictions beyond reproach (unfortunately, at present times, we do not have 
to look far for examples of misguided, moral heroism). In this respect, we adopt an 
ethical (as opposed to a moral) standpoint, and claim that the right to conscience is more 
than the right to adhere unreservedly to our convictions. However, because society has 
the potential to both progress and regress to various stages of freedom, it is essential to 
recognise the different forms of conscience and the unique function they have in 
society. For this reason, I believe that the dialectic of conscience within Hegel's 
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Philosophy of Right can serve as an enlightening backdrop for our discussions on 
conscience in the twenty-first century.   
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